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Editor’s Note
Years ago, Dr. Laina Farhat-Holzman joined the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations as a California scholar expert in Persian history.
An incisive thinker, armed with extensive knowledge of the history of civilization, Laina
possesses a critical mind that never stops challenging received explanations for the events
humanity has faced, and the patterns and meanings of our sojourn over the past several
thousand years. She has worked professionally for many years as an editor and professor,
a writer of books that probe the intersection of the currents of history and religion in Iran
and elsewhere, a skilled debater on topics of the day in both the U.S. and abroad, and a
weekly author of commentary on current events. An indefatigable world traveler, she
has also been for many years a Bay Area leader on the analysis of global concerns.
Soon after we met, Laina and I teamed up, and together we have headed the editorial
section of this journal. For the felicitous results, she must be given all the credit.
At the annual ISCSC meeting held in beautiful Monmouth University, New Jersey, early
this past summer, Laina announced that she was leaving editorship of the journal in order
to concentrate more intensively on her opinion columns, which are followed nationally
and internationally and which appear at least twice a week in Northern California
newspapers, and on her ever-expanding series of scholarly books.
Over the summer she reminisced, writing down some of her key thoughts about these
years at the CCR. They are published below.
On behalf of the members of the Editorial Board, the international society, and the many
dozens of authors you have mentored over these years, and in recognition of continuous
and extensive labor offered by you without any financial recompense whatsoever, my
observation is: thank you, Laina. What the CCR has become – the journal of record on
comparative civilization and the intellectual flagship of the ISCSC – would have been
impossible without your cheerful leadership and active intellectual architecture over the
past decade and a half.
Joseph Drew
Washington, D.C.
Autumn, 2014
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Memories of an Editor
I recently stepped down after fifteen years as an editor of the Comparative Civilizations
Review. This was an enjoyable but heavy task, and one that I will certainly miss.
When I first signed on as an editor under the leadership of Joe Drew, we were in complete
agreement about what sort of journal we wanted to see. Both of us had other writing and
editing experience over the years, and for us both, we believed that even scholarly articles
should be readable. Too many scholarly journals are so rigorous that it requires real
motivation to wade through some of the overly-footnoted materials. We realized that
scholars need to publish in refereed journals for their career promotion, but at the same
time, readers should also be considered.
Editing Comparative Civilizations Review brought another problem that single-issue
journals do not have: multiple disciplines. Our readers are not necessarily reading articles
in their own areas of expertise. We had to make the assumption that our intended
audience was liberally educated, able to make sense of articles not overly specialized.
Our mission was to explore those issues that extended over the globe and throughout
history.
Producing our journals twice a year required a non-ending process of soliciting papers
(many from our annual conferences), sending them out for peer review, getting the
reviews, and tactfully guiding the authors into making the needed corrections to their
manuscript (or suggest that they submit to another journal). We then needed to get a
revised paper back from the author in a timely fashion; edit it (often three editors carry
out this task for each paper), then create a final document that would go to the publishers.
The publishers would typeset the articles in the journal, and then Joe and I would go
through the laborious task of line by line editing to make certain everything was correct.
We did this twice each year, year after year, for the past 15 years. We hope that the
journal was and continues to be read and enjoyed by not only our own members, but
others through libraries and now online, as well.
Several colleagues were a particular delight to work with--most especially, the late Matt
Melko, who is my model for a perfect scholar and gentleman. He was an early and
scholarly believer that mankind’s proclivity to general warfare has greatly declined. (His
work on warfare offers astonishing statistics that make peace a larger part of the human
experience than we might imagine.) Melko was also a superb Peer Review editor; he
seemed to know everybody--a roster of extremely diverse experts.
Another colleague that I particularly enjoyed was the late Steadman Noble, who became
a scholar late in his life. He worked as a civil engineer in Washington, DC, and, upon his
retirement, he seemed to have moved into the Library of Congress and read everything!
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol71/iss71/18
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Steadman was our best specialist on prehistoric mankind. He claimed to be bored by
anything later than 300 AD, and definitely preferred the Caves of Lascaux to ancient
Rome. An example of pure Steadman can be found in the Spring 2001 journal: “How
Humans Domesticated Themselves, Invented Agriculture and Became Civilized.”
In that same journal, by the way, is my own offering on how a work of literature can
become the vehicle to a nation’s identity: “The Shahnameh of Ferdowsi: An Icon to
National Identity [Iran].”
One of the most fascinating series we published was by Robert Duncan Enzmann and
Donald Thomas Burgy: “Reading Europe’s Paleolithic Writing.” We had several editorial
meetings to decide whether to print this series because it was so original, and I am happy
to say that we took a chance. The fact that one of the authors was a code breaker by trade
was a deciding factor. See the Fall 2004 issue for one of these articles.
Until we got our journals online (thanks to Editor Connie Lamb and her school, Brigham
Young University), we had materials that only a dedicated few were able to read. Now
we are available to what I believe will be a greatly growing audience.
Best of luck to my replacements. I will happily keep reading.
Laina Farhat-Holzman
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Can Civilization Save Us?
A Study in Civilizational Analysis and Legal History
Toby E. Huff
thuff@fas.harvard.edu
Let me say at the outset that I have no illusions that I can provide solutions to all the
threats--climate change, ecological destruction, civil wars, terrorism, etc.--that we face
today, because we civilizationalists operate at a high level of analysis.
On the other hand, I do believe that we can identify a number of civilizational complexes
that emerged only in the West and that will be indispensable for guiding whatever efforts
can be made to ameliorate the threats we face.
Civilizational Analysis
Just to be clear about the level of analysis with which I operate: I mean by the term
civilizations social entities that tend to be multi-ethnic, often multi-lingual and even multinational but which share underlying religious, legal, and philosophical assumptions.
Consequently such formations have very large-scale coherence. The fundamental
symbolic and institutional structures of such entities produce transnational effects that
give both coherence and developmental design to the whole configuration. From this
point of view, "A civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain
number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole.”1 As
Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss put it,
social phenomena that are not strictly attached to a determinate social organism
do exist; they extend into areas that reach beyond the national territory or they
develop over periods of time that exceed the history of a single society. They
have a life which is in some ways supranational.2
I take Europe as the exemplar of that kind of civilizational formation. Other examples of
this kind of formation would obviously include the Islamic world, China, Indian, and
Russian Orthodox civilization. Of course there are many mixed cases but here I only
want to set out the extraordinary consequences of the European civilizational
development, set against the background of the divergent developments of Islam and
China.

1

Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss "Note on the Notion of Civilization,” Social Research, vol. 38, no.
4 (1971): 809-813, at p. 811.
2
Durkheim and Mauss, ibid, p. 810.
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The Formative Period
During the High Middle Ages, especially the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Europe
experienced a great transformation that put it on an entirely different footing than any
other part of the world. This was above all a great legal revolution that laid the
foundations for what are now seen as modern political institutions.3 These include the rise
of parliamentary democracy, the foundations of what we know as due process of law, the
very idea of elective representation in all forms of corporate bodies, and not least of all,
the legal autonomy of cities and towns. All of these innovations contributed to the
establishment of elements of constitutionalism that became the hallmark of modernity.4
Moreover, this broad legal transformation laid the foundations for the rise and
autonomous development of universities that enabled the unfettered pursuit of modern
science that has continued to the present. Furthermore, the structural stability of these
new institutions gave a new measure of predictability, providing a new foundation for
economic development that has been called the "commercial revolution" of the thirteenth
century.5 This legal revolution is the too-little-discussed foundation for the rise of modern
capitalism as well.
At the center of this development one finds the legal and political principle of treating
collective actors as a whole body--a corporation, or corporate entity. This is the
fundamental basis of all forms of legal autonomy--that is, the legal autonomy of cities
and towns, and professional associations such as doctors and lawyers, but also charitable
organizations and, of course, the foundation for the legal autonomy enjoyed by different
kinds of business and commercial organizations. The now infamous recent Supreme
Court decision in the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission is clearly based on
this early modern legal notion of legally autonomous entities referred to as corporations.
But let me add just one more aspect of the legal revolution that has been completely lost
from view by all of our fashionable digital presentism. That is, consider for a moment
what the idea of legal autonomy means in the sphere of government and legislation. It
3
This assessment was first announced by Harold Berman in his landmark study, Law and Revolution. The
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
4
I discussed these different legal systems in The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the
West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2003), especially chapters 4 and 7. I am also
drawing from a manuscript in progress, "Legal Evolution: European vs Islamic Law," in two parts.
5
See Raymond De Roover, "The Commercial Revolution of the Thirteenth Century," in Enterprise and
Secular Change: Readings in Economic History, edited by Frederic C. Lane and Jelle C. Riemersma
(American Economic Association, 1953): 80-851947; Robert S. Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of
the Middle Ages, 950-1350 (Cambridge University Press, 1977)1976, and now van Bavel, "The Medieval
Origins of Capitalism in the Netherlands," BMCN/LCHR (2010) v. 125: 45-79, especially pp. 60-66;
idem, Manors and Markets. Economy and Society in the Low Countries, 500-1600 (Oxford University
Press, 2010), pp. 93-99; and Tina De Moor, "The Silent Revolution: A New Perspective on the
Emergence of Commons, Guilds, and Other Forms of Corporate Collective Action in Western Europe,"
International Review of Social History 53 (2008): 179- 212.
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means that some public body--some corporate entity, some group of citizens--is capable
of composing and promulgating new laws that transcend Biblical injunctions, customary
law, Quranic legal prescriptions, or even edicts issued by an Emperor in China. But of
course, that power of autonomous legislation did not exist in Chinese, Islamic, or Indian
law of the early modern period. The same applies to Russia. This was an entirely
European developmental outcome.
In short, any adequate appreciation of the medieval legal revolution in Europe puts before
us the realization that the vast landscape of freedoms and powers of modern institutions,
including the idea of due process of law, are European medieval inventions--spelled out
by the canonists--without parallel anywhere else in the world. Those innovations stand
at the very heart of what we think of modern political institutions, especially
parliamentary democracy, constitutionalism, election by consent, and not least of all, the
institutional structures protecting freedom of thought and expression. Accordingly, I
want to set out a brief compass of the nature of institutional innovations so that we can
see the connection with the present moment. Once having grasped those connections, we
might not be as pessimistic about the future of "civilization" or the putative "decline of
the West."
Due Process of Law
Now let me say just a few words about the idea of “due process of law”--something I
believe all Americans and Europeans consider vital to the whole political process.
Although this development drew heavily on the tradition of the rediscovered Roman Civil
Law (Corpus Juris Civilis), it was the canonists--and some civilians--whose creative and
innovative work defined the whole process. What the European medievals did was to
spell out just what due process meant, how it was to be applied, when, and to whom. By
the end of the twelfth century, this new system had been formally articulated as the ordo
iudiciarius (the system of legal procedure).6
Perhaps the first to define the idea of due process was Stephen, Bishop of Tournai
(1138-1203). According to him,
The defendant shall be summoned before his own judge and be legitimately called
by three edicts or one peremptory edict. He must be permitted to have legitimate
delays. The accusations must be formally presented in writing. Legitimate
6

Among others see Kenneth Pennington, "Law, Procedure of" Dictionary of the Middle Ages, Vol. 7
(1986), esp. pp. 504-505; idem., The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the
Western Legal Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); idem., "Due Process..."; Susan
Reynolds, "The Emergence of Professional Law in the Long Twelfth Century," Law and History Review
21 #2 (2003): 347-366; and James Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, chapter 6 (London: Longman, 1995);
Linda Fowler-Mangerl, Ordo Iudicarius vel ordo iudiciarius.
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witnesses must be produced. A decision may be rendered only after someone has
been convicted or confessed. The decision must be in writing.7
It is also notable in our context that virtually all records, whatever they be--the initial
complaint to the court (the libellius), summonses, testimony, reports or contracts--were
presented in writing and filed away. These records became part of the official court
records, kept by proctors or notaries in an official location, always bearing the signature
or Seal of the official acting head of the court; not as in the case of Islamic law, irregularly
filed by the judge or his clerk in the "qadi's diwan,"8 his private files usually maintained
in his home. So insecure were such documentary arrangements in Islamic law that until
the last decade of the twentieth century, specialists in Islamic law had concluded that such
records did not exist. Even so, very few have ever been recovered, and it was only with
the Ottomans after the sixteenth century that a building was actually designated in cities
and towns for that purpose.9
To amplify the view of Stephen of Tournai stated above, it should be noted that European
legal doctrine (that was articulated by scholars in legal treatises, established in court cases
and declared in Papal decretals), expected that every trial must involve a plaintiff and a
defendant, advocates for those two parties, the appearance of witnesses, the presence of
court recorders such as clerks, proctors and notaries who record the names of those
present at the trial, what was said, and so on.10 This was established legal procedure by
the end of the twelfth century-- all worked out by legal scholars who were attached either
to the Papal court or to the schools and emerging universities. It was not just worked out
as a matter of "customary practice" but ensconced in major textbooks used all across
Europe from the thirteenth century onward-- Tancred's Ordo iudicale [1214-16] and
Durand's Mirror for Judges (Speculum iudiciale) [ca.1271]). There were also Papal letters
and official statements (concilia) circulated across Europe and adopted as mandatory by
local courts.
What is notable about this new court procedure was that it was a man-made set of
consensual ordinances. Though it had earlier roots in Roman law, and though some
jurists who articulated its contours believed that it had earlier foundations (if not origins)
7

As cited in Pennington, "Due Process," p. 20. and Linda Fowler-Magerl, Ordo iudiciorum vel ordo
iudiciarius (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1984), p. 27.
8
Wael B. Halaq, "The 'qadi's diwan (sijill)' before the Ottomans," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies 61 (1998): 415- 436
9
Hallaq Wael B. Shari'a: Theory, Practice, Transformation (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2009), p. 343n9. Even in 20th century Yemen, there are reports of individuals involved with court
proceedings who, having been presented to a judge, lost the documents because the judge subsequently
died. Such documents seem to be more private than public. Brinkley Messick, "Literacy and the Law:
Documents and Document Specialists in Yemen," in Law and Islam in the Middle East edited by Daisy
Hilse Dwyer, (New York: Bergin & Garvey, 1990), p. 64.
10
James Brundage, "The Practice of Canon Law," in Medieval Origins, chapter 10; and the sources in the
previous note. Tancred: "the service of advocates is essential in lawsuits," as cited in ibid, p. 171.
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in Biblical stories of Adam and Eve being tried by God, it was a set of juridical
conventions, restated and refined by a broad group of scholars and Popes in the second
half of the twelfth century. Numerous letters by Pope Alexander III as well as Pope
Innocent III contributed to the definition of due process.11 What this tells us is that the
European medievals were constantly engaged in the process of legal innovation, of
refining and articulating the rules and procedures that they felt necessary for the smooth,
efficient and just working of their legal system.
At the same time Romano-canonical procedure specified that each court was meant to run
according to a calendar--once the plaintiff's complaint was presented, the presiding judge
would establish a date for a hearing along with specified sessions for the hearing of the
testimony of witnesses. Although legitimate delays were granted to those who applied,
all proceedings were determined by a court schedule, not the whim of the defendant.12
Furthermore, when a limited number of witnesses were scheduled to be heard (during
three or fewer sessions), the opposing advocates prepared a list of questions to be put to
the witnesses by the judge (or official examiner) for close questioning individually and in
private. Every effort was made by the interrogatories provided to the judge and by the
opposing attorneys to separate direct evidence from hearsay testimony. The witnesses
were sworn to tell the truth "the whole truth and nothing but the truth about everything
they knew in connection with the action in which they were to testify."13 They were also
cautioned to testify only about events they had seen and heard, "but not about what they
believed or thought they heard from others."
An example of such close questioning comes from the Canterbury Court of England in
the thirteenth century in the case of Master Robert de Picheford concerning the ownership
of a church in the Diocese of Lincoln. The interrogatories submitted on behalf of the
defendant Thomas de Nevill stated,
First, the examiners are to hear what the witnesses say of their own motion and to
enquire as to the source of their information about each of the articles [submitted
by Master Robert]. If they say that Robert was in possession of the church of
Houghton as rector by himself or others from 26 July to 3 August 1268, they are
to be asked whether they know this from seeing, hearing, knowledge, belief or
public report. If they say seeing, ask where, when, the nature of the possession
whether natural or civil, mental or physical, and how long before the feast Robert
possessed the church and whether continuously or at intervals.14
11

Pennington op. cit., pp. 13-17.
Richard Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1974), chapters 4 and 5.
13
Brundage, Medieval Origins (2008): 436.
14
Norma Adams and Charles Donahue, Selected Cases from the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Province of
Canterbury c. 1200-1301 (London: The Selden Society, 1981), p. 269.
12
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In another case from the same court, the witnesses were to be asked, "how they know
[that the defendant's submissions to the court] are true, who made the proposition on
behalf of the monks, before whom, the year, month, day, hour, place, those present, etc;
what tithes were at stake, how they happened to testify; whether they are clerks or
laymen."15 As I suggested earlier, you will not find this kind of a clearly articulated due
process of law in Islamic, Chinese, Indian,16 or indeed, Russian17 law during the period
we are talking about.
Second, I need to point out that these elements of due process that evolved in Europe over
the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were also applied to the prince and the
Pope alike. In contrast, we need to notice that there were no equivalent legal structures
and protocols that could be called upon to restrain czars, sultans, emirs and emperors in
the other civilizational areas of the world. The legal apparatus and legal conceptions such
as these outside Europe were simply absent. The developments we are talking about are,
of course, examples of what we mean by the imposition of the rule of law, not the rule of
men. That process is never complete and is ongoing. But the European medievals made
huge strides in that direction.
Let me reiterate that this new system of law with its clear definition of due process and
other legal innovations was carried all across Europe because the Church set up
ecclesiastical courts wherever it went. Beyond that, civilian lawyers were trained in the
same system because they might be called upon to defend a case in an ecclesiastical court
and because the new legal system was being recognized as the ius commune, the common
law of Europe.
Islamic Law
Now to make these comparative civilizational contrasts clearer, let me add here just a few
comments on Islamic law and its very different history. While it is true that there were
customary rules governing Islamic legal procedure, the process tended to be highly
informal, even though it began by translating a plaintiff's claim into the language of
Islamic law by the judge. A plaintiff could approach the qadi very informally, perhaps
walking with him in the qadi's court yard, while explaining his religious problem. The
15

Ibid, p. 211, the Case of The Prior and Monks of Stogursey c. John de Winton, Rector of Over Stowey,
Diocese of Bath and Wells, 1271-1272.
16
See Donald R. David, The Spirit of Hindu Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and
Timothy Lubin, Donald R. Davis, and Jayanth Krishnan, Hinduism and Law: An Introduction (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
17
On the very belated development of Russia's legal system, see Harold Berman, "The Rule of Law and
the Law-Based State (Rechtsstaat)" with Special Reference to the Soviet Union," pp. 43-60 in Toward the
”rule of law” in Russia?: Political and Legal Reform in the Transition Period, edited by Donald D. Barry
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992).
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judge would then, perhaps with the assistance of this clerk, translate the petitioner's
complaint into legal language necessary for a formal hearing. This stands in contrast to
the European situation where nothing could be done before seeking the counsel of an
attorney, specifying the justiciable issues. For as medieval legal scholar Dorothy Owen
put it, in the later middle ages of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
a clerk could not resign his benefice, appoint an official deputy, or conduct an
election, a layman could not begin or continue a cause in an ecclesiastical court,
or bring a will to probate if he did not employ a legally qualified proctor to draw
up and present the appropriate documents. A bishop's or archdeacon's affairs
could only be carried on with legal advice from men skilled in the law (iurisperiti).
A royal government needed to be represented in diplomatic business by men
skilled in the Roman (civil) law...18
The rules of Islamic procedure, however, used throughout the classical and early modern
period tended toward customary procedure, and were entirely based on Quranic
injunctions. Consequently, even later Islamic manuals of legal procedure contain no
reforms or innovations,19 nothing like the European innovations codified in the thirteenth
century.
Most notable of missing conceptions was that of the defense attorney--such a conception
did not exist in Islamic20 or for that matter in Chinese law.21 Consequently, the vital
process of cross-questioning all witnesses (as noted above) did not exist in Islamic law.
To be sure, judges did question witnesses, but it tended to be less than impartial as the
judge ended up siding with one side or the other with the judge explicitly rejecting the
witness testimony or other evidence presented. Of course there was no jury system. The
judge in effect served as judge and jury (or prosecutor and jury) in simple and complex
cases.
One of the consequences of this absence of a defense attorney, especially in criminal
cases, was that the judge generally accepted police reports without questioning by
counsel. This attitude persisted in many Muslim countries all the way to the twentieth
century, and one can see it operating in late twentieth century Afghanistan. Looking at
several dozen cases ruled on by the highest courts in Afghanistan in the early 1970s--long
after the system had been (incompletely) displaced by a European code system--one finds
the judges rarely summarizing or carefully evaluating the evidence presented by police

18

Dorothy Owen, The Medieval Canon Law. Teaching, Literature and Transmission (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,1990), p. 2.
19
See the manuals of Nawawi, al-Mawadi, Ibn Rushd, and the Almamgiriyah.
20
Tyan, Historie d'Organisation Judiciare en Pays d'Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2nd edition,1960), p. 267.
21
Derk Bodde, "Basic Concepts of Chinese Law," in Law in Imperial China;, and Geoffrey
MacCormack, The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996).
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authorities, or that of other witnesses. Such evidence is simply accepted at face value,
with all attention given to the question of punishment.22
Likewise, we have all heard of the recent decisions of Egyptian judges, condemning to
death, in one case over 500 accused, and in the other 600 accused, obviously without
proper procedures or careful weighing of evidence.23 Moreover, the Egyptian system was
reformed and reorganized following European Civil law protocols a century ago, but
inculcating Western legal culture and sensibilities maybe something quite different.
It was possible in Islamic law for a plaintiff or witness to be represented by a wakil, an
"agent," but that agent need not be formally trained in law. A brother with no legal
training can represent a sister, and in fact, suppress the sister's actual testimony.24 Nor was
there any punishment for perjury.25 Put differently, there was no conception of "a member
of the bar" who was a sworn official of a professional body or association.26 There were
no independent associations of legal or, for that matter, medical practitioners.
On the other hand, "professional witnesses" (shâhids) were used from early times, and in
some countries, all the way into the twentieth century. These were individuals selected
by the judge and examined for their religious purity (adl). Then they were certified to
supply and verify information presented to an Islamic court.27 Their testimony was not
subjected to cross-questioning. Moreover, if a judge were dismissed or retired, then his
professional witnesses were also dismissed, and all disputed cases in which they testified
could then be re-litigated.28

22

Richard C. Casplar, editor, A Collection of Afghan Judicial Decisions. Photostatic copy, 1976.
New York Times April/May 2014.
24
This happened in the case of Salim vs. 'Abd al-Rahmân in Morocco in 14th century; see David Powers,
Law, Society and Culture in the Maghrib 1300-1500 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
chapter 1.
25
Joseph Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, New York: Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 159.
26
Tyan, "Judicial Organization," p. 257.
27
Jeannette A. Wakin, Function of Documents in Islamic Law (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1972). "Certified witnesses" were still used in Afghanistan in the1970s and in Pakistan today in
some courts. The principle is to examine the witness, not the evidence he gives. Cf. Richard C. Csaplar, A
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28
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China
In this short presentation I cannot give more than a brief hint at the differences between
Western and Chinese law.29 As noted earlier, Chinese law had no place for formally
trained attorneys, and anyone who attempted to enter into the legal deliberations of second
or third parties was considered a legal trickster. The conception of a formal trial with
defense attorneys, public witnessing, and public announcement of trial verdicts was
unknown. As more recent scholarship has shown, Chinese "court opinions" were
published privately, not by an official court. They "were not court verdicts themselves
but documents justifying the verdicts with reasoned opinions."30 The problem here, as in
the Afghan case law mentioned earlier, is that without the intervention of advocates for
the defense and a tradition of carefully weighing all the evidence, judges give much higher
credence to the views of the police and other public officials; the result is rule of men, not
the rule of law as established by standard (and contestable) legal procedure. This was
why the Europeans developed the ordo iudiciarius, legal procedure that became due
process.31
Just how this lack of standard defense procedures has been carried over to the twenty-first
century in China can be seen in the murder trial of Madame Gu, the wife of a high Chinese
official, Bo Xilai, who had been dismissed from office.
Bo Xilai was removed as the top official in a major Chinese city (Chongqing), then
removed from the Communist Party. The big story, however, was his wife, Madame Gu,
who was accused of murdering a British businessman. The trial, which seems to us an
exceedingly brief show trial in Stalinist fashion, lasted barely one day. Madame Gu and
her co-defendant had their own attorneys replaced by state-appointed officials so that in
effect she had no defense. Very little evidence was presented, all of it produced by
government officials in secrecy, and none of it could be challenged or debated in court.
Moreover, any kind of recording or note-taking was expressly forbidden by court
officials. Consequently it is far from clear what was actually said during the trial or how
the evidence against Madame Gu was collected. All sorts of questions were left
unanswered, but public interest was so strong that officials felt compelled to add more to

29

I have discussed traditional Chinese law in The Rise of Early Modern Science, chapter 7. See also the
references in note 21.
30
Jiang Yonglin and Wu Yanhong, "Satisfying Both Sentiment and Law. Fairness-Centered Judicial
Reasoning as Seen in Late Ming Casebooks," p. 31 in Charlotte Furth, Judith T. Zeitlin and Ping-ChenHsiung, editors, Thinking with Cases. Specialist Knowledge in Chinese Cultural History (Honolulu:
University of Hawai'i Press, 2007).
31
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Klostermann, 1984).
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the public record by posting their expanded official account of the trial on the Web the
day after the event.32
The whole proceeding was shrouded in mystery while only snippets here and there were
revealed to the public. Madame Gu was said to have confessed to everything and was at
peace with the official proceedings. She was sentenced to death for murder, but the
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
In a word, even the wife of a high Chinese official in the twenty-first century had no legal
rights in a murder trial that was conducted from beginning to end in secrecy, entirely
lacking the kind of formalized due process known to Europe since the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. While some observers might think this was the influence of
Communist rule, it is far more plausible to suggest that Madame Gu's trial was merely the
extension of the authoritarian quasi-legal procedures that governed China for centuries,
all the way back to the Ming Dynasty.
Synthesis
If we return now to our original question about who or what can save us from the present
crises of climate change, ecological destruction, terrorism, civil wars and so on, it seems
to me that only the institutional and techno-philosophical tools evolved in Western
civilization over several centuries are likely to aid us. It might also be noticed that this
constellation of institutions is what some political scientists have labeled "modern
political institutions," which are the backbone of the democratization process.33
Unfortunately those observers were unaware of the medieval foundations of these
institutions, and hence unaware of the great difficulty of establishing them elsewhere and,
above all, unaware of their embeddedness in the unique legal history of the West. At the
same time, I have accented the fact that all these civilizational complexes, rooted in the
unique legal history of the West, have been absent in the Muslim world, in China, and
even in Russia, so that volatility in those places--both economic and political--is a highly
likely scenario in the future.34
In any case, it is this institutional apparatus represented by constitutionalism,
parliamentary democracy, due process of law, and an open public sphere along with the
32
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33
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331-354.
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unfettered pursuit of science incubated in Western universities that will enable us to find
the solutions to the travails we face.
In this light, it seems to me unlikely that solutions to the global problems mentioned
earlier will come from the Middle East, China, Russia,35 or even India. Of course, all of
these civilizational areas have large resources of one sort or another, including large
human populations, but for different reasons their institutional and educational structures,
as well as their public spheres, are weak or even non-existent. We can imagine all sorts
of wonderful innovations ("billions" of innovations) coming out of the new digital age,
as Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee do,36 but if the institutional apparatus and the
cultural permission to innovate freely is absent, as it is in so many parts of the world,
many people will be disappointed.
I do not dismiss the great wealth of human capital that these societies have, but rather
expect that in the long run, in the absence of the essential legal and institutional structures
of the West, the creative and highly driven individuals in those areas will turn up in the
West--not only, but especially in the United States--contributing to scientific,
technological and economic innovation here.
Beyond that, those who dismiss the potential leadership of the West, whether that of the
United States or the greater European community, have almost totally overlooked the
scientific and technological innovations that have been powering the rapid economic
growth of the West and the world for the last two centuries or so.37
At the very moment when observers have been declaring the "decline of the West" (or of
the United States), we have been witnessing the ICT or Internet Revolution that is based
on a variety of scientific and technological innovations made entirely in the West, some
of them stretching back to the late nineteenth century.
The first of these underlying, and revolutionary, innovations was the invention of the
transistor, or microchip that emerged from the Bell Labs in 1947. That path-breaking
innovation depended on the new theory of quantum physics of the 1930s that explained
how a cascade of electrons could be unleashed in certain solid state materials such as
silicon (and others even better) under certain conditions. These advances paved the way
for the invention of computers on a chip (computers that did not use vacuum tubes), and
hence both high speed computers and miniaturized computers could fit on any tiny device
35

On Russia's inability to pursue great innovations to commercial success, see Loren Graham, Lonely
Ideas. Can Russia Compete? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013).
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such as heat and energy control devices, traffic lights, and ultimately on satellites and cell
phones.38
The second major innovation for these purposes was the discovery of wireless
transmissions. This was a revolutionary discovery of the 1880s in Germany and
elsewhere in Europe, leading to the first commercial uses of wireless in radio and
telegraphic communication. It was the German scientist Heinrich Hertz, working with
the implications of James Maxwell's mathematical equations, who discovered that
wireless signals are indeed transmitted by certain electric circuits (1888). Much more had
to be done to get a practical application such as Marconi achieved in the 1890s.39
Television followed later.
Third, and now I skip to the creation of the Internet, it needs to be recalled that it was the
US government that pioneered the development of this area by funding the DARPA team
(the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) in the 1960s and 1970s that invented
the hardware and software allowing computers to talk to each other, thus making the
Internet possible.40 This new communication system was then further developed and
made available to Everyman by the invention of the World Wide Web protocols created
by Tim Berners-Lee in 1990, and which are still with us.41 The most recent advances in
wireless communication and miniaturization of everything are obviously an extension of
those earlier scientific and technological breakthroughs along with recent advances in
materials science.
So it bears emphasizing that none of these innovations occurred in China, India, or Japan.
The latter, Japan, had no computer industry until a frustrated American engineer and
entrepreneur took the technology to Japan in the 1980s.42 Likewise, Japan was not on the
Internet path, primarily because Japan did not use typewriters from the beginning of the
twentieth century as Americans and Europeans did, and so it went in a different direction
(a more symbolic path), but provided no Internet leadership.43
Now if we were to bring in the many hot, new cutting edge scientific fields of today--the
DNA revolution of the 1950s enabling genetic engineering, the revolutions in
38
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biochemistry and microbiology (and each of these brings in highly sophisticated subfields
such as immunology, virology and others too numerous to mention), and then
nanotechnology (which emerged only in the last twenty years), not forgetting "green
technology"-- then we would only begin to grasp the many areas of scientific revolution
that have been spawned in the West during just the last thirty to forty years that, again,
find their roots in late nineteenth century research, much of it pioneered in Europe, and
virtually none outside the West.44 The book by Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee,
above, tells us of even more breathtaking inventions that may have major impacts on
social and economic development.
Of course there will be great innovators who will emerge from outside the West, but the
impact of their innovations, especially societally and globally, will be almost completely
muted unless they emigrate to the West.
In short, all the institutional apparatus that we associate with modern political institutions
-- that is, constitutionalism, parliamentary democracy, due process of law, some notion
of election by consent, the rise of universities and the unfettered pursuit of science -- are
all unique civilizational entities bearing a Western signature, whose innovative vigor is
too vibrant to write off. Whether all of this can save us is a question for the future.

44
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Thoughts on Religion, Culture, and Civilization
Thorsten Botz-Bornstein
thorstenbotz@hotmail.com
Abstract: I attempt to disentangle the compact knot composed of culture, religion, and
civilization. Often the difference between secularists and believers is construed along the
lines of a religious “culture” unable to join a more progressive civilization. The
identification of culture with religion and of civilization with more general, civic
phenomena summarized under the heading of civilization is widespread. I analyze
different points of view, which classify “Secularism as Civilization,” “Civilization as
Evil,” or “Religion as Evil.” I also consider the converse point of view, which sees
religion as a sort of civilization that is opposed to culture.
Finally, I trace the term culture with the help of a few words from Matthew Arnold who
delimits culture from the above idea of civilization. Arnold believes that culture “is best
described by the word interesting.”
From a certain point onwards, Islam was no longer “interesting.” Values would be
hermetically codified up to a point that this religion offered no intellectual challenge. At
present, Islam is losing even more of its cultural appeal, offering few pleasures and
entertainment that could be seen as intrinsic to Islam. Islam has submitted to the
identification of concrete cultural items with general civilizational guidelines. A
civilizational understanding of religion in the fundamentalist sense is more and more
emphasized and the distinction between culture and religion is becoming more and more
distinct.
Introduction
Many Christian and Muslim believers share the view that secular culture is sterile, purely
technical, monotonous, and culturally poor. Christian theologian John Betz holds that
“the modern world, insofar as it is a secular world (…) is mindless, heartless and gutless”
(Betz: 338) and Muslim cultural critic Ziauddin Sardar is convinced that the aim of all
secularists is “to dominate, isolate, alienate, decimate and finally bore all cultures to death
with uniformity” (Sardar: 185). For Sardar, secularism spells the end of history in the
form of monoculture while “religious worldviews recognize diversity of spiritual
experiences” (185).
Curiously, secular people attack the believers’ position from the same angle. Often they
perceive religion’s refusal to recognize cultural values because they are “merely cultural”
as nihilistic and interpret this anti-cultural attitude as a refusal of precisely those values
that are dearest to them. Even more, they find the dogmatism with which religious people
often tend to define their values incompatible with their own ideas of how values should
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be presented. In other words, though they are not strictly opposed to the idea that religion
can be incorporated into culture, they find religious values, once they are spelled out in
purely religious and not cultural terms, incompatible with the values of culture. In light
of this paradoxical constellation, it becomes necessary to distinguish culture from another
term: civilization.
In this article I analyze the relationships between religion and culture as well as between
religion and civilization by using thought patterns or paradigms that I believe to be
common in Christian, Muslim, and secular traditions. I show that many false ideas about
both religion and secularism can be traced to misconceptions about how religion relates
to culture and civilization respectively. I am operating with four paradigms: (1)
secularism is civilization and therefore “good” while religion is culture and therefore
“evil”; (2) secular civilization is “evil” while religion is culture and therefore “good;” (3)
religion is civilization and therefore “evil” while culture is “good”; (4) religion is
civilization and therefore “good” while culture is “evil.” In the end, I show that only by
integrating religion into culture can religion avoid both religious and scientific
dogmatism.
1. Culture, Religion, and Civilization
Often the difference between secularists and believers is construed along the lines of a
religious “culture” unable to join a more progressive civilization. According to Edward
Jayne, it has been assumed that “primitive people are consummate believers; in contrast,
civilized people possess a residue of belief, but they are also skeptical—and the more
skeptical, the more civilized” (Jayne 1993). The identification of culture with religion
and of civilization with more general, civic phenomena summarized under the heading of
“civilization” is indeed widespread. Often civilization is believed to be “better” because
it is more universal than both culture and religion.
1.1 Culture and Civilization
Before analyzing the relationships between religion, culture, and civilization, it is
necessary to define the difference between culture and civilization as precisely as
possible.
The distinction between culture and civilization is not very well embedded in the English
language, but has proved to be relatively meaningful in other European languages.
“Culture” (from the Latin cultura) is the older term and corresponds to the Latin
etymology both in form and content; “civilization” (from the Latin civis) was coined at a
later stage and evolved rapidly, especially during the eighteenth century in France and
subsequently in England.
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Roughly put, the distinction can be established in the way that the former refers more
specifically to material, technical, economic and social facts while the latter
conceptualizes spiritual, intellectual, and artistic phenomena – individual or collective
concrete human expressions rather than abstract systems. Especially the German usage of
the word Zivilisation has always alluded to some utilitarian, outer aspect of human
existence that is subordinated to Kultur, which was itself perceived as the “real” being of
humans, society, and their achievements. Norbert Elias found that civilization as a
concept has always had an “expansive” character and that it describes a process referring
to something which is constantly in motion and is constantly moving forward (Elias 1978:
5). Culture fulfils the opposite function as it delimits; and it exists only through this
delimitation. Being the expression of a people’s individuality, the term culture is
conceptually powerful only as long as it excludes most phenomena from itself.
Accordingly, the French began to use the word culture as a synonym for everything that
can be acquired through education (manners, arts, and sciences for example); the Germans
cut “culture” down to more personal and individual expressions linked to art and
philosophy.
Johann Gottfried Herder (1774) opposed all generalizing forces of civilization and made
the distinction between culture and civilization very explicit by equating civilization with
the most alienating forms of industrialization. Around 1880, a consistent opposition of
civilization and culture is firmly established in German philosophy; German
Romanticism develops an idealist notion of Kultur while in France, the term civilisation
adopts more and more general and supra-national connotations.
In this article I use the terms culture and civilization in the way they have been defined
by Herder and Elias. I avoid E. B. Tylor’s (1958) broad definition of “culture” as a
phenomenon embracing everything; Tyler’s concept of culture was meant to free culture
from its elitist connotations to which it had become attached through the work of his
contemporary Matthew Arnold, whose ideas will be the subject of the last section of this
article.
2. Four Paradigms
The following four subsections examine the relationships between culture, religion, and
civilization by crystallizing four paradigms that I believe to be firmly rooted in current
discourses on culture, religion, and civilization. First it will be shown how secular
civilization can be seen favorably by defining its position in opposition to religion that is
believed to be “backward.” Since this secular attitude defines itself as progressive
civilization, the more backward religion is seen as culture. Next I describe the contrary
pattern, through which secular civilization is defined as an evil element from which
religion-culture must be protected. Then I describe the paradigm which sees religion as
civilization and believes that this “good civilization” needs to be used to combat “evil
secular culture.” Finally, I describe the contrary version of this paradigm, which sees
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religion as civilization and declares it to be “evil” while culture is seen as “good.” The
four paradigms can be listed like this:
(A) Good secular civilization

vs.

evil religion-culture

(E) Evil secular civilization

vs.

good religion-culture

(I) Good civilization-religion

vs.

evil secular culture

(O) Evil civilization-religion

vs.

good secular culture

All above propositions see culture and civilization as dichotomies. Given the symmetrical
character of the entire system of oppositions, the relationships between the four paradigms
can be rendered with the help of the Aristotelian square of oppositions:

The top axis of the diagram perceives civilization as secular and culture as possibly
religious, but both propositions differ through their contrary relationship. The Aproposition sees civilization as good and religion as evil while the E-proposition inverts
the good and bad values. On the bottom axis, religion is identified as civilization and
culture as secular. Again, through the subcontrary relationship, the positive and negative
values are distributed differently.
The propositions on the left vertical axis see civilization as “good.” The subalternative
relationship leading from ‘A’ to ‘I’ lets civilization appear once again as good but for
different reasons. The same is true for the right vertical axis, which sees civilization twice
as evil but each time for different reasons. The contradictory relationship that traverses
the square diagonally links entirely opposed mindsets.
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2.1. Good Secular Civilization vs. Evil Religion-Culture (A)
From a Western perspective, the ‘religion equals culture’ equation has frequently
appeared in unison with another equation: that of ‘secularism equals civilization’. When
Muslim countries were colonized by Europeans, the aim was to bring civilization to
uncivilized Muslims and democracy to those living under autocratic regimes. For the
French who invaded Northern Africa, “Islam was not to be evaluated as a theology, but
as a culture, in the sense employed by Herder, Kant, or Schiller” (Massad 2007: 13). Of
course, this culture was supposed to be an inferior culture; but as “culture” it could be
opposed to civilization that would stand for modernization. In the end, even religious
people began to believe in this paradigm: Saba Mahmood mentions those Egyptians who
still today “consider such quotidian attention to religious practice to be passé, or
uncivilized” (Mahmood 2005: 44).
In this context, Muslim religion with its fundamentalist outgrowths could come to
represent the contrary of civilization. Martin Jacques finds that “the dominance of the
West for the last two centuries has served to couch the debate about values
overwhelmingly in terms of those that are civilized, a synonym for Western values,
against those that are backward (Muslim)” (Jacques: 397). The paradigm surfaces
regularly in everyday politics. In 2011, U.S. First Lady Laura Bush declared in a radio
address that “civilized people throughout the world are speaking out in horror—not only
because our hearts break for the women and children of Afghanistan” (Ahmed 2011: 195).
Her husband had expressed the same idea earlier and more graphically – in the form of a
false dichotomy – declaring that there is “no neutral ground in the fight between
civilization and terror (…) because there is no neutral ground between good and evil,
freedom and slavery, and life and death” (Stevenson 2004). Though religion is not
explicitly mentioned, it is clear that the non-civilized item is fundamentalist religion.
In all those cases, religious fundamentalism represents non-civilization par excellence.
Consequently, Thomas Friedman uses the above pattern, announcing that he has detected
the “real problem” of terrorism, which is a clash of backwardness with civilization. He
quotes the Arab-American psychiatrist Wafa Sultan in his New York Times editorial:
The clash we are witnessing (...) is not a clash of religions, or a clash of civilizations.
(…) It is a clash between a mentality that belongs to the Middle Ages and another
mentality that belongs to the 21st century. It is a clash between civilization and
backwardness, between the civilized and the primitive, between barbarity and
rationality. (…) It is a clash between human rights, on the one hand, and the violation
of these rights, on the other hand. It is a clash between those who treat women like
beasts, and those who treat them like human beings. (Friedman 2006)
This is a simplification, because fundamentalist “backwardness” tends to see itself as
civilization, which means that it is not against civilization but wants another kind of
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civilization. Fundamentalism tends to opt not for the A-proposition but for the Iproposition (“good civilization-religion vs. evil secular culture”) as will be shown below,
and thus interprets religion as civilization. Second, also the “other side” (here simply
called “civilization”) is more complex than the civilization-backwardness dichotomy
suggests. “Western civilization” is composed of everything the left axis of the square has
to offer, that is, it is composed of secularists as well as of religious people whose ideas
about “religion and culture” or “religion and civilization” are not necessarily identical.
Terry Eagleton confirms the A-proposition. By writing that religious fundamentalism is
opposed to “all values dear to civilization,” he establishes the religious view as a “merely
cultural” view undermined by relativism to which he opposes the secular, “civilizational”
view based on firm enlightenment principles. For Eagleton, “the line runs between
civilization (in the sense of universality, autonomy, individuality, rational speculation,
etc.) and culture if we understand by this all those unreflected loyalties and spontaneous
convictions” (Eagleton 2008: 46, my italics).
2.2. The Contrary: Evil Secular Civilization vs. Good Religion-Culture (E)
Others agree that civilization is secular and that religion is culture, but they see
civilization as the “evil” element from which religion-culture must be protected. While
in the above cases culture (and religion, with which it was equated) has been criticized as
being incompatible with modern standards of civilization, culture (with all its relativism)
can also be used in order to express one’s opposition towards civilizational progressivism.
However, this is a complex approach. Many will think, when hearing of “religion vs.
civilization” confrontations, of fundamentalism and religious terrorism that seems to be
so much against all values dear to civilized people. However, contrary to what is often
assumed, playing out religion against civilization is not the typical fundamentalist
strategy. It will be shown below that fundamentalists tend to see their religion rather as
civilization and lean more towards the I-proposition.
Sardar formulates an E-proposition because for him,
On one side is militant, dogmatic secularism, which claims the realm of literature as
its new religion, an absolute where unlimited freedom should be exercised by the
high priests of modern culture, the artists. On the other, there is the religious
worldview wherein freedom of thought and expression arises from the existence of
the sacred and the ideas of respect for sanctity, tolerance for others and responsibility
in the exercise of freedom. (Sardar 2003: 231)
It is also possible to encounter the E-proposition (“evil secular civilization vs. good
religion-culture”) in the form of an internal social critique, for example when Muslims
reflect upon the relationship between religion and their society. Here universal social
structures (which are, because of their universal character, easily identifiable
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civilizational structures) can be declared evil while the individual religion-culture will be
declared good. For example, Islam (as a religion) can be identified as ‘feminist’ while
Muslim society can be seen as ‘misogynistic’ (cf. Massad 2007: 155). This means that
Islam as religion-culture has a positive potential but, so far, its values could not be
implemented within the general and civilizational structures of Arab society because such
structures are not receptive of those values. In any case, this scheme reinstates the belief
that religion should be seen in opposition to civilization, but this time holding that (Arab)
civilization is bad and that their religion-culture is good.
2.3. Good Civilization-Religion vs. Evil Secular Culture (I)
From a Muslim perspective, religion can very well be understood as coming closer to
civilization, be it only because of the intimate connection that exists between the concept
of din (religion) and the idea of medina (city). The prophet Muhammad migrated from
Mecca to Yathrib whose name would then be changed to Medina, which means city. Din
developed thus very early from a community of believers into a civic society representing
not only faith, but also civilization; and fundamentalist equations of Islam with the state
merely confirm the ‘religion is civilization’ equation.
However, to see religion as civilization is not a uniquely Islamic characteristic but the
pattern occurs in America where religious fundamentalists once declared that
“Christianity was the only basis for a healthy civilization” (Marsden: 12). Here, religion
was supposed to be civilization and not culture. Reinhold Niebuhr explains that “we had
a religious version of our national destiny which interpreted the meaning of our
nationhood as God’s effort to make a new beginning in the history of mankind” (Niebuhr
1952: 4). In general, Protestantism has been interpreted in America as a civil religion,
because in America, just like in Islamic countries, religious and political values were, as
Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the 1830s, “so intertwined as to be inseparable” (from
Boyers 1992: 227).
Very often evangelical Christians present their “Intelligent Design” theories in a
scientifically sophisticated fashion, which implies that they want to appear – at least
temporarily – as not merely religious. When talking about creationism or bioethical
imperatives, they most often do not base their arguments on an aspect of Christian law,
but rather on a natural law (see Vattimo 2007: 93). If it is not science, it is “common
sense” that will be used as an extra-religious basis. This is particularly true for the U.S.
where the frequent appeal to “common sense” in evangelical discourses denotes the
curious ambition to define religion and science on an equal ground provided by
Enlightenment. Marsden writes that
In a nation born during the Enlightenment, the reverence for science as the way to
understand all aspects of reality was nearly unbounded. Evangelical Christians and
liberal Enlightenment figures alike assumed that the universe was governed by a
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rational system of laws guaranteed by an all-wise and benevolent creator. The
function of science was to discover such laws, something like Newton's laws of
physics, which were assumed to exist in all areas. (Marsden 2006: 15)

The attempt to redesign religion as a form of civilization is repeated in a very explicit
fashion by Muslim reformist and puritan movements such as Wahhabism. This is what
distinguishes Wahhabism from other forms of Islam, which have traditionally permitted
more of a fusion of religion and culture, even in the sense of an integration of religion
into culture. Ahmed writes that prior to the 1960s, “religious piety and practice across
the Muslim world were rooted in Muslim traditions of learning and practice and at the
same time they were rooted to some extent in local traditions and practices” (Ahmed
2011: 96). One of the most important changes since the 1960s is that Wahhabism, with
its clear distinction between civilizational religion and relativist (secular) culture became
more influential all over the Muslim world.
Religious people pertaining to the paradigm of the I-proposition tend to perceive the lack
of anything absolute within the secular model as a moral deficiency that will sooner or
later turn this “culture” into a technocratic civilization because it contains no real values.
However, contrary to the proponents of the E-proposition, they do not suggest to replace
secular culture with religious culture but to replace secular culture with religious
civilization. The recent spectacular rise of fundamentalism, which follows a strict
“religion as religion” line, aims to exclude culture from religion and must therefore be
identified as an I-proposition paradigm, seeing religion as civilization.
2.4. Evil Civilization-Religion vs. Good Secular Culture (O)
A critique of the above I-proposition can be formulated with the help of the O-proposition
paradigm. Like the I-proposition, the adherents of the O-proposition assume that religion
is civilization, but they intend to combat this religion-civilization with the help of secular
culture. Secular people who base their decisions on culture and not on a god often find
that any search for truths more absolute than those provided by culture, can easily “kill
culture” because a religious culture based on absolute truths will turn culture into a rigid
model of civilization. They find that civilizational rigidity often adopts a form of both
stubborn scientific progressivism and religious dogmatism. Those secular people believe
that critically evaluated standards of sincerity are sufficient for the construction of a
culture. In other words, their secularism is cultural: it is not opposed to religion per se,
but only to any religion that pretends to be civilization.
2.5. How some Scholars Disregard the Square
The square becomes dysfunctional when culture and civilization are not correctly
identified, which happens very often. Often the analysts’ vocabulary shifts randomly
between culture and civilization. For example, anything religious can superficially be
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classified as belonging to culture, even when it displays many traits of civilization.
Historian Bassam Tibi, for example, calls values like democracy and human rights
“products of cultural modernity” (Tibi 1998: 24, my italics) and does not consider the
possibility of classifying them as civilization.
The most flagrant problem is that reality is often forced into either the top or the bottom
axis while all vertical movements are ignored. In other words, critiques of certain
positions are most often formulated by adopting the contrary position (thus by moving
horizontally on the square), but rarely by applying subalternative or contradictory
inferences. Eagleton, for example, lumps all “religion” together in the form of an Eproposition and does not consider the existence of the I-proposition. As a result, he
presents religious fundamentalism as an attitude opposed to civilization (moving from his
own A-proposition to an E-proposition), which is just as hasty as equating religion with
culture. Many people will actually find that Eagleton is right with regard to religion: is
religion not able to contradict scientific civilization by declaring, for example, that
evolution does not exist? However, religion questions evolution not on the basis of a
relativist culture, but on the basis of a religion that claims to be more absolute than
science. This position should be identified as an I-proposition, which opposes
civilization-religion to secular culture. Such vertical interferences are rarely undertaken.
Wahhabism makes the same mistake. For Wahhabism, absolute values defined by a
puritan ideology represent the basis of everything -- just like for Eagleton values such as
universality, autonomy, individuality, and rational speculation represent the basis of
(secular) civilization. Paradoxically, Wahhabism speaks out against precisely those
“cultural” values that many secular people cherish as values of civilization: democracy,
political structures of pluralism, human rights, and liberal tolerance, because for them,
those values are merely cultural. The reason is that it does not consider the existence of
the square’s top axis.
2.6. Overcoming the Square
The preceding section has shown that the square is too often used in a limited fashion.
Another problem is that the four positions and five logical connections indicated by the
square do not necessarily reflect existing conditions. The problem with the square is
indeed that it is too rigid: sometimes social reality is forced into the square, most probably
because its logical coherence is so tempting. Similar to Tibi, Leila Ahmed amalgamates
culture and civilization when writing that “the Western meaning of the veil [is] a sign of
the inferiority of Islam as religion, culture, and civilization” (Ahmed 2011: 45). In
principle, Ahmed attributes to “Westerners” the A-proposition (“Good secular
civilization against evil religion culture”) though it is obvious that this is reductive.
With regard to the veil it can be said that many Western people are likely to accept this
item as a cultural symbol and are only disturbed by its religious connotations; and then
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again, they are not disturbed by those connotations because they find this particular
religion inferior or opposed to their own religion or civilization, but rather because they
find the dogmatic way in which the religion is practiced incompatible with the standards
of their culture. In other words, they are disturbed by the fact that this practice, which
should be called ‘cultural’ in every sense of the word, emphasizes its universal value by
advertising itself as a civilizational religion.
This means that they do not lean towards the A-proposition to which Ahmed attempts to
pin them down, but rather towards an O-proposition because they are opposed to
“civilization-religion.” At the same time, they do not oppose “civilization-religion” by
building around them a bulwark of “secular culture” (as the O-proposition would
indicate), but rather by adopting an attitude that does not exclude “religion-culture” either.
In other words, what is lacking on the square is a combination of the E- and the Oproposition. This new proposition would be named “Evil civilization-religion vs. good
religion culture.”
Thinking outside the square does not seem to be on the mind of many people writing
about religion. Sometimes this leads to absurd constellations. It has been show above
how Betz (who is a representative of the E-proposition) depicts those who are secular as
prototypical enlightenment people who see reason as the only foundation of culture. For
Betz, the fact of looking back at tradition (something that enlightenment so often spurns)
automatically implies a looking back at those items that he sees as the essence of culture:
religion and faith. Curiously, Eagleton, though coming from the contrary end of the
square (A-proposition), offers very similar assumptions. His argument, as it appears in
the quotation in which he identifies culture as “all those unreflected loyalties and
spontaneous convictions” (Eagleton 2008: 46), is that secular enlightenment people can
only be against religion because religion is merely cultural.
Eagleton’s position must be understood as a direct reaction to a post-secular pattern
relying very much on the fusion of religion and culture. In the context of this argument,
Eagleton decides to refuse the influence of tradition because he prefers universal values
and reason. In the end, however, his argument plays into the hands of adherents of the Eproposition, such as Betz and Sardar. Like them, Eagleton equates culture with religion
and condemns both because of their relativism. The above new proposition (“Evil
civilization-religion vs. good religion culture”) would solve this conundrum. We need to
look at this new paradigm more closely.
3. Overcoming the Square through “Sweetness and Light”
The first purpose of the above exercise has been to disentangle the paradox of culture (as
part of religion and at the same time as a quality that can be seen as opposed to religion)
by distinguishing culture from civilization. It has been shown that the four paradigms
attributed to the square of oppositions are solid but that they can also be reductive. The
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second purpose has been to show that the square is too rigid and unable to reflect all cases.
It can function as a useful tool of conceptualization, but at the same time, it prevents the
appropriate conceptualization of the “religion-culture” option. The “thinking inside the
square” reacts to a dogmatic concept of religion as civilization in an equally dogmatic
fashion. An extension of the logical model is required in order to show that cultural forms
of religion represent the most efficient means able to deconstruct civilizational forms of
religion.
In order to provide such an extension, I want to trace the term culture with the help of a
formula coined by Victorian critic and poet Matthew Arnold. Also, Arnold most clearly
delimits culture from the above idea of civilization. For Arnold, culture is a state of
civilization containing both truth and beauty as well as another quality that he names
“sweetness and light” (Arnold 1869: 19). This concept of culture is interesting in the
present context because it insists on “aesthetic” components on the one hand, but also
remains linked to a certain quality of enlightenment. Arnold’s insistence on culture’s
aesthetic quality (beauty) in combination with “light” is unusual. Though “light” is
clearly connected to enlightenment, Arnold’s notion of “light” does not reduce culture to
civilization; on the contrary, the “light” metaphor can even suggest a religious dimension
of culture. In Arnold’s model of culture, the enlightenment heritage is not rejected but
confirmed; on the other hand, culture becomes “sweetness and light” not through the blunt
adherence to enlightenment’s scientific, universal, and rational principles, but rather
through subtle reflections on the self and the other, which can produce “sweet” qualities
such as tolerance.
Arnold is not the only person to describe culture in this stylistic-existentialist way.
Almost a hundred years later, the English art critic Clive Bell does the same, though he
chooses to name the quality in question not culture but civilization: “tolerance,
receptivity, magnanimity, unshockableness, and taste for, and sympathy with pleasure,
are prime characters of civilization” (Bell 1973: 168). Bell also refers to a certain kind
of aesthetic sensitivity and insists that “the civilized man will be highly perceptible to
aesthetic impressions, and to aesthetic impressions not of one sort only” (124).
Apart from that, at least partially, Arnold’s and Bell’s use of the term culture is not very
different from how some religious people use the term religion today: culture is “the great
help out of our present difficulties” (Arnold 1869: viii), and it is able to oppose the sort
of materialism emergent “in a Britain that holds that coal and iron constitute the greatness
of England” (19). This culture is opposed to a civilization based on universality and
rational speculation.
At the same time, it is opposed to fundamentalist notions of religion because it is not
dependent on absolute qualities, truths or essences. Bell singles out “puritans” as the
enemies of culture because “for all their good intentions, [they] are the enemies of good,
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because they make it more difficult than it need to be for themselves and everyone else
to enjoy good states of mind” (Bell 1973: 177).
.
3.1 Culture Must be “Interesting”
It is relatively easy to define culture negatively as the opposite of scientism and
puritanism, and it has been shown that the square of oppositions encourages such onedimensional definitions.
However, what are the positive qualities of culture?
There is a term to which Arnold attributes much importance in his writings on culture:
culture “is best described by the word interesting” (170). Culture is “interesting” because
it provides subtle reflections on the world and on ourselves. Interesting are those
phenomena that we can submit to critical examination – after which we will perhaps not
even agree with them – but which we will still perceive as being beneficial for the
development of our cultural or intellectual environment. This is why “interesting” things
are often precisely those things that are subtle. “Subtle” comes from the French “souple,”
which means soft, flexible, and open -- that is, the contrary of rigid. A good portion of
relativism is enclosed to the project of “being subtle” by definition; but blunt relativism
is the contrary of subtle.
It is not far-fetched to link Arnold’s ideas from 1869 to our contemporary “postmodern
culture” that is so often the red cloth of all believers. Like postmodern culture, Arnold’s
“interesting” culture is suspicious of all forms of prophetic revelations as well as of
transcendental purity and immediate truths or unmediated self-certainties. Still, its aspect
of “sweetness and light” is the contrary of the dark and nihilistic scenario that (Eproposition) believers often attribute to the secular or – in particular – to the postmodern
situation that they identify with the A-proposition. The source of Arnold’s light is neither
rational Enlightenment nor God, but culture itself, which manages to be interesting just
because it is culture.
5. Can Religion be Interesting?
When religion turns out to be interesting for both cultural and civilizational reason, the
rigid logic of the square has been overcome. A priori, religion can be interesting for all
the reasons pointed out in the preceding section, which is why in the history of humanity,
religion has often attracted the world’s brightest minds. And when it fell into decline, it
often was because the features displayed by religion were too dogmatic. Then values or
“the good” would be hermetically codified up to a point that religion was no longer
interesting because it offered no intellectual challenge.
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In other words, religion was civilization, and secular culture was opposed to it (Iproposition). This happened, for example, to Islam. While Islam employed for several
centuries the best philosophers and scientists available for its development, in the tenth
century, it ceased being subtle and went along a path that made it unable, in the words of
Malek Chebel, to “equip itself with a critical history” or to maintain a critical approach
towards its sources of tradition (usul al-fiqh) (Chebel 2006: 31).
Instead of thinking critically, it began to focus on immediate (often “natural”) truths as
well as on small theological details; and whenever “details begin to dominate the spirit of
a religion one can conclude that it is obsolete” (32). Muslim lawyers would now codify
the Islamic law and reduce Islam to a ‘cult of fiqh’, or jurisprudence. Worse, “religious
scholars feared that the proliferation of written texts would undermine their authority and
control, and prevented the emergence of printing in the Muslim world for over three
hundred years. This stopped creative thought, and centralized authority in a few hands”
(Inayatullah & Boxwell 2003: 18).
In the end, Islam gained a lot of questionable “truths” but lost anything that could be
called “interesting.” In a climate of orthodoxy and formalism, one “no longer thinks as
serenely as in the past, and every invention is considered as treason” (Chebel: 34). Long
lists of things forbidden do not lead to light but to obscurantism. When Chebel concludes
that “the ninth century appears as the grave of free thought” (70), he could as well say
that it appears as the grave of culture if we understand culture as a movement nourished
by the ambition to create interesting and subtle thoughts as well as expressions of
sweetness and light. However, in spite of the excessive preoccupation with concrete
details, Islam will also be afflicted by the opposite ailment: as a civilization it becomes
too abstract, and its teachings can no longer be linked to concrete regional or cultural
ideas: “too vast, too large and without spinal column, the Islamic community becomes a
generous idea that is often thought of but which translates nothing in geostrategic terms”
(34).
Islam’s particular problem is that it has always been torn between the extremes of
universal civilization and individual culture, between a supra-national “way of life” based
on unconditional truth on the one hand and communitarian identity politics on the other.
Can one and the same institution fulfill both promises? Can one and the same institution
be both culture and civilization?
It seems that at present Islam is losing even more of its cultural appeal, offering few
pleasures and entertainment that could be seen as intrinsic to Islam; what it offers are
mainly universal instructions about cultural activities that are forbidden. Bell’s qualities
like “tolerance, receptivity, magnanimity, unshockableness, and taste for, and sympathy
with pleasure” (Bell: 168) have moved to the background. Nor is there present Islam
“perceptible to aesthetic impressions, and to aesthetic impressions not of one sort only”
(124).
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As a result, subjects will most likely be tempted by ways of life and entertainments offered
by other cultures and keep Islam only as a form of civilization. This civilization can then
most comfortably be expressed as an anti-Western, anti-imperialistic ideology or provide
detailed instructions about how to behave or represent the sharia. To call this a
“civilization” might appear paradoxical given the concreteness of those Islamic
prescriptions about cultural details. The problem is that those details do not create a
culture but rather a paranoiac identification of concrete cultural items with general
civilizational guidelines. In any case, the outcome will probably not be what Arnold has
described as sweetness and light.
It is true that in the case of the sharia, the status of “sharia as civilization” is sometimes
difficult to recognize because the sharia is increasingly not used as a universal legal code
but rather as an affirmation of cultural identities, which represents a paradox. Olivier Roy
explains this paradox by pointing out that while “the criterion of an Islamic cultural
identity is looked for in the sharia, as a legal norm it should actually be thought of outside
the frame of cultural contingency” (Roy 1999: 27). In Muslim emigrant circles, for
example, one likes to define the sharia “not as a legal system but as a body of cultural
norms defining a way of life more than a legal status, an identitarian horizon more than a
civil code” (26). At the same time, the sharia continues to regulate the life of a religious
international community that exists beyond cultures.
Roy concludes very aptly that the strong desire for the sharia can only denote the cultural
crisis of Islam: Islamic religion can no longer be lived culturally and spontaneously in a
self-evident fashion. Normally, cultures can be lived spontaneously without recurring to
general laws. The paradox exists in the fact that the Islamic culture project is restricted
to the ambition “to ground Islamic identity on a body of norms spelled out as legal rules”
(26). Strictly speaking, this codification of religion-culture kills culture by turning it into
a religion-civilization unable to develop naturally and organically. And, of course, it
cannot develop organically in contact with other cultures. What is supposed to be
“culture” develops rather ideologically and abstractly almost as if it were a science.
The above considerations have shown that Islam has lost its “interesting” cultural appeal
not once but twice: first, in the tenth century, when it gave in to a stubborn form of
mysticism and cut itself off from both reason and culture; second, more recently, when it
began to define itself as a “cultural civilization.” The second step is not typical for a
religion, but more akin to Western Enlightenment civilizations. “Cultural civilizations”
appear when a scientifically grounded civilization isolates itself from everything that
cannot be positively evaluated. Critics of Enlightenment have therefore long held that a
civilization exclusively based on Enlightenment principles will be well-organized and
technologically advanced but disenchanted1 because it is lacking those features that could
qualify it as culture: it is no longer subtle and interesting.
1

The hypothesis about the “disenchantment of the world” through technology and intellectualization
comes from Max Weber.
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The case of Islam is different. When Islam entered the stage of a scientifically grounded
civilization by believing that in this “civilization-culture” everything should be positively
evaluated, it went directly from mysticism to positivism, thus circumventing culture
twice. First it omitted the step that Enlightenment undertook when it was forcing itself
to see religion in terms of culture. Second it circumvented culture when refusing to accept
critical evaluations of absolute civilizational values in terms of cultural critiques.
Culture, as it is understood in post-Enlightenment western societies, is supposed to settle
right in the middle, on a critical ground able to accommodate different positions and to
consider both abstract and concrete manifestations of human ingenuity. This is how
culture avoids both religious and scientific dogmatism. To see culture like this also means
to deconstruct the oppositional logic suggested by the square of oppositions. In a word,
it means to advance the “Evil civilization-religion vs. good religion-culture” proposition.
Conclusion
The preceding section has described how civilizational religion kills not only secular
culture but also religious culture. Apart from that, it has been shown that any
civilizational religion has difficulties to progress -- that is, it has difficulties to formulate
its position in terms of progressive civilization. Only the new paradigm called “Evil
civilization religion vs. good culture-religion” is able to amend this situation. The new
paradigm is not merely one ready to confound everything that this article has tried to
disentangle. Confusions happen when one thing is seen as the other, while I suggest a
model of coexistence. Within this model, all elements remain distinct. As a result, really
“interesting” constellations can appear. This happens, of course, only on the condition
that all elements are allowed to play equal roles.
In our post-secular post-modernity, religions should stop seeing “absolute civilizational
religion” and “relativist culture” as opposites. Then they can make religion more
“interesting.” In other words, religion should be turned into culture (1) without
abandoning religious elements and (2) without designating secular civilization as an
“evil” element.
In the Western world – with the obvious exception of American puritan fundamentalism
– secularization has brought religion very much on a “cultural level” – at least for a large
part of the population.
In the Muslim world the contrary is the case. Under Wahhabist influence, a civilizational
understanding of religion in the fundamentalist sense is more and more emphasized, and
the distinction between culture and religion is becoming more and more distinct. Cultural
versions of Islam, like the spiritual or ‘mystical’ tradition of Sufism, are suppressed.
What religion lacks in those cases is a relevant combination of culture and civilization or
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simply “sweetness and light.” In the end, this is the reason why it has difficulties
progressing – both as a culture and as a civilization.
I suggest that Muslims embrace postmodernism in its truest form: not just as a postsecular ideology but as an attempt to integrate secularism and religion. In that way Islam
could also organize a cultural fight against monolithic and standardized global capitalism
or other political or secular phenomena by which it has always been so intrigued. The
current identification of religiosity with terrorism on the one hand, and of secularism with
the philosophy of technocrats on the other, does not help to amend the situation.
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Essay: The Great Literary Utopias Have a Nightmarish History
Laina Farhat-Holzman
Lfarhat102@aol.com
Literary utopias, a seemingly modest form of fiction intended for amusement and
contemplation, have had a surprising history. They have been a source of conscious
civilizational design that has been taken seriously by some very powerful leaders, more
often than not with dire consequences.
Plato's Republic, written 2500 years ago in ancient Greece, was the first to explore
seriously what it would take to create a perfect society. Thomas More, one of England's
greatest Renaissance intellectuals, redesigned Plato's Republic for his own time a
thousand years later. His Utopia reflected the European fascination with the entirely
novel civilizations discovered in the New World. One can better understand one's own
culture through comparison with that of another.
Both Plato and More contemplated the conditions needed to support a perfect state. They
considered geography, economy, and the ethical nature of leadership required to produce
such a state. Most essential were social equality, even of the sexes; careful population
control; rigorous education for commonality of values, and rule by only the most mentally
fit.
Utopias leaped from the pages of literature with the birth of the United States. Our
Founding Fathers, familiar with the works of Plato and Thomas More, reflected their
vision for our country. But other readers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were
thinking about these ideas, too; among these were Marx, Lenin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot.
Today we have seen that dystopias are more real than utopias. The newest dystopians
among us are Al Qaeda and its imitators, imagining a brave new world under a caliphate.
This is, of course, just one more fantasy utopia. The anarchists are their real model.
Types of Utopian Fiction
From the time that human beings had the leisure to think, there have always been those
who did not like how their cultures were organized. One of the quatrains of Omar
Khayyam (the Rubaiyyat), as translated by Edward Fitzgerald, expresses it best:
“Ah Love! Could thou and I with Fate conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits----and then
Re-mould it neared to the Heart's Desire!”
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He expresses in this verse what others have felt from antiquity, that the world should be
organized much better. Some who felt this way imagined paradises, fantasies, satires,
and even today, imaginary brave new worlds (such as the cinema version in Avatar). But
one Athenian genius, Plato, tried “to grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,” and the
key here is entire. He was the first to attempt to analyze what makes a republic function
and how to design a better one. His fictional Republic has gone on to live and to influence
the world in an astonishing way, including creating some societies that are not ideal
utopias, but are nightmares.
According to that master of Utopian analysis, Lewis Mumford (The Story of Utopias,
1922), there are two kinds of literary utopias: fantasy and reconstruction. The fantasies
and satires make fun of existing society and create an imaginary alternate universe, or are
elaborate imaginings of either life after death or “brave new worlds.” The construct
utopias seriously attempt to imagine a perfect state, one that explores all aspects of a
human society. Plato's Republic, written 2500 years ago in ancient Greece, was the first
to seriously explore what it would take to create a perfect society.
Thomas More, one of England's greatest Renaissance intellectuals, redesigned Plato's
Republic for his own time. His Utopia reflected the European fascination with the entirely
novel civilizations discovered in the New World. One can better understand one's own
culture through comparison with that of another.
A perfect state, they both said, would have enough land to feed itself, access to the sea or
waterways for trade, every citizen working at what each did best, the best brains educated
for unselfish leadership, absolute equality of all goods (to prevent corruption of the
leaders), women freed from domestic duties to participate in all work for which they were
qualified, all meals eaten together with cooking chores shared, and strict birth control
(having no more children than could be fed). The children were to have community
education so that they would all be citizens with a common culture.
Utopias leaped from the pages of literature with the birth of the United States. Our
Founding Fathers knew the works of Plato and More, which is reflected in the totality of
their vision for our country. But other readers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
were considering these ideas, too. The French Revolution also gave rise to the Anarchists,
who were convinced that only by destroying all existing states could a perfect utopia arise.
Jonathan Swift in the eighteenth century wrote Gulliver's Travels. He was the first to take
a very sour look at utopias and the first to recognize the dark underbelly of utopias
(dystopias). Alas, his was a voice in the wilderness.
Marx, Lenin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot translated Plato's and More's small nation-state
idea into nightmare empires. All of them (except for Hitler) embraced the communist
idea of totally sharing all property (at least in theory). They all liked putting women to
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work, demolishing the notion of the biological family. They all had a ruling class,
indoctrinated for that job, and an unthinking culture of obedience and loyalty to the state.
Hitler was more in line with the anarchists who believed in a brave new world that only
would come in the future after everything else was destroyed.
Today we have seen that dystopias are more real than utopias. In addition to nightmare
empires, we have home-grown pseudo-religious cults, run almost exactly like Plato's and
More's states, except that the leaders are insane. The newest dystopians among us are Al
Qaeda and its imitators, imagining a brave new world under a caliphate. This is, of course,
just one more fantasy utopia. The anarchists are their real model.
Plato’s Republic
Four hundred years before the Christian era, the Greek Philosopher Plato wrote The
Republic, part of a series of dialogues that were held with the brightest of Athens’
thinkers, all friends of Socrates, the mentor whose ideas Plato brought to the world. We
know Socrates through his protégé’s writing, thoughts that have had enormous effect on
the world and continue to do so today.
The Greek culture of that time differed from any others in that all sorts of new ways of
organizing society were tried and critiqued. It was a period of social disintegration too,
the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, in which it was clear that many mistakes had
been made by citizens and their leaders.
This was not a civilization that could be ruled by a single autocrat (as was the Persia of
that time). It was a world in which experimentation was possible, and with few
exceptions, thinkers could challenge all accepted wisdom without penalty. The
exception, unfortunately, was Socrates himself; he finally ran afoul of the powers that be
over concerns that his free-wheeling ideas were corrupting the youth.
The period during which Greek thinkers could examine, speculate, and criticize their own
societies was, alas, brief; the Greek city-states fell to a variety of autocrats and empires:
Alexander the Great (a student of Aristotle), the Romans, Byzantine Christianity, and
ultimately the Ottoman Turks.
However, thanks to Plato, we do have what must have been the first attempt to construct
mentally the perfect society, a republic, from the ground up. He charted what Socrates
and his companions devised as requirements for the perfect society:


Geography. The favored geography of utopias is islands or sea coasts, finite
places surrounded by the sea---both as protection and open for trade. For both
Plato and More, these were the geographies of ancient Greece and England. As
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part of that geography was climate: recognition that only temperate climates could
provide enough food and relative physical comfort for a good society.


Size. The Greeks of Plato’s time already had the concept of a commonwealth, a
larger society that shared language, gods, and for the most part, similar
institutions. But for his imaginary republic, he envisioned it being able to be seen
from a hilltop; he expected those who lived within these limits to share common
gods to worship, common theaters and gymnasia, and a multitude of common
interests that could be satisfied only by their working together, playing together,
thinking together. The ideal commonwealth, Mumford tells us, would be a city
region—a city that was surrounded by enough land to supply the greater part of
the food needed by the inhabitants and convenient to the sea. [Mumford, 33.]



Agriculture. The terrain was mountainous, providing different soils and climate
zones for a variety of agricultural and industrial uses. There would be evergreen
trees at the summit for the woodcutter, going down the slope to the herdsman and
their goats, further down for the cultivator and his crops, and finally culminating
where the river (valleys usually have rivers) meets the sea. It was essential in his
republic that there be enough food for the population, and if there was not, the
population was to reduce itself, either by moving pioneers to found a new colony
elsewhere or exerting population control.



Economy. Plato makes the point that the economy should be modest, that people
should be happy with sufficient corn (grain) and wine, have clothes and shoes,
and build houses for themselves. People would work hard, benefitting from
outdoor labor with healthy bodies. There must be a common standard of living
(no very rich or very poor). Plato wanted a lifestyle neither impoverished nor
luxurious, something between the styles of Athens and the military dictatorship of
Sparta. When asked should we moderate our wants or should we increase our
production (today’s big question), he opted for moderating our wants.



Ideal Population Size. For Plato, the ideal size was to be a community where a
speaker could be heard by everybody; 5,040 was his selected number of citizens.
This may still be so in New England’s Town Hall meetings and for many town
planners. This population was to share certain institutions and ways of life with
similarly educated people. Without this basis, such communities would be
doomed to break apart, a phenomenon we are seeing today even in nation-states.



Work. A diversity of work and professions is needed by the healthy
commonwealth, a good thing when we consider the variety of human talents and
capabilities. Systems such as India’s caste system do not allow for the variability
of children born into a family with an inherited trade. While Plato recognizes that
heredity and apprenticeships are good for providing skilled professionals, he
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recognizes that each individual should be able to find a calling that suits him more
in another trade. Plato’s Republic has class differences (workers and craftsmen
have different educations than the leadership class or those devoted to the state’s
defense or military). Yet he allows for talent (and merit) to rise to the top. This
is the beginning of the notion of a meritocracy.


Values. Plato identified four human virtues to each category (class) of people:
wisdom, valor, temperance, and justice. Wisdom is appropriate for the rulers, the
Guardians. Valor is for the defenders, the auxiliaries. Temperance (agreement)
belongs to all classes. And Justice is the ultimate cause and condition of all of
them. Justice (the perception of fairness) is essential for the health of a society.



Property. Plato worried about the corrupting effect of too much luxury on a
society. He wanted his people healthy, industrious, and satisfied with simplicity.
The craftsmen and farmers should have such property as might be needed for their
occupations and simple and pleasurable property for their homes. But the warriors
were to have their own culture, and that included only the equipment they needed
for service. All other property was to be held in common. Also original in Plato’s
concept was that the warrior class women were permitted an equal place in the
life of the camp, gymnasiums, and military academy.
The Guardians, the ruling class, was to be the most controlled to prevent any abuse
of the great power they were given. They had to be not only mentally fit for this
class, but also the most just, avoiding any corrupting influence of money or
property. He also worried about anything smacking of hereditary power. Plato
proposed a system of common marriage. “The wives of these guardians are to be
in common, and their children are also common, and no parent is to know his own
child, nor any child his parent.” He managed the incest problem by having all
children born in the same year to be barred from breeding among each other; they
were to be siblings.
This is not easy to do, and has been attempted only by one dystopian modern
dictator, Hitler, with the program of Aryan genetic manipulation, called the
“Lebensborn,” with all the women and children the common property of the SS
breeders.
The problem of family power has dogged all societies from the beginning of
civilization. How does one keep a family from monopolizing privileges? For
Plato, and only for the Guardian Class, it was to eliminate marriage and family
life altogether. For the rest of the society, children with talent were to be
recognized and those without it, even when born among the Guardians, were
either to find their own lower level or, if handicapped, to be abandoned at birth.
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Education of Guardians. Unlike the rest of the society, which was free to enjoy
normal family life and simple pleasures, the Guardians were to be a very
disciplined lot. Every part of their lives and education was for the purpose of
keeping the Guardians disinterested (to avoid abuse of power and corruption).
They lived in common barracks, none had his own home or storehouse; they were
on the public payroll, which supported them because of their superiority of brains
and integrity (not a large number in any society). These Guardians first served in
the military class (auxiliaries), where military preparation (not constant warfare)
shaped their valor. There they increasingly practiced leadership (much like
today’s military). After the age of 50, those who were qualified devoted
themselves to philosophy and rule. The business of the Guardian was to
manufacture liberty. They had nothing to do with marketing, industry, graft,
bribery, theft, rules established by the ordinary people themselves. They are
responsible for the basic constitution of how good people can flourish in a good
society.

More’s Utopia
While Plato is the first to deliberately imagine what it would require to produce a perfect
republic, Sir Thomas More’s Utopia, written as a lark over a long weekend of leisure in
the company of some of Europe’s greatest intellectuals (including Erasmus), was based
on the newly popular Plato’s Republic, but with changes reflecting a Christian, rather than
pagan world, and technological changes of his own time, sixteenth century England.


Geography. Like Plato’s, his utopia is small and finite, and, like Britain,
surrounded by water. It is the first of the island utopias. It is made up of citystates and their rural areas.



Economy. Agriculture is the economic base. Some people live on their farms
year round, but everybody, even from the cities, take time to work on farms
(perhaps at planting or harvesting times) so that they can be competent farmers
when needed. City magistrates draw up lists of those who will help with the
harvests as required. (China and the USSR both adopted this idea.)



Technologies. Agricultural technologies are designed to provide enough to feed
the state and a surplus for trade. More describes the world’s first incubators,
designed to provide great surpluses of poultry and eggs.



Social Mobility. As did Plato, More avoids creating caste systems in his society.
Although most families follow their own special occupation, a boy whose genius
lies another way may be adopted into a family plying that trade.
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Work Loads and Labor Rules. More, like Plato, has a horror of idleness, but in
his Utopia, everyone (including women) is expected to be industrious, including
princes, rich men, and healthy beggars (all notoriously idle). With everybody
working, work could be done in less time than it was in More’s age. He included
public works among the tasks that could be dispatched in little time if everyone
were working. The only people exempt from hard labor were the magistrates and
students, who, if they were doing their work properly, were industrious enough.



Distribution of Goods. Monthly festivals provided for exchanges of urban and
agricultural goods, overseen by the Magistrates to make certain they were fair.
The family was the unit of distribution; there were no private entrepreneurs. Each
city was divided into four equal parts, surrounding a central marketplace. The
goods were taken to a storehouse and each family head selected what his family
needed. No money was exchanged. (To each according to his needs…?) More
justifies this system for eliminating fear of want; a productive society produces
plenty.



Diet. Renaissance England produced far more good food than did Plato’s Greece.
Plato wanted his people to have a simple palate: bread, wine, olives, green herbs,
and fish: nothing imported. He also stressed that if the Republic wanted meat,
they would require more land than needed for their simple diet--and that might
require taking land from somebody else, one of the origins of warfare. More,
however, allowed for herbs, fruits, and bread, but also fish, fowl, and cattle for
meat and cheese. In addition to the monthly apportionment of goods in each town,
he provided for an annual distribution in the entire country, equalizing the goods
among all the various regions.



Gold and Luxuries. Gold was only to be used to make chamber pots; it was not
a medium of exchange nor was it used for adornment. Conspicuous display was
absolutely forbidden. It is interesting to consider how this sat with the
conspicuously displayed nobility of England.



Town Design. In his Utopia, all of the towns were designed alike. They were
usually on the side of a hill; almost square, two miles per side, facing a river.
There was a high, thick wall; the streets designed for carriages and sheltered from
the wind; and the houses were connected and built in a row, much as we can see
in Bath today. (This did become an eighteenth century model.) The streets were
broad, and in back of the houses were gardens, which everyone had to keep up.
There was competition among homeowners to have excellent gardens. This,
thinks More, is a useful kind of competition.



Community Dining. In Plato, the common dining hall was only for the military
and Guardians. In More, it was obviously a means for producing community
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solidarity and an opportunity to socialize the children. The work of shopping,
cooking, and serving was shared, a much better use of women’s time than if each
had to spend the day providing for a family. The dining hall even had a common
nursery and chapel, a great benefit to women with small children. The midday
meal was simple and without ceremony (so that people could get back to work).
However, the evening meal was designed to give pleasure. More was not as
suspicious as Plato of the arts, music, delicious food, conversation, and merriment.
More recognized that man is a sensual being and that we should not ignore this
aspect.


Government. More’s Utopia, unlike Plato’s, was not exactly a republic, but did
have participatory governance of sorts. Each group of thirty families chose a
magistrate (Philarch) yearly, and those 200 Philarchs serve as a senate tasked to
choose the Prince out of a list of four candidates, named by the families (not clear
how chosen). The Prince was elected for life, unless impeached for attempting to
enslave the people. The government’s duties were to regulate commerce, travel,
crime, and war.



Slavery. Even today, unfortunately, work that is obnoxious to human beings is
done involuntarily, as can be seen throughout South Asia, Africa, and in the global
trafficking of women and children. We have not yet eliminated slavery.
In Plato’s time, slaves were captured in warfare but never constituted a permanent
caste, except for women. The same holds true for More, but warfare is no longer
the major means of acquiring slaves for those occupations no one else wants, such
as butchering beef for food. Warfare would be infrequent, and the Utopians used
strategy, propaganda, and corruption to undermine an enemy rather than always
resorting to force. But when using force, they made sure that the soldiers were
not their best people. This is a way to weed out undesirables. More did not think
much of a military establishment.
Slaves were acquired through the law courts: people who had committed venial
crimes, such as violating the limited permission to travel (being a runaway);
unchastity and adultery were crimes punished by slavery. Divorce was accepted
when a couple agreed that they were incompatible; but there was a novel attempt
to avoid such incompatibility: young couples were introduced before marriage
naked; no surprises here and no forced marriages. I suspect this was More’s little
joke. (There was a Star Trek episode showing such a marriage custom in one of
the other planets.)



More’s Ultimate Values. Summarized by Louis Mumford [78]: “To cultivate
the soil rather than simply to get on with a job; to take food and drink rather to
earn money; to think and dream and invent, rather than increase one’s reputation;
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in short, to grasp the living reality and spurn the shadow--this is the substance of
the Utopian way of life….In this Utopia of the World every man has the
opportunity to be a man because no one else has the opportunity to be a monster.
Here, too, the chief end of man is that he should grow to the fullest stature of his
species.” This is a highly admirable vision indeed, and extraordinary in his time
and place of birth.

Dystopia Arrives
Jonathan Swift, an eighteenth century Anglo-Irish satirist, wrote the brilliant Gulliver’s
Travels, a book that should be rescued from children’s literature and should be part of
literary utopias. Swift was not enamored of utopias, nor was he dazzled by the spate of
travel books fascinating readers in his time. Marco Polo’s travels across Asia and the
many adventurers in awe of the New World’s strange civilizations were popular in Swift’s
day. He refused to be enchanted.
Gulliver’s Travels gives us a hero named Gulliver, hinting broadly at “gullible.” This
imaginary traveler has four adventures, of which only the first two are still popular, which
is a shame. Book One covers Gulliver shipwrecked upon an island of very small human
beings (we are talking in inches here), the Lilliputians. It is like looking at human beings
through the wrong end of a telescope. They are tiny, perfect-looking little beings who
are, at first acquaintance, utterly charming. However, he finds out how much they are
like the most frivolous and nastiest beings of his own civilization, much to his distaste.
His second adventure is to flee to another island, this time peopled by giants. To them,
he looks just like the Lilliputians had looked to him. He is the pet and darling of a young
girl. These giant human beings are as if seen through the right end of a telescope with
every flaw apparent. He sees giant pores and is overwhelmed by their smell. But they
too have a society not really different from his native civilization. He is not enchanted.
The third adventure (and my favorite) is to an island dominated by another island, actually
a flying saucer that threatens the natives with destruction if they do not obey them and
provide them with food. The men living on the flying saucer are mad scientists engaged
in all sorts of ridiculous scientific projects financed by government grants. Their wives
are normal women with appetites unsatisfied by these absent-minded professors. Wives
frequently run away with their coachmen, tolerating abusive lovers rather than remaining
married to the scientists.
The final adventure is to an island in which the horses rule and humans fill their zoos.
They have a truly wise civilization and the caged animals, monkey-like humans, are
disgusting and wild. To get wisdom directly from the “horse’s mouth” is wonderful
indeed.
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At the end of the work, Gulliver returns home, completely disgusted and embarrassed by
his human condition. He takes refuge in the stables, talking to the horses.
This work is not, of course, a utopian blueprint as were those of Plato and More, but rather
a cautionary tale warning people about human nature, which he did not admire.
Aldous Huxley, a twentieth century British-American writer, wrote the next great
dystopian novel after Swift. In the time between them, only imaginative technological
utopias were written, of little use to us pursuing utopian policies. The nineteenth and
twentieth centuries were also periods of experimentation, with many small groups
attempting to live out utopian ideals. The United States is still a home of utopian
experiments, such as those of the Mormons and the Mennonites, both of which have
survived; and the Shakers, Jonestown, and the Davidians in Waco, all failed, the last two
disastrously.
Huxley wrote during the early and late parts of his life two of the most important
contemporary explorations of utopian fiction. In the 1920s, he wrote Brave New World,
taking the title from the line in Shakespeare’s final work, The Tempest. In this play, the
naïve Miranda sees the first human beings other than her father, with whom she has lived
alone since babyhood. She is dazzled by a “brave new world that has such people in it.”
The line, of course, is very funny considering how terrible some of these people actually
were.
Huxley used the framework of most utopias since More: a traveler arriving from a very
different world, introduced to the utopia. He also leaned heavily on the technological
utopias of the past and had a tongue-in-cheek assessment of Henry Ford, the devisor of
assembly-line technologies. In this case, the technologies were devoted to eliminating
the family (including the mother) by incubating and using science to shape the outcomes
of these children. “Our Ford” has replaced “Our Lord” by way of religion, and for the
first time ever, “mother” was a nasty pornographic notion.
Brave New World was a warning against unquestioned trust in science, and it posited that
if a society really wants great elites in its leadership, it cannot program everything in the
test tube. The best human minds are very difficult for a society to control. Even as tight
a utopia as this one risks rebellions and even revolutions. We can never have total control
over human complexity.
Huxley’s last work before he died was Island, where he, like the greats before him, tried
his hand at designing a perfect society on an island, a society characterized by
intelligence, simplicity of wants, and a spirituality not poisoned by organized religion.
His people were modern, educated, and were bonded by the use of a drug, soma, that kept
them civil. (Huxley had just discovered LSD, and was an enthusiast.)
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Like the other utopias, a stranger comes to the island and the utopia is explained to him.
It certainly appears to be a lovely society but it has one problem: it has no way of
defending itself from a not-as-lovely neighboring island. The mid-twentieth century
distaste for war biased Huxley against dealing with defense issues. His utopian island
was invaded and enslaved.
Utopias in the Modern World
The twentieth century has witnessed three major attempts at designing a civilization and
three smaller attempts. The largest designed societies were the USSR, from the end of
the Russian Revolution to its collapse in 1979; the Nazi experiment, which owed more to
ancient Sparta than to the intellectuals Plato and More, which ran from 1933 until its
disgrace and collapse in 1945; and the Chinese Communist State, which ran from 1954
to its much more relaxed state today. At the height of their utopian runs, each became
more classic dystopias, nightmare worlds, than anything like their literary utopia models.
However, their debt to these precursors is evident, particularly in certain institutions that
they adopted.
One small but horrible utopian experiment was carried out in Cambodia, the vision of a
western-educated Cambodian communist, Pol Pot. Pot took seriously the Marxian attack
on class privilege and set about exterminating the entire middle class of his country,
resulting in the death of one-third of his population. He deported people from cities,
considering cities dens of corruption, and worked the urban population to death in the
countryside. Wearing eyeglasses was enough to get a person sent to a work camp to die.
This was one of the worst cases of putting an imaginary utopia to the test, making it the
ultimate nightmare world.
Israel was founded as a utopian ideal, a small modern state with a commonality of values
and room to experiment with a variety of model villages. There was never any of the
coercion and totalitarian force found in the dystopias described above. In Israel, these
utopias were tiny, voluntary, and experimental. Some have survived as a variety of
designed small societies, the Kibbutz movement, today.
The other utopia is the only nation-state-designed society in the world today, Singapore.
Singapore began as an unlikely candidate for utopianism, being a breakaway city-state
that removed itself from Muslim Malaya. Singapore was an unpromising and fly-bitten
Chinese ethnic backwater. It is today one of the most prosperous, and from all accounts,
happiest of nation states thanks to that rarest of leaders, Lee Kuan Yew, who modeled
himself after Plato’s dream leader, a Philosopher King. He was not a king, but he
certainly was the unquestioned genius who created an exceedingly unusual city-state.
Singapore’s example would be almost impossible to replicate elsewhere.
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Dystopians
The Russian Revolution emerged out of the collapse of the Russian Empire, a 500-year
old backward, authoritarian, but slowly modernizing society. The revolutionaries, the
Bolsheviks, based their notions of governance on Karl Marx’s mid-nineteenth century
critique of Capitalism. They enforced values already present among the Russian peasant
farmers: equality among themselves--a village value. But they expropriated the land of
the former aristocratic landowners and, instead of distributing it among the peasants, took
it into state coffers. Thus the peasants had new feudal masters, the Soviet Government
itself. The state also expropriated all industries, an industrialization process not yet
modernized. Instead of having companies run by industrialists and stockholders, the State
assumed this power.


Agriculture and industry, the two most important elements of the Soviet
economy, were thus abandoned to state functionaries with no vested interest in
success. The country continued to suffer from unsatisfactory harvests,
disinterested agricultural workers with no reason for diligence, and the same thing
happened in the industrial sector. To this day, Russian agriculture is inadequate
and Russian manufacture produces nothing that anyone outside of the country
seems to want to buy.
However, the Soviets diligently enforced collectives in both agriculture and
industry, which was utopian, but in practice discouraged ambition and excellence
and ultimately created economic disaster.



Commonality of Culture, essential to both More’s and Plato’s utopias, is a
difficult thing to have in a country of (then) 11 time zones, with myriad ethnicities,
languages, religions, and cultures. The Soviets attempted to get this commonality
by force, planting Russian-speakers throughout, assuring there could be no
upward mobility without a Russian education, and severely punishing anybody
who dared complain about it. Resistant ethnic groups were uprooted from their
native turf and replanted in the vastness of Siberia, among hostile neighbors. The
consequences of this policy eat at Russia today, with a resurgence of terrorism and
guerilla warfare.



Cultural Practices. Whereas both Plato and More emphasized moderation in
foods and luxuries, avoiding their corrupting influences on leaders, the Soviet
system only moderated the food, clothing, and housing of the majority of subjects.
The leadership itself quickly became very much corrupted by access to goods and
services not available to their subjects. Simultaneously, their intrusive secret
services kept terror as a weapon to use against any incipient complaints from the
masses.
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Another cultural practice not found in either Plato’s or More’s utopian visions was
the all-pervading nostrum that has dogged all classes of Russians from their
inception, alcohol. Alcohol became a substitute for food or warmth for many, and
for the leadership class, it fueled dangerous behavior.


Current Prognosis. The Soviet Union has collapsed, followed by two decades
of chaos and close anarchy. Today, a leader from the former Soviet establishment,
Vladimir Putin, rules in a parody of democracy. His visions are not utopian; he is
far more pragmatically trying to restore Russia’s influence over Russia’s former
subject states. There is nothing utopian in his vision and without the temporary
flow of funds from the energy sector (Russian luck, not excellence), they may well
sink into the backwater from which they rose.

The Nazi German Empire
It is strange to think that out of one of Europe’s most dazzling countries, home of
extraordinary geniuses in music, art, philosophy, and literature, and even one genius in
state-building, Prime Minister Otto Von Bismarck, could become a dystopia that nearly
destroyed Europe. Under the utopian imagination of Hitler, his totalitarian Germany set
about creating a “brave new world” with nothing but the Aryan Race (an imaginary
concept) to run it. He imagined a “thousand-year” reign of Nazi rule in which his utopia
could be played out. Instead, he was stopped 12 years after he began, almost completely
destroying Germany.
In his notion of commonality of culture, one of the hallmarks of utopias, he ordered the
murder of all of his and his conquered countries’ Jews (Europe’s treasure of intellectuals
and artists); he did the same with the small population of European Gypsies; and then
decided that all Slavic peoples should be a permanent class of slaves.
He dabbled in an experiment to produce an entire class of Aryan citizens who would only
owe their allegiance to him, eliminating any concept of family. He kept specially selected
young women in what can only be called brothels to be impregnated by his elite Aryan
special services to produce perfect Aryan babies throughout his realm. This was, of
course, based on Plato’s description of Sparta.
The People’s Republic of China
It is amazing to think that a country as large as China, as diverse in the ethnicities it
contains, and with such a long history of centralized authority and relatively well-run
governance, could fall into a utopian fantasy under the control of a very small group of
totalitarian utopians. But out of the chaos of the Chinese Revolution rose a new empire
designed as a laboratory for utopian ideals.
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From Each According to His Abilities, To Each According to his Needs. This
theory eliminated the whole concept of enlightened self-interest. It imagined that
people would work hard, indifferent to reward for such work, and unselfishly
share the fruits of their labor with those who needed it. Incentive vanished in the
blink of an eye. The sharp end of this theory was force, not voluntary
unselfishness.



Community was to replace Family. Most utopias do not like family life. They
replace it with the commune, the common dining hall, the common rearing and
indoctrination of children, and group labor for projects ordered by the State. China
picked up More’s notion of urban populations annually assisting the farmers with
their labor. For More, this was to make everyone competent at food cultivation;
in China, it was used to punish, or to keep in line, middle class intellectuals.
Cambodia used it to exterminate its middle class.



Status of Women. Modern utopias supposedly emancipate women from being
the property of a husband. Many also pick up Plato’s suggestion that among the
guardian classes, sexuality be liberated from marriage to something once called
“free love.” This was tried, but never became popular. Marriage survived the
assault. But again, as in More’s Utopia, modern utopian movements recognized
that there would be need for female labor, which was wasted in the individuality
of family life.



Commonality of Values. Every utopia is designed to foment common values
among the participants. In a way, this is the idea of the consent of the governed.
China has always had a commonality of basic values from its inception. A
difference is that under the Marxist utopia, new values would be taught,
strengthened with propaganda, and enforced. It was a simultaneous action of
denigrating the old values and propping up the new ones.



Economic Transformation. Although China has a long history of autocracy, in
reality, it was governed by the rules of the Mandarins, civil servants culled through
layers of examinations for their positions. In this case, China has always had a
system that resembled that of Plato’s Guardians. But China has also had a long
history of entrepreneurism and the rewards earned from it. The Marxist utopian
system had no room for that, believing that there should be a classless civilization
in which everyone was equal.

China’s headlong plunge into this utopian structure was only sustained by reigns of terror
and ruthless compulsion. Their desire to reform agriculture resulted in famines; the
attempt to multiply their manufacturing capacity resulted in the stupid system of
establishing furnaces in each village, an enormous waste of labor and the death of
incompetent workers.
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Their single success was in communizing the nation’s health system. Village women
were trained to provide basic health instruction and care throughout China. Although not
a sophisticated system of modern medicine, it greatly improved national health through
new sanitary practices and better water supplies.
With the death of utopian Mao Zedong, whose last years were dogged by insanity, China
had the good luck (and intelligent governance) to open to the West and climb out of the
utopian straightjacket. It is now thriving economically, socially (with a burgeoning
modern middle class), and materially in almost every way.
Even Chinese
entrepreneurialism has returned, and with it the emergence of a class of ultra-rich and
powerful.
The Current Dystopians
Utopian visions die hard. Although there are no longer any nation-states trying to enforce
a single vision of society on its population, cults, usually wrapped in the mystique of
religion, are still trying to mirror Plato and More. Cults such as Jonestown and the Branch
Davidians both came to bad ends, largely because their respective leaders were not
philosopher kings; they were thugs drunk with total power.
The best example of dystopian nightmare is North Korea, whose family dynasty of leaders
has not been philosopher kings; they have been monsters. Albania, until the fall of the
Soviet Union, was an outlier of dystopian misery. It is no longer so, and North Korea is
not destined for longevity either.
Other dystopias still with us are not the descendants of Plato or More; they are the
products of another ideology, the fantasy of the perfect and just realms mirroring an
imagined perfect world of early Islam. The nation-state of Saudi Arabia is the only
country totally governed by the imagined utopia of the time of the Prophet Mohammad.
It continues to function because of its petrochemical wealth, authoritarian governance,
and an almost closed-off society. It is teetering on the brink of destruction from within.
It cannot seal itself off from the currents of the modern world much longer.
Some militant Muslim cults have taken up arms to retake lands once ruled by Islam.
Although their efforts are more addressed to areas already Muslim, they are attempting
to establish imagined utopian purist Muslim governance, undoing all the trappings of
modern global values. They oppose education, western dress, modernization for women,
and any of the arts and cultures of the global society. Their notions of a utopia do not sit
well with their conquered populations. They too are in failure mode.
Anarchists are still with us. They fall into the category of imagined, not constructed
utopias. Their mode is destruction, and they begin with no organized governance, which
quickly melts in the light of reality. The Bolsheviks imagined a utopia in the future as all
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governments melt away. Their anarchism was quickly replaced by totalitarianism and
big sticks. The Nazis also envisioned a thousand year empire peopled by only Aryans.
Their vision paralleled that of ancient Sparta, a military elite presiding over a world of
non-person slaves.
Conclusions
Literary utopias, inconsequential among the greatest works of literature, have had an
unexpected influence since the Renaissance. They have inspired designed societies not
only in Europe and America, but in Russia and China, with a number of satellite countries
of the big powers.
Almost all of these utopian experiments have morphed into dystopias, resulting in the
deaths of millions of people and global war. None have remained, with the exception of
North Korea. All the rest have morphed into more ordinary political and social
arrangements. But we must never overlook the seductiveness of utopian dreams and
nightmares.
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Criminal Justice Models and their Influence on Civilization: A
Comparison of East and West
Zhou Ling Ph.D1 and Harry D. Rhodes
zhouling@znufe.edu.cn; harrydet@hotmail.com
Criminal justice systems in the world generally seek two major goals: punishment of
crime (in turn, protection of society) and protection of individual rights. These two goals
are often in conflict with each other in the delivery of justice; sometimes satisfying one
would inevitably mean sacrificing the other. Criminal justice systems in different
countries differ in the actual execution of their criminal procedure, which has an
immediate and long term impact on society, culture, and ultimately the rise, fall, or
marginalization of their civilization(s).
Some would prefer to pursue the punishment of guilty at the cost of individual rights,
while others would insist on the preservation of rights even if that means the
marginalization of criminal investigation and prosecution. This false dichotomy can be
better understood as a continuum, with the focus of crime control on one end, gradually
adding the protection of rights while lowering the priority of crime control
simultaneously.
Generally, the U.S. and China are representatives of these two tendencies, with the U.S.
sitting on the side of rights’ protection and China on the crime control side. Differences
in the balance of these two goals play a major role in shaping the operational philosophies
of the two systems. Legislative, structural and procedural features of the two systems are
reflective of these philosophies and are deeply rooted in the cultural, political and
historical make-up of these two countries.

Figure 1. Map of China from CIA World Factbook 2014
1
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Figure 2. Map of United States from CIA World Factbook 2014

Structure of Criminal Justice Systems
Articles 123-135 in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982), describe
the judicial system of the PRC. It consists of two major components: the people’s court
system and the people’s procuratorate system, consisting of a 4-level hierarchy: the basic
(local) level, the municipal (intermediate) level, the provincial (higher) level, and the
national (Supreme) level. The procuratorates serve essentially as state entities for legal
supervision and they have specific powers and functions that are similar in nature to
prosecutors in the United States. They also investigate and decide which cases will be
prosecuted in addition to providing other oversight. They also supervise legal aspects of
the people’s courts, prisons and how judgments are carried out.
One might see the procuratorate as China’s public prosecutor by a different name. But
the difference in titles reflects the different roles they each play in their respective criminal
justice systems. While commonly called the District Attorney at the state level and U.S.
Attorney at the federal level, public prosecutors in the U.S. are considered officers of the
court, opposing defense attorneys in a virtually equal position. As governmental officials,
their job descriptions are limited, for the most part, to representing the government in
courts2. On the other hand, the Chinese procurators are embedded much deeper into the
concerted crime fighting effort by the government: not only do they work more closely
with an accusatorily - minded judge in criminal trials, they also exercise key supervisory
power (not simply coordinating) over criminal investigation by the police, issue warrants
for search and arrests, and are put directly in charge of investigation into corruption
crimes by government officials.

2

At both the state and federal level, the Attorney General usually heads the department of justice, which
makes him or her the leader of state and federal law enforcement. The district attorneys and U.S. Attorneys
in the field offices do not generally impose authority over local law enforcement other than coordination
and resource allocation. Their primary duty is legal representation and criminal prosecution.
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The wide range of power invested in the hands of a procurator can be largely explained
by the desire to fight crime more directly and efficiently. However, one can see the
potential of abuse when so much power is concentrated in the hands of one agency. At
times, concerns over the abuse of power outweigh the need to repress crime. This to a
large extent provides the rationale for relative compartmentalization of investigative,
prosecutorial and judicial power in the U.S. system.
The hierarchy of China’s court structure begins at the lowest level with the Basic People’s
Court and rises up to the Supreme People’s Court.
The Basic People’s Court consists of local level courts that adjudicate criminal and civil
cases of first instances. Criminal cases carrying penalty of death or life imprisonment, as
well as certain foreign civil cases, are excluded from jurisdiction at the Basic People’s
Courts. The Basic People’s courts can request certain important cases be transferred to a
higher court.
Intermediate People’s Court handles first instance jurisdiction in some cases, including
those transferred to it from the Basic People’s Court; major cases dealing with foreign
parties; counter revolutionary charges; criminal cases subject to life imprisonment or
death and crimes committed by foreigners. This type of court also hears appeals and
protests.
The Higher People’s Court has jurisdiction in the first instance in cases assigned by law
or transferred from lower courts and major criminal cases which impact the entire
province. The Higher People’s Court also hears cases of appeals or protests against
judgments and orders of lower courts.
The Supreme People’s Court has original jurisdiction over cases that have been assigned
to it by law, or over cases that it decides it should try. It has jurisdiction over appeals or
protests from the Higher People’s court and Special People’s Courts.
In addition to the Higher, Intermediate and Basic Peoples Courts, the following courts
also report to the Supreme People’s Court. They are: the Maritime Court, the Military
Court of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Railway Transportation and Forest
Affairs Courts. These courts, small in number and size, function as auxiliary to the main
frame of the court system, with limited jurisdiction in highly specialized areas that might
not be suitable for a regular court to cover.
Unlike the separation of trial courts and appellate courts in the U.S. court system, the
Chinese courts are differentiated by levels, not functions. In other words, all courts,
except the Basic People’s Courts function as trial courts and appellate courts at the same
time. Trial jurisdictions are allocated among courts at different levels based on the nature
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and gravity of cases specified by the Criminal Procedural Law, the Civil Procedural Law,
and the Administrative Procedural Law.
This structural feature actually presents a procedural glitch: the Supreme People’s Court
sits as a trial court with no upper court available for appeal. It rarely tries cases of first
instances. At such a time, the defendants would have virtually no way to exercise their
constitutional right to appeal. To this day, this issue is not addressed leglislatively and is
essentially circumvented in judicial practice: the trial jurisdiction of the Supreme People’s
Court’s is provided by law for cases of national importance or cases it decides to try. This
leaves enough room for interpretation, which helps to keep the Supreme People’s Court,
in essence, an appellate court.
The provincial Higher People’s Courts are essentially the highest level any case of first
instances can go, regardless of importance. In the last three decades, a handful of top
ranking government officials were tried for a variety of crimes, including several
members of the Politburo. None of them were tried by the Supreme People’s Court;
instead, they were all heard by the Higher People’s Courts, which left them opportunity
for at least one round of appeal.3
The U.S. court system is a dual judiciary system of which the two constituent parts
(federal and state) function independently of each other. The federal judiciary system
includes district courts, circuit courts of appeals, and the United States Supreme Court.
The state system includes trial courts at the local and state levels, intermediate courts of
appeal, and state supreme court. The primary agents working alongside each other are
the judge, prosecutor, and defense lawyer.4
An observer from China can easily identify several structural features of the U.S. court
system that distinguish it from the Chinese system: the overlapping judiciary systems, the
separation of trial courts and appellate courts, and the relatively limited and comparatively
simple role played by the public prosecutor.
The U.S. system, as in China, has its own structural glitch: the potential for violation of
the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy because of the dual system
structure. The Fifth Amendment prohibits a person from being “subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”. So when a person is acquitted,
convicted, or punished for an offense, he or she should be free from future prosecution
based on the same facts.
3

The Supreme People’s Court initially tried only one case in the history of the People’s Republic of
China, which is the “Gang of Four” case, where four top ranking government officials, including Jiang
Qing, wife of Chairman Mao ZeDong, were tried and convicted for treason.
4
Comparing US and Republic of China’s Criminal Justice System. (Page 3)
http://www.ukessays.com/essays/criminology/comparing-us-and-republic-of-chinas-criminal-justicesystem-criminology-essay.php Retrieved 2014.04.10
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But the “dual sovereignty” doctrine that recognizes federal and state as two different
jurisdictions thus allow a federal prosecution of an offense to proceed regardless of a
previous state prosecution for the same offense5, and vice versa6. Although the Supreme
Court stands behind this arrangement on legal grounds7, the nature of its logic (that one
can be held responsible for one action twice if there are two sets of rules overlapping in
coverage) has caused reluctance among the federal law enforcement agencies to exploit
the condition.
These two systems, despite their many differences, show something in common:
pragmatic wisdom when trying to balance two key interests of the justice systems,
namely, legality, based on the formal institution, and legitimacy, proven by substantive
protection of rights.

Figure 3. Legal System in China source Law Info China
5

Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959)
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)
7
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922)
6
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Methods of Punishment
From a comparative point of view, Chinese and U.S. punishment methods look similar at
higher levels, but they begin to diverge at lower levels of seriousness.
Both systems retain death penalty provisions despite the international trend of abolition;
both reserve death penalties for only the most serious types of offenses. Imprisonment
(including life-long and termed) is the most commonly used punishment in both systems.
Both systems punish some individuals by imposition of a fine.
Some punishment methods show subtle differences in the ways they are imposed. For
example, seizure of property can be used as a punishment for certain types of property
crime in China. It sounds similar to what can happen in the U.S. but bears key differences
from American criminal forfeiture rules. In the U.S., seizure is normally imposed only
upon property believed to be proceeds or instruments of crime. Property subject to seizure
under the Chinese law can be all or part of a person’s legal property, regardless of its
relationship to a crime.
Many in China find its legal property seizure practices to be an effective deterrence to
crimes for profit. However, taking of legal property beyond the scope of a fine can be
and often is controversial.
Another punishment appearing similar but differing in execution is the deprivation of
political rights. In China, all inmates are stripped of their political rights including, but
not limited to, the right to vote. The penal code also allows the imposition of such
deprivation as either a follow-up to imprisonment or as a stand-alone penalty. The
Chinese penal code provides that for the duration of this penalty, one cannot run for public
office, cannot head a public enterprise or organization and cannot vote. In addition,
individuals may not exercise freedom of speech and press.
By comparison, the deprivation of rights is used in more limited scope in the U.S., usually
involving voting restrictions and in some circumstances, beyond incarceration. A
prisoners’ right to vote is handled differently from state to state, with the majority not
allowing inmates to vote while imprisoned. Once the terms are served, most rights are
reinstated. However, this position varies between states and political perspectives. In
that sense, the deprivation of voting rights, in a general sense, is not used as a punishment,
but more as a security measure preventing abuse by a special population.
Some might consider these differences nuances and not substantial. We find them
consistent with general orientations of the two systems. The Chinese system, concerned
about public safety and social control, tends to be more aggressive when it comes to
stripping criminals of their rights, be it property, political or civil. The U.S. system,
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concerned more about the government’s infringement upon people’s rights, treads more
carefully when it comes to taking those rights away, even from known criminals.
One right bearing crucial importance is the offenders’ right to judicial process (or due
process, as referenced by the U.S. Constitution). Differences in how the two systems deal
with this issue can be seen in societal and civilizational impacts of the past, present and
long term future.
In most Western legal systems, punishment for criminal activity is handled only by courts.
By contrast, China has different levels of punishment based on value or damage. Thus it
also uses an “administrative penalty” outside the judiciary to manage public security
infringements that are not considered a “crime”.
According to Xia Yong, Dean of the Criminal Justice School, Zhongnan University
School of Economics and Law,8 in essence, theft can be a criminal offense if the amount
stolen is above 500 Yuan (Chinese currency)9, but it is considered an administrative
violation if below that amount.
Administrative penalties were first enacted in 1986 and amended in 1994 by the Chinese
legislature. Administrative penalties may result in a term of confinement or a fine. A
person may be charged with an administrative violation for disturbing the social order,
endangering public safety, infringing upon the rights of others, or encroaching upon
public or private property.
Where an act is not deemed serious enough for referral to the courts, the Chinese police
may handle a case. In fact, according to Dean Xia, Chinese police usually settle more
cases administratively than as criminal cases each year. (Xia 2002). The existence of
administrative penalties helps to increase the efficiency of the court system by removing
large numbers of minor cases from the crowded court dockets.
Penalties associated with administrative violations of the public security are classified
into three categories:
1. Warning
2. Fines ranging from one to 200 Yuan (or in certain circumstances up to 5,000
Yuan) or
3. Detention ranging from one day to a maximum of fifteen days.

8

Xia Yong (2002) Administrative Punishment as a Means of social Control. Page 1-2. Vol. 18 Issue 61.
Criminal Justice Institute Archives. http://www.cjimagazine.com/archivescji3221.html Retrieved
2014.04.10
9
According to recent changes in the penal code and judicial interpretation, the threshold of
criminalization for theft has been raised to 1000 Yuan.
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Interestingly, the appropriate jurisdictional authority may administer warnings and fines
up to 50 Yuan on the spot. Fines exceeding 50 Yuan may be imposed if there is no
objection by the offender. If a person does not accept a fine exceeding 50 Yuan or if there
are other penalties involved, different procedures are initiated. These involve:
1) Summons; 2) Interrogation; 3) Presentation of evidence; and 4) Ruling.
After being summoned to the respective public security entity, an offender will be
interrogated and an investigation will be conducted. The investigation is not to exceed 24
hours. An offender or victim may protest the ruling of the public security entity or the
people’s governments of townships or towns. He or she may petition to the public
security entity at the next higher jurisdictional level within five days after receiving notice
of the ruling. The next higher level shall make a new ruling within five days after
receiving the petition.
When an offender protests this ruling, he or she may file a petition within five days with
the Local People’s court. The case is then handled by the courts. If a mistake was found
to have been made by the lower level public security entity, an apology shall be made to
the offender and all fines or confiscated property will be returned. Where the legal rights
or interests of those who have been punished have been violated, an individual may also
be compensated. (Xia 2002).
This method of handling many cases via administrative processes that would otherwise
be criminal, impacts citizens, the court process and society. It ameliorates to a large extent
the stigma of a criminal offense, helps to reduce a large caseload of the overall courts
system, and can provide an incentive to social order and acceptable behavior of citizens.
Indeed, the title of Xia’s paper is “Administrative Punishment as a Means of Social
Control.”
Deprivation of liberty, no matter how slight, without a judicial process would be
unconstitutional in the U.S. This concern has been raised by scholars in China as well;
attention has been called to the lack of qualified and impartial adjudicators, prudent
decision-making mechanisms, and effective means for legal challenges. Nonetheless, this
particular approach of punishing minor offences is widely supported in the Chinese
system for three major reasons: First, only a very short term imprisonment may be
imposed. Second, the system is very efficient in handling minor cases. Third, it avoids
the unnecessary label of “criminal” that might cause secondary deviance. Apparently, it
is yet another example of choosing public security and social control over protection of
rights.
Criminal Procedure
Law in the United States stems from four primary sources; constitutional law, statutory
law, administrative regulations and common law. The Constitution of the United States
is the primary source and all other laws are subordinate to the Constitution. The United
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States uses precedent as a means for making decisions in court and previous cases serve
as guides for subsequent cases before the court(s). The United States system considers
that there is presumption of innocence until proven guilty, allows for plea-bargaining,
trial by jury, and the right to a speedy or quick trial.10 A flow chart of Sino-American
criminal procedures is illustrated in Figure 4.
The reader can identify a number of differences between the criminal procedures of the
two countries as reported in Figure 4. Some are inconsequential technicalities. However,
others reflect crucial differences in core values.
The following are what the authors deem to be the defining differences:
1) The Jury
The right to be tried by an impartial jury is provided by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. It applies to federal criminal procedures by its own right, and to the state
criminal procedures via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
concept of a jury trial has been deeply rooted in the American idea of justice and many
students of law admit they would have a difficult time imagining how a criminal justice
system would function without it. In China, the jury system is a relatively foreign idea.
The literal translation in Chinese for the term “juror” is “accompanying judge.” In the
Chinese system, the term is used, but it refers to a significantly different entity, the lay
judges who sit on the judge’s panel and serve the same function as a professional judge.
From a Chinese point of view, the two systems are not that different as far as the jury
feature is concerned. They both have in their criminal procedure a component called
“accompanying judge,” that is, a “jury” member. But this type of “jury” system is not
recognized by Western observers, many of whom would rather call it “People’s Assessor”
instead. This is an interesting case of lost in translation.
The key difference between the two systems is that the U.S. jury is a separate institution
in the courtroom, working independently from the judge both in terms of purpose and
decision-making. The Chinese people’s assessor is imbedded in the judge’s panel, united
in purpose with and greatly influenced by the professional judge(s) on the panel. Working
so closely with the professional judge, the people’s assessors generally are unable to do
what the American jury was designed to do: protect the defendant from an arbitrary and
capricious decision by taking a substantial portion of judicial power from the judge’s
hands.

10

Comparing US and Republic of China’s Criminal Justice System. (Page 3)
http://www.ukessays.com/essays/criminology/comparing-us-and-republic-of-chinas-criminal-justicesystem-criminology-essay.php Retrieved 2014.04.10
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Figure 4. Ling Zhou & H.D. Rhodes 2014
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2) The Effect of a Plea
It may be argued that the American jury system has an Achilles heel, to wit, the high
demand for allocation of time and resources. A jury trial, in comparison to a bench trial
without jury, requires additional personnel, extra procedures, and normally longer
deliberation so as to meet the needs of twelve people to reach agreement. When a serious
matter is being weighed, or complex fact digested, the additional time is justifiable.
However, it is harder to justify the additional time for minor offenses with simple facts
that swamp the courtroom on a daily basis. This is one reason the American system
invented the “plea bargain” as a remedy.
Beginning at the arraignment, a defendant may enter a guilty plea. Thereupon, a judge
may skip trial and proceed directly to the sentencing stage. So, in the American system,
the plea of guilty may substantially alter court proceedings. It is utilized fully today,
alleviating the court’s burden while avoiding a jury trial, the defendant’s constitutional
right.
One may argue that very few guilty pleas at arraignment arise from the good conscience
of the defendant. The plea is commonly used by defendants as leverage to bargain for a
more favorable outcome of the case and the prosecutors frequently are under pressure to
complete their caseload in a timely fashion. If a lesser charge can entice a guilty plea, it
will in turn save a potentially lengthy (sometimes unwinnable) trial, so most prosecutors
would consider this a step forward. Hence the term “plea bargain.” Of course,
constitutional rights are not technically infringed upon in such a situation since the right
to a jury trial has been given up voluntarily.
In contrast, the Chinese criminal procedure recognizes a guilty plea, regardless of the time
it was entered, only as a confession extracted by investigation.
The Chinese criminal justice system includes a stated policy of “leniency on confession,
harshness on resistance” (坦白从宽， 抗拒从严). There is a somewhat similar concept in U.S.
practice, whereby a defendant who professes innocence but is found guilty may receive
harsher treatment simply because of continued claims of innocence. But the Chinese
policy should in no way be interpreted as the Chinese version of the plea bargain. Why?
Because all confessions of a crime must be independently verified just as any other
evidence obtained must be. Thus, a guilty plea (or confession, in essence) will not alter
the criminal proceeding substantively.
The police or the procurator uses this policy to entice cooperation from the accused, but
not nearly to the extent of a plea bargain in the U.S. This is primarily because, unlike a
U.S. prosecutor, who can use his or her prosecutorial discretion to lower or raise the
seriousness of charges and penalties asked for, the procurators in China are permitted only
to file charges based on the facts and according to the law. Without discretion, there is
simply no position to bargain. The most one can expect in return for a confession to
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Chinese authorities is the consideration of the court during sentencing. The penal code
provides for confession as an alleviating factor for the seriousness of a crime, therefore
justifying a relatively milder punishment. But the decision is in the hands of the judge
and not up for negotiation.
It is said by some that the Chinese system does not need the plea bargain because, unlike
the U.S. system, there is no pressing need to speed up the pace of criminal proceedings.
This brings us to the third difference between the two systems.
3) The Pace of Proceedings
When it comes to the pace of criminal proceedings, both an American looking towards
the Chinese system and a Chinese looking toward the American system are likely to be
surprised. The American observer would likely cry out “too quick!” and the Chinese
observer “too slow!”
To put this comparison into perspective, we compare two actual capital cases handled by
the two systems: the Scott Peterson case of the U.S. and the Ma Jiajue case of China.
Both cases featured severe crimes of extreme cruelty. Peterson, a California businessman,
was accused of murdering his pregnant wife in December 2002, presumably so he could
be free from the marriage and be with his lover. He was arrested on April 18, 2003. Ma,
a biology student of Yunnan University, was accused of murdering four of his classmates
in February 2004, allegedly over trivial disputes. He was arrested on March 15, 2004.
The two events happened about 14 months apart. Peterson’s arrest took longer as a result
of his apparent deception during the investigation. Ma was named the prime suspect
almost immediately and caught as a fugitive shortly after the crime. Both men were
brought to justice in a reasonably swift manner. However, if we take the time of arrest as
the official starting point of criminal proceeding, the pace and progress of the cases show
significant differences.
Following his arrest, Peterson was officially charged with murder on April 21, 2003; he
plead not guilty. A preliminary hearing was held on October 29, 2003. As a result of the
preliminary hearing, two charges of murder were filed against him on November 18,
2003. A few months later, in February 5, 2004, trial began with the selection of the jury.
On May 27, 2004, jury selection was completed, enabling the fact-finding to begin. On
November 12, 2004, the jury convicted Peterson on the two charges of murder. On
December 13, 2004, almost two years after the victim, Laci Peterson, was reported
missing, the jury recommended the death penalty for Peterson. He was not formally
sentenced to death for another three months, on March 16 of 2005. However, the criminal
proceedings continued. On July 5, 2012, eight years after being sentenced to death and
several rounds of appeals, Peterson filed an automatic appeal to the California Supreme
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Court11. As of this writing, Scott Peterson continues to be held in San Quentin State Prison
in California, awaiting the final conclusion of his case. Peterson may continue to file
further petitions through the federal court systems if his appeal were denied by the
California Supreme Court. His case may continue for years to come.
If the Peterson case raises Chinese readers’ eyebrows for its crawling pace, the Ma case
likely sends chills down American readers’ spines for the opposite reason. Almost
immediately after his arrest on March 15, 2004, a charge of murder was filed against Ma
by the Kunming People’s Procuratorate. His trial began on April 22, 2004, and he was
convicted on April 24. Because Ma did not file for appeal, the Yunnan Higher People’s
Court automatically initiated the Death Penalty Confirmation process. And on June 17,
2004, less than 4 months after the crime was reported, the Higher People’s Court
confirmed Ma’s death penalty and he was executed the same day.
Differences in pace between the two systems are not easily explained. The presence or
absence of a jury in criminal proceeding is a major factor. Even in the U.S., a bench trial
can be swift. Another important reason is the dynamic in the courtroom during trial, be
it unilateral or contentious. This brings us to the next major difference between the
systems.
4) The Dynamics of the Courtroom Work Group
Generally, the U.S. courtroom work group consists of the judge, the prosecutor, and the
defense attorney. Other than the jury (or the people’s assessors in China’s case), they are
the major players in the courtroom and to a large extent determine how things move
forward in the criminal proceedings.
They are grouped together because they interact with one another on a routine basis and
share commonalities relating to occupation, education and experience. Although not
formally, the courtroom work group is a type of social organization, with its own values,
norms, and accepted practices (Neubauer 1996, 70-76). And the members each are
dependent upon the others to accomplish their goals in the criminal proceedings.
The same characterization applies to the Chinese courtroom. With closer inspection, one
might even say that the courtroom work group in the Chinese system brings the nature of
such a group to the next level. If one would paint a picture of a typical U.S. criminal trial
as the prosecutor and the defense attorney fighting in front of a neutral judge for the fate
of the accused, he or she might describe the Chinese criminal trial as the judge, aided by
the prosecutor, coming down hard on the accused, while the defense attorney barely puts
up a fight. Comparative criminal justice study has specific terms for each of the above
scenes: the former is known as the adversarial trial model, and the latter accusatorial trial
model.
11

Fox News, 2012. Timeline: The Scott Peterson Case, FoxNews.com: July 06, 2012. Online article
retrieved on June 12, 2014 at: http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/07/06/timeline-scott-peterson-case/
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A tenet of comparative criminal justice study is that the difference between the adversarial
model and the accusatorial model is highly related to the criminal justice system’s
orientation on rights’ protection or crime control.


In the adversarial model, the most powerful player, namely the judge, is to a large
extent limited to a passive role, while the accuser and the accused present
arguments against each other from equally entitled footing. The benefit of this
model is that the government is stripped of its administrative power, left only with
the tools of evidence and logic, and carries the need to prove the burden of proof.
Thus it is hard to wrong an innocent man, but it is correspondingly difficult to
convict a guilty one.



On the contrary, the accusatorial model moves the judge out of the passive
position, charges him with the fact-finding authority. And the roles of the
prosecutor and defense attorney are also changed subtly, from representatives of
each side (regardless of the fact), to judge’s aids in the search for truth, each from
a different perspective. The benefit of this model is if everyone is working
together to uncover the truth, the truth (or assumed truth) will be revealed much
faster. Of course, even with all parties acting impartially, the rushed procedure
itself risks a higher chance for errors. To advocates of the adversarial model, that
is simply the price to be paid for swift justice.

The distinct features of each model and their pros and cons demonstrate why the U.S.
criminal justice system is described as adversarial in nature and the Chinese accusatorial.
Underlying Cultural Foundations
The value of equality as experienced in each culture is another vantage point from which
to understand the two systems.
Both cultures emphasize the importance of equality in maintaining social order. The great
Chinese philosopher Confucius once said: “It is not the insufficiency, but the inequality
that worries me.” It resonates deeply with the famous observation by Plato about the poor
and the rich being at war with each other. Therefore, both countries were constructed
with the desire to promote social justice via social equality. This is seen in the phrase
averring that “All men are created equal” found in the Declaration of Independence of the
United States and in the statement that “each person stands equally in front of the law”
found in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
Differences between the two cultures cause differences in how each country materializes
the promises of equality. The criminal justice system, whose very existence stems from
the issue of inequality, and whose operation relies on the perception of equality, highlights
such differences for everyone to see.
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The U.S. style of equality is deeply rooted in the idea of individualism. While the
Declaration of Independence states that “All men are created equal,” all may not
necessarily end up as equal. In fact, U.S. ideals of equality may endorse inequality
resulting from personal endeavor: as long as everyone starts on equal footing, some say,
the rich deserve to be rich, and the poor pay by being poor. A social system of
individualistic equality may tend to elevate private entities while sometimes demeaning
public entities such as, for example, the government. Some on the American right today
argue that the former embodies the value of personal endeavor while the latter, according
to them, seeks to “take from the achieved and give to the under-achiever.
Thus, when it comes to the U.S. criminal justice system, the notion of equality based on
individualism can easily translate into a design that allows the protection of rights to be
enhanced by personal wealth (or compromised by the lack thereof). At the core of this
design are attorneys who enter the profession and are subsequently paid for their services.
Many features of the criminal proceedings make lawyers even more influential in shaping
the delivery of justice, such as the adversarial trial model, the jury, the plea bargain.
In the end, we are left with a criminal justice system that spares no effort to protect the
rights of those who can afford it, and leaves it to governmental support, friends, and
charity to cover the rights of those who cannot. One might protest the unfairness of the
system, but when individualism is added into the equation, it becomes a common
outcome.
By contrast, the Chinese style of equality is collectivistic at its core. While it recognizes
the endeavor by individuals, it pays particular attention to the underprivileged. It is
mindful that those with more stature could take advantage of their established position,
causing undue harm to those in a less defensible position.
A social system of this orientation attempts to emphasize the importance of the state as a
balancing force and upholder of social justice. As a result, the criminal justice system
would not intentionally endorse a design that would allow manipulation based on wealth
or power unless it is absolutely necessary.
The result of this is a more limited role for lawyers and fewer loopholes to be exploited
by the legal professionals. We may note the lack of enthusiasm for an independent jury
in China’s criminal procedures. A jury made up by lay people, lacking in basic training
in legal reasoning, may be easily swayed by a highly skilled (probably very expensive)
defense attorney. This creates substantial inconsistency in a jury’s decision, with the
defendant’s financial resources as a primary predictor. Many Chinese feel that by
removing the jury, and leaving the decision to a panel of professional judges properly
trained in truth-finding and the application of law, the lawyers will be limited in the
number and type of methods (tricks) to use in the courtroom, and the delivery of justice
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will be largely independent from the wealth of the defendant, and more reflective of the
evidence and the law.
A 2008 report by the American Bar Association, entitled Criminal Justice System
Improvements, begins by saying all of us rely on the criminal justice system to keep us
safe and maintain order. We expect our criminal laws to enable the courts to separate the
guilty from the innocent, to incapacitate truly dangerous individuals, and to promote
deterrence and retribution for those who violate the law. We also expect the criminal law
and the criminal justice system to be fair and even-handed and to enable the rehabilitation
of criminal offenders. Further, we expect the criminal justice system to assist offenders
who completed their sentences to re-enter the community as productive citizens and to
avoid commission of crimes in the future.12
Current national policy on crime prevention, control and punishment in the United States
is, however, overbalanced toward punishment. In 2014 the Executive branch of
government – the President and Justice Department – have begun to re-evaluate such
things as disparate mandatory sentencing laws and confinement practices that are
excessively harsh. The American Bar Association Report cited above supports use of
alternatives to incarceration for offenders who pose little or no threat to communities.
Criminal justice systems in China and the United States both seek to curb the proliferation
of crime, maintain public safety and minimize additional offenses. Both systems use
court systems, employ police, and have correctional or detention facilities. But because
of ideologically different government models, there are clear differences that affect
outcomes and society.
Chris Jones, Rutgers University, wrote in an article Comparison of Social Control in
China and the United States13 that to bring about social compliance, the United States
utilizes formal institutionalized means as it controls crime through the state and
government at all levels. The views of society have less influence than institutional
actions. We have an exceedingly active formal legal system. Because of that, deterrence
of crime is through the police, the law, and the court system. In the United States almost
all instances of crime involve use of the police as the first resort. People call the police
for nearly everything. In addition to the police, the court system is used extensively. The
concept of “innocent until proven guilty” is one reason why people constantly resort to
the court system. Another is that there is the chance one might avoid punishment for
crime.

12

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/transition/2008dec_crimjustice.authcheckd
am.pdf Retrieved 2014.05.12
13
Jones, Chris. (2014) Comparison of Social Control in China and the United States. Rutgers University
Alum. Yahoo Contributor Network (now closed). Pp1-2
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Social control in China sharply contrasts with social control in the United States. In China,
Jones states, the main source of social control is informal. The Chinese rely on morality
and family pride to deter crimes. Thus, what you do reflects strongly on your image and
family’s honor. In addition, the numerous teachings of morality in early childhood have
a strong impact on values and mindset. They stress that a person must have self-discipline
and subordination to the family and country. The Chinese rely on the social collective to
enforce crime.
Morality plays a large part in the deterrence of crime in China as it is part of early
education and norms. Crime deterrence in the United States is primarily due to external
factors which work to impede crimes. The difference is between intrinsic (China) versus
extrinsic (United States), this argument maintains. According to Jones, a number of
psychological studies have shown intrinsic factors are stronger than extrinsic motivating
factors. American children are taught that committing a crime will lead to severe
punishments such as jail, Chinese children are taught what it means “to be a dutiful son,
a loyal official, and even a benevolent ruler”. Education and reasoning provide a much
stronger and lasting effect on controlling crime.
There are fundamental differences in the effectiveness of the two systems. Each country
begins with a different cultural paradigm. For the culture of the United States being
individualistic is paramount; for China’s culture, it is being collective. While people in
China measure crimes and deviance through morality and how it will affect their family
image, people in the United States, for the most part, avoid committing crimes because
of punishment. (Jones P 1-2).
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From Brinton To Goldstone: A Scientific Civilizational Perspective On
The Theory Of Revolution
Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov and Stephen Satkiewicz
vlad_ai@yahoo.com; ssatkiewicz@yahoo.com
“Revolutions are the locomotives of history.”
Karl Marx
“The revolution, like Saturn, devours its children.”
Pierre Victurnien Vergniaud
“Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.”
John F. Kennedy

INTRODUCTION
In order to adequately investigate the complex and volatile phenomenon of revolution,
we ought to place it within a relevant scientific field of knowledge. The theoretical and
methodological foundations of such a field, named Civilizational Science, have been
developed by Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov (Alalykin-Izvekov, 2011).
The analysis of the phenomenon of revolution and its theory draws on the work of
prominent social scholars and thinkers, including Pitirim Sorokin, Arnold Toynbee, Leo
Trotsky, Crane Brinton, Samuel Huntington, Charles Tilly, and Jack Goldstone. The goal
of the investigation is to produce an empirical framework of the phenomenon of
revolution that is explanatory and open to repeated application and testing. After laying
out theoretical premises and illustrating them with examples of four revolutions from the
period between the 17th and the 20th century, the authors analyze the unfolding Ukrainian
Revolution and present plausible scenarios of future developments.
Sections on “Civilizational Science Perspective on the Phenomenon of Revolution,”
“Theory of Revolution in the Context of Civilizational Science,” and “Case Studies of
Revolutions” were written by Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov and the section on the “Externaltype versus Internal-type Revolutions” was written by Stephen Satkiewicz.
THE CIVILIZATIONAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE ON THE PHENOMENON
OF REVOLUTION
One of the perennial features of sociocultural development is the phenomenon of
revolution. Its underlying conditions, causes, symptoms, stages, sociocultural dynamics,
consequences, and other relevant aspects are still poorly understood and, as a result, many
people suffer during those often horrific events. Yet, as a careful scientific analysis
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convincingly proves, it is often possible to explain and predict those phenomena as well
as to alleviate some of their most terrible consequences.
Let us consider this phenomenon in the context of Civilizational Science in search
for answers on the causes, conditions, symptoms, stages, sociocultural dynamics, and
consequences of revolutions.
THEORY OF REVOLUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVILIZATIONAL
SCIENCE
Defining Revolution
Charles Tilly differentiates between a coup, a top-down seizure of power, a civil war,
a revolt, a rebellion and other occurrences that do not transform justification for authority,
political institutions or economic and social structures, and a revolution which does just
that. (Tilly, 1995:15).
Samuel Huntington agrees, noting that a coup d’état in itself changes only leadership
and perhaps policies; a rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and
political institutions, but not social structure and values; a war of independence is a
struggle of one community against rule by an alien community and does not necessarily
involve changes in the social structure of either community. (Huntington, 1977: 264).
Jack Goldstone highlights the significance of the universal human quest for social
justice. Of all social upheavals, the scholar notes, only revolutions combine all the
elements of forcible overthrow of the government, mass mobilization, the pursuit of a
vision of social justice, and the creation of new political institutions (Goldstone, 2014: 9).
Thus we arrive at a general definition of the phenomenon of revolution as a strategy
of struggle for a certain vision of social justice, which at minimum leads to mass
mobilization, the change of government, and the creation of new institutions.
Revolutionary Conditions
Scholars agree that revolution is a complex process that emerges from the social order
becoming frayed in many areas at once. Jack Goldstone writes: “This is how revolutions
arise – over time, a society shifts from a condition of stable equilibrium to unstable
equilibrium. Then, even a small disorder can set off an accelerating movement toward
greater disorder and the overturning of the existing regime.” (Goldstone, 2014: 15).
This thinker points to a general agreement among social scholars regarding the five
elements that create an unstable social equilibrium from which revolutions can arise:
1) national economic or fiscal strains; 2) alienation and opposition among the elites;
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3) widespread popular anger at injustice; 4) an ideology that presents a persuasive shared
narrative of resistance; and 5) favorable international relations. (Goldstone, 2014: 16-18).
When these five conditions coincide, the normal social mechanisms that restore order
in crises are unlikely to work. Instead, societies where these conditions prevail are in an
unstable equilibrium, where any untoward event can trigger escalating popular revolts
and open elite resistance, producing a revolution. (Goldstone, 2014: 19).
Structural and Transient Causes of Revolutions
Scholars define the structural causes as long-term and large-scale trends that
undermine existing social institutions and relationships. They include: 1) demographic
change; 2) shift in the pattern of international relations; 3) uneven or dependent economic
development; 4) new patterns of exclusion or discrimination against particular groups;
and 5) the evolution of personalist regimes. (Goldstone, 2014: 23).
According to Crane Brinton, examples of these types of causes may be the
following:
 long and unresolved struggle between the monarchy and the lesser nobility over
political power and revenues;
 exploitation of the peasantry, and a huge gap in the standard of living between
rich and poor;
 gradual and long-range effects of the Commercial and Industrial Revolutions
bring about change;
 rise of the middle class based on urbanization, and mercantile, and industrial
growth;
 rise of the working class (19th century or later);
 structural unemployment and re-employment created by changes in modes of
production caused by industrialization;
 more "enlightened" philosophy and greater political awareness as a result of
more widespread education, greater expectations, and ideas of equality and
liberty;
 immediate factors which trigger unrest and unleash the revolutionary process
usually include economic problems associated with war, financial indebtedness,
privation among the lower class, an inefficient and corrupt government; and
 crisis, usually of a financial nature, dividing the ruling elite and paralyzing the
government. (Brinton, 1965: 27-66; 250-252).
The transient causes are contingent events or actions by particular individuals or
groups that reveal the impact of longer term trends and often galvanize revolutionary
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oppositions to take further action. Among those may be, for example, spikes of inflation,
defeat in war, riots or demonstrations that challenge state authority. In addition, state
responses to protest can trigger wider protests. (Goldstone, 2014: 24). Still, it is the
structural causes which create the underlying instability that scholars treat as the
fundamental causes of revolutions. (Goldstone, 2014: 25).
Uniformities in Revolutions
Crane Brinton observes that the discernible uniformities in the revolutionary
processes are usually as follows:
1) although the society as a whole may be on a relative economic upswing, the
general ineptitude and inefficiency of the governmental machinery usually
causes major financial difficulties;
2) lack of social mobility for the middle classes;
3) definite and bitter class antagonisms;
4) transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals toward social change;
5) many members of the ruling class lose faith in their old traditions and habits
and/or become decadent; and
6) ineptitude in using force to suppress the revolution. (Brinton, 1965: 250-253).
In a kind of Hegelian modus operandi, the life-career of these tectonic events may
resemble the movement of a giant pendulum, moving from the Right (“The Old Order”)
to the Middle (“The Moderates”) to the Left (“The Radicals”), and then back to the Right
(“The Thermidor”). (Brinton, 1965: IX-X)
One of the characteristic features of revolutions is the so called “dual power”
(sometimes referred to as “two-fold power,” “double sovereignty,” or “two-power
regime”). It reflects the moment of historical tension when two powers stand poised
against each other: that of the faltering state which represents the declining social forces
and that of the revolutionary institutions which speak in the name of the new. Among
those who first investigated this important phenomenon was Leon Trotsky. Analyzing
the English, the French, the Russian, and the German revolutions, the legendary
revolutionary considers the whole revolutionary process through the prism of this
concept, as a kind of a dialectical struggle of opposites in the recurring revolutionary
cycles. (Trotsky, 1976)
As for the leaders, in the opinion of Eric Hoffer, revolutions are prepared by “men of
words” brought to fulfillment by “fanatics,” and finally again reduced to the “measure of
ordinary societies” by the “practical men of action.” (Brinton, 1965:117)
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“Western-type” versus “Eastern-type” Revolutions; Revolutionary Alliances
Among a wealth of other innovative ideas, Samuel Huntington brings into the theory
of revolution a concept of “Western-type” and “Eastern-type” revolutions. Other terms
identifying those two patterns of state breakdown are “central collapse” and “peripheral
advance.” (Goldstone, 2014: 27)
Huntington notes: “The Western revolution moves through the collapse of the
established political institutions, the expansion of participation, the creation of new
institutions. More elaborately, in Brinton’s terms, it evolves from the fall of the old order,
through the revolutionary honeymoon, the rule of the moderates, the efforts at counterrevolution, the rise of the radicals, the reign of terror and of virtue, and, eventually, the
Thermidor.
“The pattern of the Eastern revolution is quite different... In the Western revolution
the revolutionaries come to power in the capital first and then gradually expand their
control over the countryside. In the Eastern revolution they withdraw from central, urban
areas of the country, establish a base area of control in a remote section, struggle to win
the support of the peasants through terror and propaganda, slowly expand the scope of
their authority, and gradually escalate the level of their military operations from
individual terroristic attacks to guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare and regular warfare.
“Eventually they are able to defeat the government troops in battle. The last phase of
the revolutionary struggle is the occupation of the capital.” (Huntington, 1977: 271-272).
The thinker goes on to explain that while the “Western-type” revolutions are usually
directed against the highly vulnerable traditional regimes amidst dire financial and
sociopolitical troubles, the “Eastern-type” revolutions are typically directed against at
least partially modernized regimes, in which circumstances no quick revolutionary
victory is possible. (Huntington, 1977: 273-274).
He also highlights the importance of a complicated interplay of various social forces
and circumstances for a revolution to occur. He notes:
A revolution necessarily involves the alienation of many groups from the existing
order... One social group can be responsible for a coup, a riot, or a revolt, but only a
combination of groups can produce a revolution. Conceivably, this combination might
take form of any number of possible group coalitions. In actuality, however, the
revolutionary alliance must include some urban and some rural groups. The opposition
of urban groups to the government can produce the continued instability characteristic of
a praetorian state. But only the combination of urban opposition with rural opposition
can produce a revolution. (Huntington, 1977: 277).
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“External-type” versus “Internal-type” Revolutions

It is also important to distinguish between "External" and the "Internal" revolutions.
"External" would convey revolutions that are conducted against external authorities, i.e.
within the context of anti-colonial struggles. This would apply to the American
Revolution as the archetype but also to other anti-colonial revolutions. "Internal" might
be called revolutions against the internal authority of a country, and both the French and
Russian revolutions would be archetypes of such.
A characteristic common to the theoretical definition of revolution is to distinguish it
from other major forms of social and political unrest. Samuel Huntington for example,
distinguishes revolutions from “insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of
independence.” (Huntington, 1977: 264). Charles Tilly further differentiates revolutions
from civil wars. (Charles Tilly, 1995: 15) While this is valid, it leaves open the potential
neglect of the complex historical realities that revolutions have often been intertwined
with, other forms of unrest. Insurrections have been important in inciting several
revolutions; coups have often marked the key transitions from one stage of a revolution
to another stage. In addition, revolutions have often been marked by civil wars between
different factions fighting for control, and it is also undeniable that throughout history
revolutions have often occurred within the context of wars of independence.
It may therefore be important for Civilizational Science, given its multi-paradigmatic
nature, to further categorize revolutions based upon their possible close relationship to
other forms of social and political unrest. This would especially be vital to any proper
comparative study and analysis of various revolutions.
One proposed way to achieve this goal is to categorize revolutions based upon the
nature of the Old Order that it is being directed against. Within this context, revolutions
can be classified as being either Internal or External in nature.
We define Internal Revolution as a revolution that occurs within a given social and
political entity and is largely directed against the domestic authority of the Old Order.
The French Revolution can be classified as a paradigmatic example of an Internal
Revolution. The Old Order was perceived as a domestically imposed form of tyranny
(countrymen oppressing fellow countrymen), and the revolutionary forces sought to
change or overthrow this order by replacing it with a transformed society. These forms
of revolutions are often closely connected with insurrections, coups, and civil wars.
We define External Revolution as a revolution that occurs within a given social and
political entity and is largely directed against the foreign authority of the Old Order. The
American Revolution can be classified as a paradigmatic example of an External
Revolution. The American colonies were governed from afar by Britain, and the Old
Order was perceived as a foreign-imposed tyranny (foreigners oppressing fellow
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countrymen). Thus, independence from Britain was vital to the overthrow of the Old
Order. These forms of revolutions are closely related to, if not inseparable from, wars of
independence.
Revolutionary Waves
In 1961 Arnold Toynbee addressed the continuing effect of the American Revolution
on contemporary societies. His message was that the principles of the American
Revolution continue to reverberate through the centuries to this day. The eminent scholar
compared them to Sputnik, traveling around the globe and affecting more and more
countries, nations, and peoples along the way. Toynbee ended with a quote from Thomas
Jefferson, who famously said that ”the disease of liberty is catching.” (Toynbee, 1978:
234-237).
In fact, revolutionary ideas do travel, often in waves. A revolutionary wave is a series
of revolutions occurring in various locations in a similar time period. In many cases, past
revolutions and revolutionary waves may inspire current ones, or an initial revolution
inspires other concurrent “affiliate revolutions” with similar aims. Colin J. Beck
elucidates: “It has long been recognized that revolutions come in waves, particularly those
that are most transformative (e.g. Arrighi, Wallerstein, and Hopkins 1989; Goldstone
1991, 2001, 2002; Katz 1997; Kurzman 2008; Markoff 1995, 1996; Merriman 1938;
Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1993). Historical accounts of revolution and revolutionary waves
often stress the commonality of ideological claims and the forces of cultural change across
the national boundaries as an explanation of their origins (e.g. Bailyn 1967; Chartier 1991;
Godechot 1965; Palmer 1954, 1959; Sewell 1985, 1996; Sharman 2003; Wuthnow 1989).
On the other hand, sociological explanations of revolution and revolutionary waves tend
to place their origins in cross-national processes, for instance as war, economic pressure,
and demographic change challenge state stability (e.g. Arrighi and Silver 1999; Boswell
and Dixon 1990, 1993; Foran 2005; Goldfrank 1979; Goldstone 1991; Hung 2009;
Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1993) or as contention diffuses across societies from an initial event
(. e.g. Katz 1997; Markoff 1995, 1996; Tarrow 1993, 1998).” (Beck, 2011: 167-168).
Phases of Revolutions
Pitirim A. Sorokin distinguishes two “inseparable” stages in the revolutionary
process: the “1st Stage” and then the “2nd Stage,” or “Reaction”. According to the scholar,
the first stage involves disintegration of existing legal, moral, religious reflexes, while the
second one sees their reconstruction on a new basis. (Sorokin, 2008: 30; 155). N.A.
Berdyaev agrees: “All revolutions ended with reactions. This is – unavoidable. This is
– the law. And the more violent and furious were the revolutions, the stronger were the
reactions.” (Berdyaev, 2007: 457).
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Crane Brinton subdivides Sorokin’s first stage of a revolution into two phases:
“Moderate” and “Radical” and adds one more – the “Thermidor.” Thus, the “classic”
four-stage formula of the revolutionary cycle is born (Brinton, 1965:IX-X). Those stages
are as follows:
Phase One - The Old Order
The Old Order usually features an autocratic regime with few or no social mechanisms
to represent the emerging classes or new social forces.
Symptoms of the Old Order decaying are:
1) the state is economically weak, the government has deficits and must heavily tax;
2) the state is also politically weak, the government is ineffective and cannot enforce
its policies. There is often an inept ruler on top of the governing hierarchy;
3) transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals;
4) antagonism between the old regime and the disenfranchised classes;
5) financial breakdown;
6) growing protests against the old government;
7) inept use of force by the government while repressing the rebellion; and
8) “dual power.”
Phase Two - Moderate Regime
A revolution begins with the moderate phase led by the upper middle class, as well as
some elements of the upper classes.
Symptoms of this stage are: 1) moderates attain power, 2) a legislature is elected
which may share power with a monarchy or an elected executive; 3) a constitution and
other documents typical of a representative government are issued; 4) moderates have to
struggle with the counter-revolutionary forces on one side and with the radicals on the
other; 5) the moderates may also have to fight an internal and/or external war.
Phase Three - Radical Regime
In the radical regime phase, unless there are already existing institutions and
experience related to representative government, a loss of control to radical populist
demagogues may occur.
Symptoms of this phase are: 1) radicals take control, usually in a coup d’état; 2) the
legislature is usually dominated by a dictator, dictatorial faction, or a revolutionary
council; 3) this period is accompanied by violence and attempts at the total control of a
society; and 4) a war (civil and/or foreign) may ensue or continue.
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Phase Four - Counter-Revolutionary Regime (“Thermidor”)
Instability during the radical phase leads to a counter-revolutionary phase involving
return to power of the upper middle class and some elements of the upper classes. If this
government is unstable, the situation may result in a dictatorship.
Symptoms of this period include: 1) radicals are repressed and moderates gain
amnesty; 2) slow and uneven return to “normalcy” is seen in everyday affairs; 3) rule by
a tyrant; and 4) aggressive nationalism.
Among permanent changes caused by the revolution there are usually the following:






removal of a government based on the inherited privileges;
establishment of a more representative government, based upon a sense of
nationalism;
government and its bureaucracy become more efficient and rational, as well as
less bound by tradition;
feudal practices are eliminated, and farmers become landowners;
and other sweeping administrative and legal changes occur.

These changes may vary, depending on factors such as culture, institutions, historical
experience, foreign intervention and wars, and the influence of neighboring countries.
That there is variation in the typical underlying conditions, causes, symptoms, phases,
sociocultural dynamics, and consequences of the “great revolutions” is evident.
Let us now illustrate these theoretical uniformities by taking a brief look at five
revolutions: the English, the American, the French, the Russian, and, as an example of a
“revolution in progress” - the Ukrainian Revolution.
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CASE STUDIES OF REVOLUTIONS
The English Revolution

The Old Order: before 1628.
England is a parliamentary monarchy. King James I, and then Charles I, come
into a political conflict with the parliament over revenue raising.
Moderate Phase: 1628-1641.
In 1628, the parliament passes the Petition of Rights which requires its approval of
any taxation imposed by the king. Charles I adjourns the parliament and rules without it
for eleven years.
When, in 1639, a rebellion occurs in Scotland, King Charles convenes the parliament
in order to finance the raising of an army. Once again, the parliament refuses to cooperate.
When the king orders the parliament to adjourn, the parliamentary leaders decline. This
act of defiance brings an end to the period of political maneuvering, both sides take up
arms, and a Civil War follows.
Radical Phase: 1641-1660.
In the Civil War, an army led by Oliver Cromwell, a leader in the parliament and a
Puritan, is victorious. The parliament tries the king for treason, convicts and executes
him. Cromwell establishes a military dictatorship, and Puritanism becomes the statesupported religion. The majority of the ruling elite of the English people, however, does
not accept Cromwell's rule and the dictatorship survives only until his death in 1658.
Thermidor: 1660-1688.
The parliament re-asserts its authority after the death of Cromwell and invites the son
of King Charles I to return from exile and to take the throne as King Charles II. The new
monarch realizes limitations on the power of the king and works cooperatively with the
parliament, finding allies among its conservative faction.
After a successful reign, Charles dies in 1685 and is succeeded by his brother, James
II. When James begins to follow a policy of arbitrary monarchical power, and prepares
to raise his son, the heir to the throne, as a Catholic, the parliament acts against him. He
is deposed in 1688 as a result of the bloodless “Glorious Revolution.” The parliament
issues the English Bill of Rights (1689) and then invites a new king to the throne. Thus,
despite a temporary return of the Stewarts to the throne, the parliament asserts its
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supremacy over the king, and it becomes clearly recognized in England as the supreme
power in a constitutional monarchy.
The American Revolution
The Old Order: until 1763.
In Crane Brinton’s words, “the American case is somewhat different. Here we have
an inept, colonial government in London, but not an inept native ruling class.” (Brinton,
1965: 89). In fact, the aristocratic and middle class leaders of the English colonies are
among the most privileged of leadership elites in the 18th century. The English
parliament is not exercising direct rule over the colonies since each colony has its own
elected legislature with considerable political influence.
Moderate Phase: 1763-1775.
The end of the Seven Years' War leads the British government to try to raise revenues
from the colonies. Colonial protest against the Sugar Act, the Stamp Act, the Townshend
Acts, and the Tea Act leads to a standoff. The determination of the English government
to enforce its will upon the colonies causes a series of political conflicts over a dozen
years.
Radical Phase: 1775-1783.
According to Crane Brinton, “this period was not reached in the American revolution,
though in the treatment of Loyalists, in the pressure to support the army, in some of the
phases of social life, you can discern in America many of the phenomena of the Terror
...” (Brinton, 1965: 254).
Nevertheless, the Revolutionary War ensues when the British try to enforce their rule
with the army and navy, and it lasts until they realize that they cannot impose their will
upon the colonies. The war creates conditions which lead to the Declaration of
Independence. The Declaration includes statements of a number of Enlightenment
principles, such as equality of opportunity under the law and the contract theory of
government. These ideas, radical at the time, challenge fundamental class inequalities,
including that of inheritance as the basis for power and privilege.
The Continental Congress writes the Articles of Confederation, creating a weak
central government without revenue-raising powers, while the former colonial
legislatures write constitutions for thirteen separate and sovereign states.
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Thermidor: 1783-1800.
Colonial resistance is effective because the rebel leaders are educated, articulate
people who are experienced with government. The war has to be fought until the British
government realizes that it cannot overcome obstacles of a well-organized rebellion on
the other side of the ocean. Foreign powers, most notably the French, play a substantial
role in the outcome. All these circumstances provide an opportunity for the rebel
leadership to establish a government based upon the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment.
After the war, the revolutionary leadership soon realizes that the central government
is too weak to protect the interests of people (especially the leadership who were property
owners), and they write a new constitution, creating a federal government with taxing and
other powers of a sovereign state. The new constitution is tested in the first administration
under President George Washington when a tax rebellion is put down. The election of
Thomas Jefferson as president in 1800 demonstrates that the new system can survive a
change in power from one elected party to another.
A system is established which recognizes validity of elections as the basis for power.
On the other hand, the same leadership elite, wealthy owners of property who had control
of colonial legislatures before the revolution, dominates both political parties after the
revolution.
The French Revolution
The Old Order: until 1789.
France is an absolute monarchy devoid of virtually any forms of representative
government. The ruling class with its outdated government machinery is facing mounting
socioeconomic and sociocultural challenges.
Among the causes of this revolution are: 1) growing financial crisis; 2) new ideas of
the Enlightenment and new means of distributing the written word; 3) growth of the
middle class, which lacks political power; 4) large gap in wealth between rich and poor;
5) privileged aristocracy which refuses to shoulder a share of the financial burden; 6)
depression during the year 1789; 7) shortages of food and as a result, soaring food prices;
8) unemployment and over-population in Paris.
Moderate Phase: 1789-1792
King Louis XVI tries to raise revenues by calling the Estates General into session. It
last met in 1614 when it was organized into three estates – nobility, clergy, and the third
estate (everyone else). Since according to the existing rules each estate has one vote, an
impasse develops over the voting. The Third Estate, now larger, insists that each delegate
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should have one vote. France is in a depression, and soaring food prices bring great
privation and hardship. Paris, especially, is a hotbed of unrest. The king calls out an
18,000 man army, which inflames tempers and fears in the city.
When representatives of the Third Estate are barred from the assembly hall, they
refuse to leave and proceed with their meetings in the nearby tennis court. Popular
uprising occurs when a mob breaks into the Bastille on July 14, 1789. The rebellious
leadership of the Third Estate organizes to defend the city, while constituting themselves
as the National Assembly. Under pressure from leaders in the city, who argue that the
presence of the army outside Paris is a source of panic and hysteria among Parisians, the
king disbands the army. The leaders of the National Assembly, supported by popular
protest in the streets of Paris, successfully defy the government of the Old Regime. France
becomes a constitutional monarchy. While the National Assembly writes a constitution
and publishes the Declaration of the Rights of Man, popular discontent leads to a march
on Versailles by unemployed workers. The king and his family are placed under a house
arrest in the nation’s capital.
In the meantime, the inability of the National Assembly to address the nation’s
economic and other problems causes them to lose control to more radical elements. Fear
of foreign invasion provokes hysteria as well as concern about traitors. Meanwhile,
rumors of the collapse of the monarchy have reached the countryside, where peasants
begin to rise up against the landlords and claim the land as their own. The revolution
spreads throughout France and is beyond the control of the revolutionary leadership in
Paris. New and more radical leadership in Paris replaces the Assembly and forms the
National Convention.
Radical Phase: 1792-1795.
As a volunteer army is raised to defend France against invasion, the People’s Courts
hold summary trials of thousands of suspected traitors. The National Convention,
intimidated by the Paris mob, tries and executes the king, while a patriotic army marches
off to the tune of “La Marseillaise.” The revolution has stirred up a new sense of
nationalism, one which greatly strengthens France in opposing the aristocratic
governments of Europe. But the National Convention cannot control the course of events
any more than the Assembly had. Rival factions vie for popular support, each accusing
the other of treason and dragging the vanquished opposition to the guillotine.
Thermidor: 1795-1815.
Demands for order and stability lead to the overthrow of the radicals and assumption
of power by a new, more conservative leadership. A new constitution is written providing
for restricted suffrage which benefits the well-to-do. The Directory, an executive
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committee, attempts to rule. Beset by threats from the aristocratic groups on the one hand,
and by radicals supported by street demonstrations on the other, the Directory calls on the
army to defend them against overthrow.
Napoleon, a brilliant young officer, seizes an opportunity to rise quickly in rank and
rapidly maneuvers himself into power. He is successful in rallying the new patriotism of
Frenchmen to his support, while he unites the country after a decade of civil strife.
Napoleon presides over completion of the “Code Napoleon,” produced to replace the Old
Regime’s outdated accumulation of regulations. He also reaches the “Concordat” with
Roman Catholic Church, giving it control over religious affairs in exchange for
undisputed mastery in secular concerns.
Summarizing his accomplishments, Bruce Porter notes: “As First Consul and later
Emperor, Napoleon consolidated the three main gains of the Revolution: rationalization,
centralization, and secularization.” (Porter, 1994: 134).
Napoleon now rules over a France which is more powerful than it has ever been;
however, he is a military man, looking for military solutions to international problems.
Failing to negotiate peace with England, he plunges Europe into a decade of war.
Napoleon's military genius and French national enthusiasm lead to a series of military
victories over Austria and Prussia. By 1808, he rules over most of continental Europe.
The British blockade is countered by the Napoleon's Continental System, which seeks
to prevent trade between England and the continent. Those two measures combine to
disrupt commercial interests and retard economic growth. In the meantime, a rebellion
in Spain, supported by an English army, creates even more problems for Napoleon.
The Russian refusal to cooperate with the Continental System provokes Napoleon into
an invasion of Russia. But even the occupation of Moscow does not induce the Russians
to accept surrender. Napoleon is forced to abandon the ravaged city and hastily retreat in
the midst of the Russian winter. Harassed by the re-grouped Russian army, the remains
of his Grande Armée are all but utterly destroyed in the process.
Uprisings against Napoleon in Austria and Prussia throw Napoleon back to a defense
of French borders. He finally faces military defeat at the hands of the coalition armies.
With Napoleon permanently exiled, the victorious powers restore the Bourbon dynasty to
rule in France, which has become a constitutional monarchy.
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The Russian Revolution of 1917
The Old Order: before 1905.
At the dawn of the 20th century Russia is a vast empire in the first stages of
industrialization with an absolute monarchy at its helm. As is usually the case in the early
stages of industrialization, working conditions are horrendous and the working class is
terribly exploited. The largest part of the population, the peasantry, is also notoriously
oppressed in spite of some improvements since the abolition of serfdom.
An impatient intelligentsia, motivated by the example of Western Europe, desires
rapid political change. The czarist government opposes it, while encouraging the
country’s industrialization. This explosive combination ensures that, driven by the
irresistible forces of modernization, the cumbersome juggernaut of the empire is now
hurtling toward self-destruction.
Moderate Phase: 1905-1917.
The 1905 “Bloody Sunday” massacre of a peaceful demonstration in Saint Petersburg
triggers nationwide strikes, which paralyze the economy. The emerging political forces
organize a common front against the government, making demands for establishment of
a constitution and a legislature. However, with the czar's government controlling
electoral rules and assuring that an obedient legislature is created, the country misses a
chance to develop a more representative political system.
Next, World War I creates a crisis of such proportions that the monarchy cannot meet
the challenge. Massive demonstrations and strikes lead to efforts by the Duma to form a
Provisional Government, which intends to govern until a Constituent Assembly can be
elected. In the meantime, as a result of the grass roots political organizing, the Soviets
are formed and now constitute a separate governing body from that of the Duma (“dual
power”).
Since the Provisional Government and the Soviets represent different social forces,
their decisions often contradict one another. In the meantime, peasants begin to rise up
and seize the land, while soldiers, most of whom are peasants, begin to desert the army in
increasing numbers.
While most in the Provisional Government are moderate leaders who attempt to carry
out a liberal revolution, the majority of the Soviets are members of the Social Democratic
Party, a Marxist organization, expecting the socialist revolution to follow the liberal
revolution. In April, 1917, Lenin arms a radical faction of the Social Democratic Party,
the Bolsheviks, with a consistent plan of action to which they adhere unremittingly.
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The effort by the Provisional Government to continue the war effort steadily erodes
its support. Using this vacuum of power, the Bolsheviks carry out a successful revolt in
November, 1917. Following the coup, they consolidate their control over the Soviets,
and, since the Bolsheviks are in the minority in the newly elected Constituent Assembly,
the Red Guard dissolves it by force.
Ludwig von Mises sharply observed: “Lenin dispelled by force of arms the
Constituent Assembly. The short-lived “liberal” interlude was liquidated. Russia passed
from the hands of the inept Romanovs into those of a real autocrat.” (Mises, 1981: 502).
Radical Phase: 1917-1921.
This period, which coincides with the whole duration of the Civil War in Russia,
begins with the seizure of power by Bolsheviks, and involves an armed power struggle
between the Bolsheviks and several rival groups.
The war effort against Germany collapses and the new Soviet government is forced
to accept terms of the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The country then faces three
years of devastating civil war as the “Reds” defend themselves against several "White"
armies. The civil war is accompanied by foreign intervention representing several outside
powers.
In the end, although the Russian economy is disrupted and the Russian people face a
massive famine, the Bolsheviks hold on to power with ruthless determination,
establishing a one-party dictatorship.
Thermidor: 1921-1985.
Crane Brinton notes:
Thermidor in Russia has been complicated and prolonged. We may perhaps regard
the period of war communism, 1917-1921, as the first main crisis of the Russian
revolution. With the New Economic Policy of 1921 began Russia’s Thermidor. Lenin’s
death and the subsequent rivalry between Stalin and Trotsky led up to a second crisis, or
rather relapse during convalescence, which we may date at the more acute periods of
violent enforcement of the first Five Year Plan. But as many an observer has noted, this
secondary crisis lacked the hopeful idealism of the first, lacked its improvisations and its
adventures, lacked its active foreign and White Guard enemies, and looks … much like
characteristic acts of the “tyrants” who came to power during other “Thermidors” – the
Cromwellian settlement of Ireland, for instance, or the Napoleonic enforcement of the
Continental System. (Brinton, 1965: 207).
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Brinton observes “a similar moral let-down, a similar process of concentration of
power in the hands of a ‘tyrant’ or ‘dictator,’ a similar seeping back of exiles, a similar
revulsion against the men who had made the Terror, a similar return to old habits in daily
life.” (Brinton, 1965: 235).
Perhaps, it would be logical to divide the long “Russian Thermidor” into several
stages, possibly “Stalin’s phase” (1924-1953), “Khrushchev’s phase” (1953-1964), and
“Brezhnev’s phase” (1964-1982).
Since the end of the 20th century the world may be witnessing the unfolding of the
Russian Revolution of 1985, which could have been a precursor, as well as an integral
part of the Revolutions of 1989. The phases of it would be as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The Old Order: before 1985.
Moderate Phase: 1985-1989.
Radical Phase: 1989-1999.
Thermidor: 1999-Present.

If so, Russia would be now in the Thermidor stage of its Revolution of 1985, while
Ukraine may be seen passing through the Radical Phase of its Revolution of 2004.
Extrapolation and Falsifiability of the Scientific Civilizational Perspective
on the Theory of Revolution
According to Karl Popper, any theory must at least in principle be falsifiable (for
example, proven to be wrong under certain circumstances) in order to be considered
scientific. In other words, a scientific theory cannot be labeled as such if it is not
fundamentally refutable. But, nevertheless, because scientific theories yield predictions,
even if some of the predictions happen to be inaccurate under certain conditions that does
not mean that they cannot still serve as useful approximations. (Popper, 2004).
Let us see how these assumptions may apply to the civilizational perspective on the
theory of revolution.
Recent scholars have noted that since the mid-1980s a number of factors have
improved the prospects for nonviolent resistance overturning regimes.
These
developments include:
1) global norms have moved strongly in the direction of requiring elections for
regimes to claim legitimacy;
2) new mass media have made it easier for the opposition almost everywhere to
acquire and disseminate evidence of regime abuses;
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3) the rise of an international network of activists to provide training in nonviolent
resistance methods has empowered opposition movements; and
4) the end of the Cold War has reduced the willingness of the great powers to
intervene militarily so as to keep rulers in power against the wishes of their own
people (Goldstone, 2014: 105).

There was hope among scholars of revolution that because these developments had
proven their effectiveness in the case of the successful anti-communist revolutions in the
former Soviet Union and its allied states of Eastern Europe, as well as in the subsequent
“color revolutions,” therefore revolutions might have now become less violent
worldwide. (Goldstone, 2014:105). Perhaps sadly, though, the formula “Old Order Moderate Phase - Radical Phase - Thermidor” outlined above appears to be reasserting
itself on the world stage. In fact, some of the “non-violent” revolutions of today may
merely be representing but one stage in the classic revolutionary process.
Jack Goldstone elucidates: “Most of the countries that have had “color” revolutions
have not made a swift and certain transition to democracy. Instead, they have had to
struggle with corrupt elites who retained their economic power, weak political parties,
unreliable judicial systems and factional struggles. In many of them some backsliding
and authoritarian tendencies have emerged. Even color revolutions thus conform to the
general pattern of revolutions, in which the fall of the old regime is only the start of a
revolutionary process that may take several years or even decades to fully unfold”
(Goldstone, 204: 116).
Let us consider, for example, a “revolution in the making” presently unfolding in the
Ukraine. After briefly analyzing the history of the revolution, we will present three
plausible scenarios of future developments within two phases.
The Ukrainian Revolution of 2004
The Old Order: before 2004.
Ukraine is a historic land with a unique and rich culture, which displays influences of
many civilizations. Not even mentioning Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, Byzantine, and
the Vikings, various parts of the country have been provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian,
the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian, the Prussian, and the Ottoman empires, and,
subsequently, of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, despite the ever-present pressures for
cultural conversion emanating from the various colonial powers, Ukrainian culture, art,
and literary language remained Ukrainian, undergoing a domestic process of rapid
development and refinement, especially during the 19th and the 20th centuries.
The first attempt to gain status as an independent state arrives in 1917, when the
Declaration of Independence on June 23, 1917 leads to the appearance from 1917 to 1921
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol71/iss71/18
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of the predecessor of modern Ukraine - the Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukrainian
National Republic). Subsequently, a civil war and a foreign invasion follow. In 1921
most of what is now Ukraine is annexed by the Soviet Union.
On August 24, 1991 the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine is adopted by
the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament). It re-establishes Ukraine as an independent
state; however things do not go well. While the corrupt and inept government balances
precariously between the lure of Europe and a Russian policy of “carrots and sticks,”
Ukraine descends to the level of the second poorest country in Europe. The nation’s
Gross Domestic Product, which had been roughly equivalent to that of Poland in the
1980s, now becomes but one fourth of the level of its western neighbor.
Moderate Phase: November 2004 - February 2014.
The “Orange Revolution” erupts between late November 2004 and January 2005. It
is a series of protests and political events that takes place in the aftermath of the run-off
vote of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, a process marred by corruption,
intimidation, and fraud.
This phase of the Ukrainian Revolution, which follows the disputed second round of
the 2004 presidential election, leads to the annulment of the result and a repeat of the
round. The leader of the opposition, Victor Yushchenko, is declared President, defeating
Victor Yanukovych. The results of the “Orange Revolution,” however, are largely
cancelled by the subsequent decade-long infighting between the moderates of various
political brands. The economy is paralyzed by warfare among the oligarchs, pervasive
corruption, and political infighting.
Jack Goldstone elaborates: “In Ukraine, Yushchenko spent his presidency in a
fruitless power struggle with his former ally Yulia Tymoshenko. By 2006 Yanukovych
had returned as prime minister, and members of Parliament were shifting their allegiance
form Yushchenko to the opposition. In the 2010 presidential election, in which
Yanukovych, Yushchenko, and Tymoshenko all ran, Yushchenko received less than 6
percent of the vote, with Yanukovych emerging as the winner. Once in office,
Yanukovych restricted press freedoms and put Tymoshenko in jail, prosecuting her for
abuse of office and other crimes. It was almost as if the Orange Revolution had not
occurred” (Goldstone, 2014: 116). On the night of November 21, 2013 the “Euromaidan”
bursts into existence. It is a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest which surges first in
Kiev, and then in other cities. At the heart of the crisis is the decision of the Yanukovych
government to stop the process of signing the Ukraine–European Union Association
Agreement. This stage of the Ukrainian Revolution begins with public demands for closer
integration with Europe, which rapidly evolve into stands for better government and
against corruption. As a result of the standoff, the process of forming the “dual power”
structures commences in Kiev as well as in other cities and regions.
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Radical Phase: February 2014 - Present.
The “Euromaidan” protests turn bloody with over 100 protesters sacrificing their lives
in February, 2014. Following a sudden departure of President Victor Yanukovych, the
parliament moves to seal a deal with the European Union. Almost immediately, the
country faces the prospect of a civil war, as well as foreign invasion. Crimea, which
became a part of Ukraine in 1954, is swiftly annexed by Russia, which is pursuing its
resurgent geopolitical interests.
The Western-leaning interim government has to deal simultaneously with “counterrevolutionary forces” (Russia plus disaffected ethnic Russians living in the eastern and
southern regions of the country) and with the “revolutionary radicals.” (The “Right
Sector” and others). Thus, it faces a threat of an external as well as an internal war.
Further, while the interim leaders succeed in swiftly securing loans and assurances of
support from the West, the separatist movements in the south-east of the country, along
with both the massing of Russian troops along the eastern border and heavy-handed
Russian negotiating tactics involving the manipulation of energy prices, foreshadow
trouble ahead.
Starting in April, 2014, waves of pro-Russian demonstrations surge into a dozen
eastern and southern Ukrainian cities. These soon escalate into a siege of government
buildings amidst calls for parts of Eastern and Southern Ukraine to secede and join Russia.
Diplomatic talks between Ukraine, Russia, the US, and the European Union in Geneva
fail to achieve any meaningful results. With the pressing concern of an armed rebellion
in the south-east of the country, Kyiv launches a “counter-terrorism” offensive. Next,
two eastern regions announce their “independence” and armed conflict erupts.
As always, the unfolding of the revolutionary process is full of sudden “shifts and
rifts” including a number with possible global implications. Especially important are two:
the catastrophic crash of a Malaysian airliner over Eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014,
killing all aboard, and an attempt by right-wing radicals to storm one of the world’s largest
nuclear plants, located in the Ukrainian city of Energodar, on May 17, 2014.
All this signals a combustible new phase along the volatile geopolitical fault line
between Europe and Russia.
Possible Scenarios:
“Optimistic.” As a result of unprecedented diplomatic efforts, a “win-win” formula is
reached between Ukraine, the West, and Russia regarding the future of the country. The
civil war and further annexation beyond Crimea are avoided. Following fair and
transparent elections, national pride is kindled as a new government is elected which
derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. A new constitution, predicated
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upon political accommodation, guarantees an equal social status to all ethnic groups.
Militarily, the country is non-aligned, similar to Austria, Switzerland, and Finland.
“Muddle through.” A period of instability ensues, characterized by the Cold War-like
rivalry between the West and Russia.
“Pessimistic.” Radical tendencies, starting with abolition of the Russian language as
one of the Ukraine’s official languages, increase, lead to unrest. Political power in Kiev
is usurped by the right-wing extremists who are ready to use any option at their disposal,
including the “nuclear card.” Alternatively, the ethnic Russian separatists rule supreme
in the east and the south of the country. A civil war follows. In addition to Crimea, Russia
annexes parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, which it re-names Novorossiya (New
Russia). Ukraine is subsequently partitioned between the West and Russia.
Thermidor: As of the time of writing the timeframe is unknown.
Possible Scenarios:
“Optimistic.” A relatively brief period of turmoil before returning to stability. A
charismatic leader such as Abraham Lincoln or Nelson Mandela emerges, leading the
process of Ukrainian unification. Investments pour in from the West and from Russia, as
well from the East and from the South. Having become the “Switzerland of Eurasia,”
Ukraine fulfills its historic mission as the “meeting place” for dialogue between the world
civilizations.
“Muddle through.” A slow and uneven return to “normalcy.”
“Pessimistic.” During a prolonged civil war in Ukraine and in Russia, sparked in part by
rivalry between the West and Russia, both Ukraine and Russia disintegrate into multiple
separate ethnic regions. In the process Russia (or some of its parts) becomes a Spartalike “petro-dictatorship” with a warrior mentality, aggressive, “trigger-happy,”
competing for vital resources. All of northern Eurasia becomes a geopolitical “black
hole,” reminiscent of Europe during the era of the religious wars in the 16th and 17th
centuries or the Balkans during the 19th century.
The West is greatly weakened by this struggle. Already, there are predictions that the E7
countries (a group of seven countries with emerging economies) may have larger
economic output than the G7 countries by 2020. (Dunkley: 2013) As a result, resurgent
civilizations with large populations and cohesive cultural unity (China, or India, or others)
rule the day.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. Revolution as a strategy of struggle for liberty and social justice arises during
periods of social and cultural change and crisis.
2. The scientific study of revolutions goes on as scholars continue to analyze their
nature, causes, stages, characteristics, and consequences.
3. Fundamental ideas of scientific civilizational theory and scientific revolutionary
theory correlate with and complement each other.
4. Within the framework of Civilizational Science the underlying conditions, causes,
socio-cultural dynamics, and consequences of revolutions can be analyzed,
modeled, and to a certain degree, predicted.
5. The “classic” four-stage formula of revolutionary development – running from
Old Order to Moderate Stage to Radical Stage to Thermidor – remains applicable.
Some of the “non-violent” revolutions of today may represent a stage in that
process.
6. By making the phenomena of revolution more “intelligible” and predictable, a
scientific civilizational analysis may help to mitigate some of revolution’s worst
consequences.
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Islamic Capitalism:
The Muslim Approach to Economic Activities in Indonesia
Hisanori Kato
Butsuryo College of Osaka, Japan
As far as property is concerned, in principle “all property belongs to God,” but
God has given human beings the right to possess their own property, although a
limit is set on the right to private property when it comes to what is meant for
everyone and should remain public such as mountains, forests, and rivers.1
Introduction
The fall of the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s
symbolized the collapse of the Communist Bloc. Since then, the world appeared to be
moving along the path of mainstream capitalism, which is based on the idea of “wage
labor and private ownership of the means of production.”2 The trend of consumerism,
founded on the notions of income generation and property ownership, has resulted in the
definition of social relations in terms of extreme competition, and has been powerful in
normalizing human behaviors towards competitive ends. This mode of society has
contributed to the so-called growth of the economy that has lifted the standard of living
to some extent. Healthy competitions in the market based on a capitalist mindset have
been able to provide consumers with better quality services.
Nevertheless, we have to admit that modern capitalism is distinguishable by its
shortcomings. Emmanuel Todd, for one, points out that capitalism could “hurt everyone,”
although he believes capitalism to be a rational economic system.3 For him, even affluent
members of society are no longer able to enjoy their profits, as an enormous sum of
expenditure is required to sustain their property.4 Tugrul Keskin also argues that
capitalism is far from perfect and exhibits social predicaments. These include
“standardization of our daily life and destruction of diversity,”5 which would elevate the
economy as a supreme value and would diminish the influence of religions in our society.
He states that,
We have departed from the social space, or a more mechanical form of solidarity
where religion used to be a dominant institution, and are moving more towards
an emphasis on an economically driven society. In this new society, mass
1

S.H. Nasr, The Heart of Islam (New York: HarperCollins, 2004) p.145
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3
E. Todd, After the Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) p. 94.
4
Ibid.
5
T. Keskin, “The Sociology of Islam”, in T. Keskin (ed.), The Sociology of Islam (Reading, UK: Ithaca
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consumption dominated every aspect of human life, including relations between
people.6
Islam, which is frequently at variance with Western values, also faces the challenges of
Keskin’s “economically driven society” today. Hence the question arises as to the
responses of Islam towards the extremely powerful normalizing tendencies of capitalist
economies, which have been shaping most of the world with little resistance in the postCold War era. Would Islam offer a solution for the dwindling of influence of religion in
a society? S.P. Huntington suggests that Muslims are inclined to emphasize Islam-ness in
the time of economic development as they regard their faith as “a source of identity,
meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power, and hope.”7 Huntington explains that
“Islamic Resurgence” is Islam’s maneuver to survive in this modern world, and yet it
shows another source of the “clash” between the West and Islam. He states,
This Islamic Resurgence in its extent and profundity is the latest phase in the
adjustment of Islamic civilization to the West, an effort to find the “solution” not
in Western ideologies but in Islam. It embodies acceptance of modernity,
rejection of Western culture, and recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in
the modern world.8
It would be of interest to observe how Muslims may deal with the current powerful
capitalist economy that prevails all over the world, even in Communist China. Would the
Islamic and Western attitude towards the capitalist economy differ from one another?
Indonesia, one of the fastest growing economic powers and the most populous Muslim
nation in the world, provides useful examples to answer the questions outlined.
Islam and Capitalism
Some scholars insist that Islam is no stranger to the capitalist economy. Maxime
Rodinson explains that the birth place of Islam, Mecca, was a “center of capitalistic
trade.”9 According to Rodinson, the economy in the Islamic world thrived after the
Abbasid Revolution until the fourteenth century. Muslims at that time showed their
capitalist attitudes in that “they seized any and every opportunity for profit, and calculated
their outlays, their encashments and their profits in money terms.”10 Even the forbidden
practice of imposing riba or interest in Islam was practiced among Muslims in the Middle
Ages.11 Rodinson’s argument leads us to the idea that Islam is by no means antagonistic
6
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to capitalism, which encourages profit-seeking activities. There is in fact support for this
in al-Qur’an:
Believers, when you are summoned to your Friday prayers hasten to the
remembrance of God and cease your trading. That would be best for you, if you
but knew it. Then, when the prayers are ended, disperse and go your ways in
quest of God’s bounty. Remember God always, so that you may prosper (alJum’ah: 62-9~10)
It is also true that Prophet Muhammad himself was a merchant and met his first wife
Khadijah through trading activities.12 All of these would be sufficient to make us believe
that Islam is not inherently hostile to commercial profit-making businesses.
The capitalist-friendly orientation of Islam is expressed by the term “merchant
Muhammad,” which was coined by Keskin.13 Does it really mean that Islam totally
accepts capitalist economic activities that are practiced in the West today? In fact, some
Muslims believe that Islam should not follow capitalist neo-liberalism, and this side of
Islam is represented by the words of “Meccan Muhammad.”14 We see the divergence
between more conservative fundamentalist Muslims and progressive moderate Muslims
in relation to economic affairs, as we see in the debate over jihad.
In either case, however, Islam is the “manifestation” of a capitalist economy, regardless
of some Muslims’ approval or rejection of capitalism.15 The Islam that exists in capitalistdriven society today can never escape from the reality that the global market economy is
showing no sign of contraction. In other words, Islam is able to play a certain role either
in promoting or in diminishing capitalist activities. However, as the influence of
capitalism is so enormous, Islam has become a pretext for fostering capitalist thought and
enhancing the foundation of capitalism.
In Indonesia, for example, Islam has been employed to nurture the business motivation
and ethics of the workers in some enterprises. Daromir Rudnyckyj has conducted
anthropological research on a series of popular seminars held across Indonesia. These
are organized under the auspices of Emotional and Spiritual Quotient (ESQ) training,
which is the creation of a businessman named Ary Ginanjar Agustian. In these seminars,
Islam is used as the basis of education. Krakatau Steel, which is one of the largest
enterprises in the country, conducted ESQ training in 2004, and Rudnyckyi described its
details as follows.

12
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In dramatic tones he (Ginanjar) told us that ESQ enhances Islamic practice and
was indispensable to productivity and prosperity in the global economy.
Equating Muslim virtues with corporate values, Ginanjar represented
globalization as a divine challenge that could be met through the intensification
of Islamic faith...The hall, darkened and cool, was filled with music conveying
buoyant optimism as Ginanjar deployed metaphorically rich language to assert
that globalization required employees to become different kinds of workers.16
It should be noted that ESQ is meant not only for increasing productivity but also for
eradicating immoral practices in businesses, such as corruption.17 Productivity can never
increase when fraudulent practices are pervasive. The two issues are deeply
interconnected. The necessity of “spiritual reform” is urged in the ESQ program, and
Islam is seen as an essential means in realizing it.18
One of the core creeds in Islam is that ‘good Muslims’ are able to obtain an assurance of
entry to akhirat or the hereafter. Spiritual purity is an important criterion for Muslims to
receive this ‘gift’ from Allah. The probability of acquiring this reward depends on the
conduct of individual Muslims. Therefore, Muslims discipline themselves in order to
assure their entry to akhirat, and the ESQ program emphasizes that profit is consistent
with spiritual purity.
ESQ training, in fact, is an opportunity to remind Muslims of their “ultimate goal,” that
is, “otherworldly salvation,”19 and simultaneously Muslims reaffirm that only the ones
who are spiritually wholesome will be able to receive it. In other words, any religious
notion with promise or fear can exercise tremendous influence over the behaviors of
humans, including economical ones.
As has been seen before, Muslims encounter virtually no theological obstacles to engage
in commercial activities for al-Qur’an clearly encourages them to exercise capitalist
profit-making business. Although some Muslims are unwilling to be part of the Western
capitalist circle, Islam can be a useful tool to enhance it by bringing about the spiritual
purity of Muslims, which is linked with the degree of their belief in Allah. Muslims need
to maintain Islamic virtues when involved in economic activities. This prerequisite may
be a crucial factor in distinguishing ‘Islamic capitalism’ from Western capitalism.
Rising Young ‘Capitalist’ Muslim Clerics in Indonesia
Indonesia, which is the world’s most populous Muslim nation, is also Southeast Asia’s
economic superpower. Its GDP growth was at the rate of at least six percent or higher
16
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between 2010 and 2012.20 The GPD growth in Indonesia in 2013 was 5.8 percent, and
the Asian Development Bank predicts that its growth will rise again to six percent in two
years.21 ADB’s report also states that Indonesia’s “private consumption is expected to
remain reasonably robust” in the first half of 2014.22 In addition, according to the recent
World Bank report, Indonesia became the tenth largest economy in the world in 2011.23
Modern shopping malls in urban cities such as Jakarta have been mushrooming in the last
decade, and consumerism is widespread throughout the archipelago.
Despite its great proportion of Muslim population, Indonesia remains a secular republic
without the implementation of Islamic law or syaria. The political as well as the economic
systems are similar to the ones in the West. Popular voting and a market economy are
features of Indonesian society. Nonetheless, Indonesians are proud of their religions
including Islam, diverse cultures, and long history. As the majority’s religion, Islam
seems to be a chief moralizing force for the social life in Indonesia. Birthday celebrations
and funerals are conducted in accordance with Islamic creed, and Arabic greetings are
common in the country. Regardless of the depth of one’s faith, Islam is constantly
appealed to for guidance in relation to social behaviors and customary interchanges
among fellow Indonesians.
In the field of economy, we find several syaria-based banks in Indonesia, such as Bank
Syariah Mandiri and Bank Muamalat Indonesia, and they have increased their total assets
after the collapse of Suharto’s government, though the total assets of syaria banks remain
relatively low.24 In the economic boom in post-Suharto Indonesian society, several
Muslim clerics gained popularity through mass media and attracted a considerable and
dedicated following. Followers can be seen to be animated as if they are present at a
popular music concert. The clerics include Zainuddin, Abdullah Gymnastiar, Arifin
Ilham, Jefri al Buchori and Yusuf Mansur, et cetera. Many of them have their own TV
shows and present themselves as ‘conveyors’ of the true message of Islam. Their
appearance has successfully instilled an Islamic ‘flavor’ in Indonesia, the secular republic.
These personages tend to be friendly, energetic, smart, modern, and economically
conscious. In fact, several of them have established their own investment institutions and
have encouraged their followers to invest in it.
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One of the well-received young Muslim clerics among these is Yusuf Mansur, who is
only in his late thirties. His success as an Islamic preacher and entrepreneur is second to
none in modern Indonesia. His publications are widely available, and he is always the
target of photo sessions for his followers. His activities are twofold: a religiously-oriented
charity arm on the one hand, and secular profit-seeking businesses on the other. The
former is represented by an Islamic boarding school and charitable organization called
Program Penbibitan Penghafal al-Qur’an (Program for Seeding al-Qur’an Learning)
which is known as PPPA. The latter consist of various private enterprises; PT Veritra
Sentosa Internasional, known as VSI, is one of the largest. Multi-level marketing or
MLM is VSI’s business strategy; it sells software programs that enable electronic
payment for utilities such as electricity and telephone, and for prepaid telephone cards, et
cetera.
However, it would be a mistake to understand these two different domains of Yusuf
Mansur’s activities as operating independently. Rather, they exert influence one upon
another, and Mansur is never hesitant to promote his MLM business by emphasizing both
Islamic spirituality and his charisma as a preacher. His popularity and the degree of his
business success seem to be mutually reinforcing. By early 2014, Mansur had already
purchased several hotels near Jakarta International Airport and was ready to offer
commercial accommodation for Muslim pilgrims.25 It is said that Mansur also has a plan
to purchase Merpati Nusantara Airline.26 The acquisition of the hotel, for example, is for
the benefit of umat or the Islamic community, and Mansur is disinclined to associate his
activities with capitalistic profit-making business.27 He explains that there are three
important elements in Islam and economy. First is niat or intention. His first priority is
not money. Rather his intention is to give benefits to other people. This is only possible
through worshipping Allah, he emphasizes. Next is cara or method. Western business is
conducted in accordance with written regulations and rules, but he states that Muslims do
not need to be formal; they do business through their hearts. Last is tujuan or purpose.
Mansur states that Muslims should do business in order to enter surga (heaven). To
summarize, the Islamic economy can be described by three phrases; it is done because of
Allah, with Allah and for Allah.28
Islamic idea of alms or sedekah
Yusuf Mansur emphasizes a specific Islamic tenet called sedekah (or sedaqoh) in his
preaching, which literarily means alms, or alms-giving. This might be confused with
well-known zakat, which also means alms and is one of the five duties of Muslims. Zakat
25
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is an obligatory donation to support the disadvantaged in the community. In zakat
practice, Muslims are supposed to contribute 2.5 percent of their income, and it is usually
collected systematically by the government in Islamic states. Sedekah, on the other hand,
is based on the free will of donors. There is no strict enforcement or fixed portion in
sedekah.
Mansur believes that it is absolutely permissible and even encouraged in Islam that all
Muslims be involved in secular commercial activities, pursuing monetary benefits.
However, he preaches to his followers not to monopolize their benefits and to offer them
to Allah. Sedekah is a practical and concrete means to ‘offer’ their benefits to Allah. This
conduct is tantamount to supporting the underprivileged, and one can receive keberkahan
or blessing through it, and it strengthens Muslim brotherhood.29 For Mansur, businesses
and sedekah mould the “philosophy of business in Islam,” and it would be wrong to
separate these two concepts.30 He points out several verses from al-Qur’an to prove his
explanations.31 For example, we read the following statements in the holy book:
But seek, by means of that which God has given you, to attain the abode of the
hereafter. Do not forget your share in this world. Be good to others as God has
been good to you, and do not strive for evil in the land for God does not love the
evil-doers.(al-Qasas:28-77)
There are some who say: ‘Lord, give us abundance in this world,’ They shall
have no share in the world to come. But there are others who say: ‘Lord give us
what is good both in this world and in the hereafter and keep us from torment of
the Fire.’ These shall have a share according to what they did.
(al Baqarah:2-201)
There are two important messages found in these verses. First is the importance of
maintaining social solidarity among Muslims, which we might call Islamic spirituality.
It is plausible that material gain might be over-cherished in a country like Indonesia, given
its rapid economic growth. In this regard, Mansur’s idea and explanation can be
understood as a reaction to pervasive self-centeredness and materialism that could
fracture the sense of togetherness of Muslims. Charles Tripp is right to say that “… the
danger for specifically Islamic society was capitalism’s elevation of materialism
(identified with both capitalism and communism) over spirituality (identified as the
defining feature of the Islamic system).32
Another significant purport in above-mentioned al-Qur’an is the reminder of the existence
of the life after this world known as akhirat. In the practice of sedekah, as we have seen,
29
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mutual support among Muslims is crucially treasured. The ‘good heart’ of people can be
the motivation of conducting charity or sedekah. However, we see another factor that
promotes sedekah, namely the hope for and, with greater proportion, the fear of akhirat.
Mansur is well aware of the psychology of the people and is eager to remind them of two
distinctive words, suraga (heaven) and neraka (hell) to which they could proceed,
depending on their behaviors in this world. The same method was employed in the ESQ
training program in order to bring about professionalism and morality in private
enterprise. The actual scene of the training session was well described by Rudyckyj.
The room was pitch black, the sound system was elevated to a thunderous
volume, and the air conditioning appeared to be turned to its coldest setting,
creating an almost refrigerator-like chill. Two films were juxtaposed with a
voice-cover by the lead trainer in which he narrated the agony of death and the
horrors of hell. The first film clip was from one of the climactic scenes in the
Hollywood blockbuster Titanic in which hundreds of near lifeless bodies
surround the sinking vessel, freezing to death in the icy waters of the North
Atlantic. …another one from a Harun Yahya film called Kehidupan Alam
Barzakh (Life in Purgatory). The clip depicted a visual representation of a corpse
being called to account for worldly sins in the afterlife as hellacious fires burn
the corpse’s body.33
It is indeed effective to refer to a cause of severe punishment when one intends to bring
about concrete social behavioral patterns, either being more professional or conducting
sedekah.
Practice and rationale of sedekah
Mansur collects sedekah through bank transfer and direct donation during his preaching
session. For example, he appeared in the event held at his pesantren or Islamic boarding
school on December 28, 2013, and gave a brief sermon.34 However, it was a social
interaction rather than a religious gathering. Mansur maintained his amicability towards
the participants, and a sense of humor seemed to be a core feature of the session. In fact,
a relaxing atmosphere prevailed in the venue. In the middle of the session, after explaining
the importance of solidarity and mutual help among fellow Muslims, Mansur invited a
late-teen male participant to the front and asked about his personal background and his
understanding of Islam. Needless to say, the young Muslim, who seemed to feel great
honor to have a personal discussion with a popular cleric, was eager to be a ‘good Muslim’
who can proceed to surga (heaven). He showed no hesitation to practice sedekah in front
of his fellow Muslims, taking out a fifty-thousand rupiah bill, which is equivalent to US
$5, from his pocket and handed it over to Mansur. He received great applause from the
33
34

D.Rudnyckyj, op.cit., p. 88.
This was observed by the author at Pesantren Daarul Qur’an in Tangerang on December 28, 2013.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014

103

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 71 [2014], No. 71, Art. 18

98

Number 71, Fall 2014

audience and Mansur. That teenage Muslim must have been convinced that his prospect
for entry into akhirat was bright and full of joy.
At the end of session, Mansur encouraged all participants to follow the way of Allah,
which was shown by a young role model who had just practiced sedekah. In fact, quite a
few people donated a great sum of money after the session: the equivalent of
approximately US $1,000 in cash, together with some jewelry, was collected after about
a half-hour session on that day. Stunningly, some even donated an ATM card and the slip
that contained its PIN number.
The religious rationale of sedekah is elaborated by Mansur in his book, The Miracle of
Giving, to which he interestingly gave an English-language title. First, he clearly states
that there is a miraculous way of becoming rich (kaya), and to realize it is not a dream
(mimpi).35 Not only is material success emphasized but also worldly wishes of people are
listed as the possible target of the miracle, such as the issues of education of children,
relationships, work, family, health, and business, etc.36 Mansur also tells readers to devote
themselves to Allah and to remember that Allah will show the way of receiving fortunes
(rezeki).37 The way of Allah is the way of sedekah.38
A specific way of calculation, which differs from normal mathematics, is shown in the
book to elucidate the process of realization of a miracle if one practices sedekah. In
normal calculation, ten minus one equals nine. However, the answer of this simple
calculation will be nineteen in sedekah calculation. Ten minus two will be twenty-eight
and ten minus three will be thirty-seven.39 ‘Minus’ here means the action of ‘giving.’ If
one gives out ‘one’ to others from what you possess as sedekah, unlike normal calculation,
it will become tenfold by Allah’s blessing. Consequently, ten minus ‘one’ whose answer
is nine becomes nineteen as ‘one’ has already become ten times more than the original
value. This suggests that the larger sedekah one practices, the more reward one could
receive. This calculation in fact is based on one of the verses in al-Qur’an.40
He that does a good deed shall be repaid tenfold; but he does evil shall be
rewarded only with evil. None shall be wronged.(al-An’am: 6-160)
Mansur also introduces another verse which states there is a reward bringing seven
hundred times the original value to the faithful ones in al-Qur’an.41
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Y. Mansur, The Miracle of Giving (Jakarta: Zikful, 2013) p.XIV.
Ibid.
37
Ibid., p. XV.
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Ibid., p .4.
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Ibid., p. 26.
40
Ibid., p. 23.
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Ibid.
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Those that give their wealth for the cause of God can be compared to a grain of
corn which brings forth seven ears, each bearing a hundred grains. (al-Baqarah:
2-261)
In most religions, the act of charity is encouraged, and compassion is regarded as one of
the highest virtues. Sedekah, which is one of the forms of charity in Islam, is much
encouraged by Mansur, and an enormous number of people have practiced it. The sense
of Islamic solidarity, a fear for akhirat, and the expectation of multiplying rewards seem
to be a great motivation for sedekah. However, there is another notion of Islam that
potentially promotes this Islamic charity.
Ozaral points out that the act of redistribution of individual wealth is much encouraged
in Islam.42 In addition to the sense of social solidarity, Islam also values “the mutual
social responsibility” or al-takaful al-ijtima’i.43 To “employ their accumulated capital for
the service of mankind” is the correct path for faithful Muslims.44 Theologically speaking,
sedekah is an expression of the faithfulness of Muslims. However, at the same time,
sedekah is a social system to facilitate the circulation of wealth that could foster social
work that is beyond the reach of authorities. Sedekah, therefore, is a useful way for
ordinary people to bring about social welfare.
Activities of PPPA
Yusuf Mansur has in fact collected a vast sum of capital as the result of his encouragement
to practice sedekah to his followers through his religious sermons. As has been mentioned
before, he has established an organization called Program Pembibitan Penghafal
AlQuran, known as PPPA, and this charitable Islamic body is an instrument to
“redistribute” capital to society. Mansur started a simple training course for “memorizing
al-Qur’an,” which later turned to be the more organized PPPA in the city of Tangerang,
just outside of Jakarta in 2003.45 PPPA’s main goal is to “establish Qur’an-based
civilization for Indonesia” and was officially inaugurated in May 2007. Its activities
cover the areas of education, including Rumah Tahfidz (al-Qur’an learning school),
national as well as international humanitarian aid, health care, social welfare for the poor,
etc.46
As one of its mission statements shows, PPPA emphasizes the “value of sedekah,” and
its operational funding is based on the principle of sedekah.47 PPPA runs 3,000 Rumah
42

B. Ozaral, “Islam and Moral Economy”, in T. Keskin (ed.), The Sociology of Islam (Reading, UK:
Ithaca Press, 2012) p. 29.
43
C. Tripp, op. cit., p. 55.
44
B. Ozaral, op. cit., p. 29.
45
Programe Pembibitan Penghafal AlQur’an means al-Qur’an Reciter Training Program.
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PPPA: Daarul Quran, p.11.
47
Interview with executive members of PPPA by the author in Tangerang, December 28, 2013.
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Tahdiz with 100,000 pupils throughout the country, and this extracurricular school does
not require students to pay fees.48 Each pupil is supposed to memorize at least one verse
from al-Qur’an each day. Apart from this informal education, there are five pesantren or
boarding schools nation-wide run by PPPA. They also offer scholarships to those who
need financial support, including orphans. PPPA’s religious network even includes travel
agencies and television and radio stations.49
PPPA also implements post natural disaster programs. One of the most significant of
these was conducted in the village called Glagh Harjo in central Java between August
2011 and November 2011. After Mt. Merapi erupted fiercely in 2010, Glagh Harjo, which
is located at the foot of this active volcano, was devastated and most of the houses were
destroyed. PPPA together with local Islamic organizations conducted a village
restoration program, re-building 180 houses, which amounts to more than sixty-six
percent of destroyed houses, without any charge to villagers.50 Most of the villagers were
by no means affluent, and their financial situation became aggravated after the disaster.
The major industry in the village is stone-collecting from Mt. Merapi, for which villagers
can earn about US $5 to US $10 a day. A sixty-year old male village resident stated that
“it was such a great help from PPPA.”51 According to the coordinator of the program, it
costs approximately US $1,000 to build a 45-square-meter house.52 PPPA also has set up
a small Islamic school or madrasa in the village in order to spread the spirit of al-Qur’an.53
Another one of PPPA’s significant contributions to society is the provision of reliable and
affordable medical services. Two medical clinics named Daarul Quran Nusantara Clinic
known as DAQU clinic was established the in the Central Javanese towns of Magelang
and Malang. The clinic in Magelang was opened in July 2013 with four medical doctors
and two Islamic counselors. Dr Finah Yulia, head of the clinic, explains that patients
whose monthly income is less than US $50 will be treated free of charge.54 In every room,
some verses from al-Qur’an are displayed. Both patients and the family have access to
counseling with Islamic teachers in the clinic. One of the patients of the clinic explains
that they like to be treated in the clinic as the standard of medical treatment there is higher
than at public ones; the staff are professional; it is economical; and they find the
atmosphere warm and Islamic.55
The operational fee of PPPA depends on the donation from the umat or Islamic
community, consisting of both individual and private companies. The sum of US
48

Inerview with Sunaryo Principal/Executive PPPA by the author in Tangerang, December 28, 2013.
PPPA: Daarul Quran, pp.18-39.
50
Interview with Kabul, former volunteer who joined the program, by the author in Glagah Harjo,
January 2, 2014.
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Interview conducted by the author in Glagah Harjo, on January 2, 2014.
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Interview with Sunaryo Executive PPPA by the author in Glagah Harjo , January 2, 2014.
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$403,000,000-worth of individual sedekah was contributed between 2007 and 2013,
while several private companies run by Yusuf Mansur have also donated US $87,000 as
sedekah.56 It seems that the enthusiasm of umat for offering sedekah never ceases. PPPA
received approximately US $600,000 as sedekah in August 2013 alone.57
Business of Yusuf Mansur and Controversy
While Yusuf Mansur heads a charitable non-profit organization such as PPPA, he also
owns several profit-making private companies. A multi-level marketing or pyramid
selling company, PT Veritra Sentosa Internasional or VSI, established in July 2013, has
been growing rapidly; its membership jumped from one thousand to fifteen thousand in
six months.58 The company sells no actual manufactured products but offers a service for
electronic payment for utilities. Each member is supposed to expand his/her lineage by
adding ‘offspring’, and about one US dollar is obtained by a ‘parent’ when a new member
joins the network. Apart from finding a new member, each ‘parent’ can receive twenty
US cents when the ‘offspring’ conducts an electronic transaction. It is possible for a
member to receive various hadiah or prizes when successful.
A gathering to introduce VSI was held at a restaurant in the suburb of Jakarta at the end
of December 2013, and approximately thirty people attended. The seminar started with
the introduction of Yusuf Mansur with a large portrait on the front screen. Iman Jaya,
who presided over the meeting, listed the characteristics of VSI networking business as
easiest, cheapest, fastest and most effective (to gain benefits). He also emphasized that
each member will become an “owner” of the online-shop, which is, according to Jaya, a
new world. The participants of the seminar were much encouraged to find their
‘offspring’, and Jaya reiterated that it was an easy task for anyone to find a few friends
who could join the scheme. On the front screen, the photos of various prizes were
ostentatiously shown, such as those of a smart phone, a free trip to Singapore and Mecca,
luxurious European-made automobiles, and a villa.
Jaya also explained that Yusuf Mansur could be the best PR figure when searching
‘offspring’. In fact, members of VSI are allowed to use the photo of Mansur for
advertisement. One of the participants of the seminar, a forty-five-year-old trader, likes
the business of VSI as he trusts Mansur. He stated that it was good to have connection
with other people in society, it was easy to do, and he felt happy that he could contribute
to economic development.59

56

Interview with Tarmizi Asshidiq, Executive Director of PPPA by the author in Tangerang, December
28, 2013.
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DAQU January 2014, p. 82.
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Interview with Imam Jaya, Sales executive conducted by the author in Tangerang, December 29, 2014.
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The participants seem to have interests in VSI as it is less complicated as they buy a
voucher first and invite their friends to join them. However, it also seems that they have
much trust in Yusuf Mansur and his activities, such as sedekah. They seem to be willing
to be a part of Yusuf Mansur’s network. A thirty-five-year old computer programmer
named Faud, who is one of the members of VSI, acknowledges his motivation of joining
VSI is Yusuf Mansur. He states:
I joined VIS because Yusuf Mansur’s image is very good. Although I do not
know him personally, he appears on TV and we know he is a good Muslim. If
the leader of VSI were not Yusuf Mansur, I would not join VSI.60
Although VSI is a commercial activity, Faud feels that he practices sedekah by joining
VSI.61 It seems that he pays little heed to the difference between capitalist benefit seeking
business and Islamic charity, believing that he will have a bright akhirat.62 VSI would
appeal to people as it is simple, finding a few friends who like to join the scheme, and it
is ‘cool’, using information technology. However, apart from these reasons, we can
assume that a great majority of the members of VSI join the scheme because of its ‘Islamic
charm,’ the feeling of being blessed by Allah brought by Yusuf Mansur.
Multi-level marketing or MLM is based on the social association of members. The
essence of MLM lies in the idea that the independent owner or ‘parent’ expands his or her
network by obtaining as many ‘offspring’ as possible. It is certainly handy as the
members engage in no physical labor but ‘persuade’ possible offspring, whoever that
might be, to join them. Should that take place in society, there is a concern that the
members of MLM will consider their associates or friends as potential sources of their
income, namely as mere objects--not fellow humans. There are also concerns that such
relationships are based on self-centered greed and materialism devoid of humanity. Some
even call attention to the inherently false logic of the MLM system, according to which
the dynamics between supply and demand are simply ignored.63
We see a clear contradiction here between Islamic solidarity and the exploitative
relationships of MLM. The former requires a true sense of compassion for others, while
the latter’s major concern is material self-benefit. Some might think that the members of
VSI disguise their intent with religious masquerade and their priority is mere individual
material benefits. As long as VSI emphasizes Mansur’s religious virtue, VSI cannot
escape this criticism.
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In fact, some Islamic scholars object to businesses such as MLM. Yazid argues that the
commercial activities in Islam should involve active, not passive, physical work. One of
the hadiths clearly states that “it is much better for the one who searches for wood to find
and carry it on his own shoulders than to ask someone or merely be given it by someone
else.”64 It seems that more conventional business, such as retail, is preferred in Islamic
tradition to those activities featuring MLM, which encourages ‘passive-income’ of the
members.
However, Indonesia’s highest Islamic authority, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) or
Indonesian Ulama Council, has not forbidden MLM business. MUI in Bandung, West
Java, has issued a fatwa or Islamic ruling on MLM that business activities that involve no
actual product are regarded as a “money game” and thus are haram or forbidden. Yet, if
the business contains activities that “sell” any product, it is halal or allowed.65
With regard to Yusuf Mansur’s VSI business, it seems permissible from the MUI’s point
of view. However, it is still controversial as VSI is rather an unconventional business
that does require almost no ‘physical work,’ and the main work of the members is to ‘ask’
others to join them. This action might clash with the essence of Islamic teaching.
We can also see controversy about Yusuf Mansur’s other activities. For example, Yusuf
Mansur was questioned by the Financial Service Authority (OJK) regarding his
investment business called Patungan Usaha (PU) or Joint Venture in July 2013. The
members of PU are supposed to invest twelve million rupiah, which is equivalent to US
$1,200, to receive an eight percent return annually. However, the authority pointed out
that this investment scheme is illegal as PU had no license to conduct investment
business.66 Yusuf Mansur chose to end PU and commenced a co-op type institution called
Koperasi Mera Puti which would allow investors to obtain twenty percent of annual
return from their investment. However, that twenty percent benefit will be divided into
twelve percent of sedekah, which will be used for charity, and the other eight percent will
be investors’ actual income.67
Conclusion
It is obvious that capitalist economy is no stranger to Islam as its theology encourages
Muslims to engage in business activities. In this regard, Islam has much resonance with
capitalist Western counterparts. Islam qua religion also shows its distinctive social
function, that is, to facilitate profit-making activities. Unlike compulsory tax-like zakat,
64
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sedekah that is based on Muslims’ free will plays a role in stimulating the economy. More
importantly, sedekah has become an essential source of funding for philanthropic
activities in a given society. The concept of social solidarity and social responsibility of
Muslims have been employed to facilitate Islamic orientation in a capitalist society. We
should remember that this phenomenon observed in Islamic society corresponds with
Western Christian society. Huntington is right that Muslims lean to Islam in a capitalist
society where severe competitions and the discrepancy between the haves and have-nots
are entrenched.
However, such Muslims’ enthusiasm towards their faith as practicing sedekah is by no
means indicative of “Islamic resurgence” or “the rejection of Western culture.” It
originates in their psychological state of mind, namely fear and hope regarding the life
after this or akhirat, rather than ideological antagonistic conviction against the nonIslamic world.
The popularity of Yusuf Mansur in Indonesia exemplifies the Islamic modern economic
model by which Islam is distinguished from the West, emphasizing the importance of
Allah together with spirituality that calls for attention to the less fortunate. Both sedekah
and MLM are assimilated into the process of ‘making a genuine Islamic society,’ which
Yusuf Mansur himself publicly stated that he intends to realize. After observing Yusuf
Mansur’s activities, Islam seems to function to actualize philanthropic attitudes of
Muslims in a so-called money driven society. At the same time, Islam facilitates business
activities such as MLM in spite of the controversy over its legitimacy in theology. If the
members of VSI and other commercial businesses of Yusuf Mansur merely concentrate
on pursuing the target of their “supply,” treating these people solely as a source of income,
the humanitarian feature of Islamic economy will be totally lost.
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The Needham Question and the Great Divergence:
Why China Fell Behind the West and Lost the Race In Ushering the
World into the Industrial Revolution and Modernity
Pierre Dimaculangan
pierre.dimaculangan@yahoo.com
At over four thousand years old, China is the oldest continuous living civilization in the
world. In that span of time, the people of that civilization have created a sophisticated
and highly developed culture unparalleled by any other neighboring nations for
millennia. With a recorded history that has remained largely unbroken since the days it
began, China has exercised great influence over Asia and has commanded its respect and
tribute for many centuries. With a highly developed culture, many significant advances
emerged in government, art, and science that were beyond the caliber of its
contemporaries throughout the ancient, medieval, and pre-modern eras. This paper
attempts to explain how Chinese and European maritime voyages, military technology,
colonialism, industrialization, philosophy, economic systems, and religious motivation
eventually allowed the West to dominate global affairs and overtake China by the
beginning of the modern era.
The Zhou Dynasty, a contemporary of the Classical Greek and Roman civilizations, gave
birth to the likes of Lao Zi, Confucius, Mencius, Zhuang Zi, and Sun Zi who laid the
foundations of Chinese thought and culture for the next two and half thousand years. The
establishment of the Han Dynasty, a contemporary of the Roman Empire, marked the
first golden age in Chinese history based on Confucian philosophy, and gave China its
identity establishing it as the dominant super power of Asia. While Europe toiled in the
Dark Ages, China flourished in the Tang Dynasty - an era of unprecedented wealth,
freedom, and cosmopolitan culture unlike anything else in the world during that time. Its
successor, the Song Dynasty, was highly industrial and inventive, marked by significant
advances in engineering and military technology.
China was considered by its people as “the birthplace of history, the font of religious
wisdom, the inspiration of philosophical insights, the source of technological innovation.
It was the Middle Kingdom. The Celestial Empire. The Center of the World” (Hawley,
2005, p. 26). The Chinese saw themselves as the preservers of culture and considered all
other people “barbarians”. If this perspective of China is true, why then did the Chinese
not lead the way to an Industrial Revolution that would pave the road towards the
modernity we now live? What factors contributed to China’s declined international
influence causing the “great divergence” that allowed the European West to dominate
world affairs? These questions are collectively known as the Needham Question, named
after Joseph Needham - a British scientist and Sinologist who is best known for his many
books on Chinese history, culture, and contributions to the world.
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Investigations of the Needham Question can begin in the early 15th century. It is here
we see the initial stages of China’s lost opportunities to become the undisputed economic,
cultural, and military world leader. At this time, China had just ousted the century old
Mongol-dominated Yuan Dynasty. A new era called the Ming was established by the
native Han people. That began what many consider to be the third golden age in China’s
history, “an era of Chinese cultural revival” (Yuan, Knapp, Landman, and Veeck, 2010,
p. 59), and it “was the most powerful empire in the world” (Parker, 2010, p. 2). In the
year 1405, almost a century before Christopher Columbus set sail, the Yongle Emperor
Zhu Di, of the Ming Dynasty, proposed to send a majestic fleet unlike the world had ever
seen to travel through the ancient Arabic trade routes of the Pacific and Indian Ocean to
proclaim China’s greatness to the nations abroad. These naval missions weren’t for
exploration but “power projection” (Dreyer, 2006). The purpose of the mission was to
establish and enhance diplomatic and trade relations with the nations inside the Indian
Ocean trade network, and to proclaim China’s power to all its people. This armada was
larger and more powerful than the combined fleets of Europe during that the same time.
The fleet was dynamic and versatile with three hundred ships of various sizes and
purposes. Some were treasure ships, believed to be either 448.8 to 493.5 feet or 390 to
408 feet in length, much larger than any other ship in the world at that time (Levathes,
1994, p. 80). Others were used as transports or battleships armed with an array of bronze
cannons. The fleet, led by court eunuch Admiral Zheng, made seven epic voyages to
Southeast Asia, India, Arabia, and the East coast of Africa over the span of almost 30
years. In 1433 the naval expeditions of Zheng He came to a sudden halt. The Admiral
unexpectedly died during a stop in India. Meanwhile, a new Emperor had ascended the
throne and ordered that the armada be recalled to China, that all ocean-going expeditions
be canceled, and that the ships be either left to rot in the shipyards or burned to the
ground. The promise of China creating an overseas empire and becoming the world’s
undisputed naval power ceased to exist. Even so, many countries continued to make
tributary missions to the Ming throne while the Indian Ocean trade network proceeded
long after the expeditions were canceled.
According to historians, the cancelation of the naval voyages was considered to be one
of the biggest blunders and major turning points in world history. “China was poised to
seize control of the seas and colonize the world years before the Portuguese, Spanish,
Dutch, and British” (“China”, 2006). The Emperor’s decision to end the voyages is also
the first of many events that caused China to unintentionally and indirectly relinquish its
potential domination of the world to the Europeans. Why did the Emperor cancel these
great expeditions? Why did the Chinese government not employ the pattern of expansion
and colonization the Europeans would later impose upon the world? Many would argue
that the Chinese culture in general was simply too pacifist, inward-looking, and perhaps
even backwards to have created an overseas empire. Is this true? Was it so simple?
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There are many theories as to why the Ming Emperor made his decision to command
such a drastic change in policy. One logical reason is that the lavish expeditions were
simply too expensive to maintain, placing to great a strain on the Imperial treasury. The
Ming were also troubled with domestic issues, especially the continual raids from
Mongols in the North along with incessant marauding of Japanese pirates on the East
Coast that plagued major shipping lanes and coastal villages. These problems may have
compelled the Emperor to cancel the voyages and focus the government’s attention and
finances on the country’s national defense.
Another possible reason for this change in foreign policy was the influence of NeoConfucianism on the government’s thought, and the management its affairs. Its teachings
were conservative and indeed inward looking, having a general neglect for foreign
affairs, and an emphasis on internal matters to promote self-improvement. This
philosophy neglected the outside world and greatly limited China’s interaction with
foreigners (whom they viewed as unimportant and insignificant) and therefore, the
exchange of knowledge and the promotion of trade was hardly present, at least legally.
After Ming China had closed its doors, Europe began to send voyages of its own a few
decades later. These early voyages marked the beginning of European expansion and
influence around the world as Europeans began to seek new trade routes and
opportunities through significant participation in the Indian Ocean trade network.
Furthermore, the discovery of the New World fueled the European drive to make even
more voyages to bring wealth to their respective monarchs, while extending their
influence internationally (albeit at the expense of the native people of the New World,
Africa, and parts of Asia). The elements that brought Europe to power and dominance
in the world will be discussed later.
Nevertheless, Ming China continued to be a powerful, influential international power
throughout the 15th, 16th, and even the 17th centuries. The Spanish, Dutch, and
Portuguese vied for the chance to trade with the Ming Dynasty but were limited to a few
trading ports along the Southern coast. Evidence for China’s continued role as a super
power, and misplaced pride in international affairs, stood strong and was demonstrated
through a ritual in the Imperial Chinese policy known as the “kow tow” in order to grant
trade requests from foreigners. It was a somewhat humiliating gesture the Europeans and
other foreigners had to exercise as a prerequisite in establishing and maintaining
diplomatic and trade relations with the Chinese (Wills, Jr., 2011, p. 29). It forced them
to kneel and bow with their foreheads pressed against the ground in submission,
admitting the superiority of China and the Emperor.
Further demonstrations of China’s authority on the world scene took place at the first and
second battle of Tunmen or Tamao against the Kingdom of Portugal in 1521 and 1522,
when China took naval action against the Portuguese sailors in defense of her national
interests and the interests of her tributaries, in particular the Sultan of Malacca from
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present day Malaysia. Both battles proved decisively victorious for the Ming Navy
(Wills, Jr., 2011, p.27-32). Even over a century after these battles, Ming Loyalist,
warlord and pirate Zheng Chenggong aka Koxinga, led an overwhelming force of troops
to invade Holland’s greatest colony of Formosa (Taiwan) to successfully reclaim the
island as Chinese territory from oppressive Dutch colonists in 1661 and 1662. This is
now known as the Sino-Dutch War (Andrade, 2012).
In the 16th and 17th centuries, China was able to exercise its military capabilities and
enforce its sovereignty over its territories effectively against the emerging Western
powers. Many historians even argue that China, including most of East Asia, developed
on par with Europe until the beginning of the 19th century -- with both regions having
the same industrial output and economic growth. With the sovereignty of China firmly
defended against emerging Western powers and its economy staying very competitive,
when did China’s decline and Europe’s ascension occur? What motivating factors did the
West have to monopolize trade and colonize the world? What contributed to their
seemingly overwhelming success?
The very beginnings of Europe’s emerging success can be traced to a series of events
took place over the span of time that historians have labeled the Renaissance. The word
Renaissance is a term used to describe the supposed gradual re-kindling of Europe’s
Greek and Roman heritage, culture, and thought and first took root in Italy in the 15th
century. This was made possible through the large amounts of both fiscal and intellectual
wealth gained from the lucrative trade the Italian city-states made with the Ottoman
Empire. This relationship allowed the Italians to afford the various artists and polymaths
that pioneered the Renaissance (Meyer, 2012). The Renaissance sparked Europe’s
renewed interest in art, culture, philosophy, and science, and was further encouraged by
the invention of Johann Gutenberg’s movable type printing press. This allowed books to
be printed and mass-produced for the public. This greatly stimulated education and
literacy rates and played a major role in gradually bringing Europe’s less privileged
population out of the so-called “Dark Ages”.
Some historical evidence also reveals that the Reformation changed learning in Europe.
Gutenberg’s version of the printing press, which helped bring about the Reformation,
“brought a renewed interest in reading and learning, and the Renaissance of learning that
had already begun in Europe served as an impetus to what was about to happen
spiritually” (Horton, Dyet, and A Beka, 2005, p. 39). The Reformation helped promote
growth, learning, and scientific advancement since its doctrines did not inhibit education
and learning the way the Roman Catholic Church did. The Reformation also encouraged
people to read, learn, and think for themselves, instead of relying on the Church to do it
for them.
The economic and social effects of the “Renaissance” helped create a growing interest to
participate in the Indian Ocean trade network that was then dominated by Muslim
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merchants. One notable voyage undertaken in 1492 by Christopher Columbus sought a
new route to the Spice Islands in present day Indonesia. Instead he accidentally found his
way to the Americas.
Columbus is one of many mariners to set sail from Europe to find trade and bring wealth
to their respective countries. History shows that the motivating factors behind these
voyages, factors such as wealth, religion, and reputation, were not unlike those of the
Knights who fought in the Crusades. The advent of these voyages created large amounts
of competition amongst the nations of Western Europe with each country working harder
and harder to gain wealth and influence overseas. These voyages did not go unnoticed
by the Church, which saw an opportunity to spread their centralized religion abroad.
Along with the sailors and soldiers went Jesuit missionaries inspired with renewed
religious fervor to convert the peoples of foreign lands to Christianity, or at least the
Roman Catholic Church’s version of it. This European mentality and inspiration for
voyage, conquest, and religious conversion was quite contrary to the Neo-Confucian
thought that dominated the government of China. Individualism and humanism, ideals
brought by the effects of the Renaissance, empowered Europeans to think and act for
themselves. This would in turn benefit the society in which they live and therefore fuel
the establishment of many businesses and companies that would come to profit from
overseas trade and colonialism backed up by a capitalist style economy.
The wealth and overall success of the maritime voyages further developed the European
states and allowed them to grow in power and influence, particularly in the field of war.
The heated competition in Europe began with the establishment of colonies in the
Americas, parts of Africa, and Asia. Most importantly, the competition created much
advancement in military technology -- notably in gunpowder and weaponry -- throughout
the 16th and 19th centuries. Military power played a tremendous role in the success of
the Western nations, and it insured their ability to conquer, maintain control over their
acquired lands, and to retain an even gap of competition amongst themselves. Matchlock,
wheel lock, and flintlock mechanisms for hand-held firearms, breech-loading cannons,
and the corning of gunpowder for a much more concentrated explosive force are a few
of the innovations from the colonial era. These weapons played an important role in the
decline of Chinese influence and the ascension of Europe’s.
China was the birthplace of gunpowder. It was also in China that gunpowder warfare saw
its beginnings. From the Song Dynasty forward, China began mass-producing the first
cannons, bombs, handguns, continuous flame-throwers, rockets, and land mines for use
in warfare against the Mongols in particular. These weapons were adopted by Mongol
forces and continued to be steadily developed under the Yuan Dynasty. By the beginning
of the Ming Dynasty, the weapons had developed into multi-barrel hand cannons,
grenades, sophisticated land mines, and rocket-propelled arrows and missiles. After the
15th century, the development of Chinese gunpowder weapons stagnated and military
technology changed very little (Lorge, 2008). Western advances in weapons, however,
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made gunpowder more potent, and made cannons and muskets more powerful, accurate,
reliable compared to their counterparts in China. In fact, by the 1500’s the Ming began
adopting Western designs for their cannons and matchlock muskets with firing methods
obtained from the Ottomans.
If strong military and advanced weaponry were an important factor in securing a
dominant position amongst the powers of the world, why then were the Chinese not
furthering the development of their own inventions the way the Europeans did? By the
1500’s Europeans had musketeers and cannons at the forefront of their warfare, with steel
weapons assigned only for use in close combat. In China it was rather the opposite. Steel
weapons still comprised the mainstay of warfare with various gunpowder units assigned
to accompany the traditional units. What caused the widening military technological gap
between these two regions?
Firstly, China did not have the same motivating factors as the Europeans to further
improve their weapons. China did not have military competition from any neighboring
countries that would create a necessity to improve the weapons they already had.
Secondly, China’s enemies were made up of Mongols and various tribes from the
Northern and Western borders that used traditional weapons. These people were almost
100% cavalry-based warriors who used bows, spears, and sabers. The domestically
produced bombs, cannons, and rocket arrows at the time were more advanced than the
equipment used by the nomads. Third, the only other real, dangerous foes China faced
were the rampant pirates from Japan pillaging coastal towns. Some had even made it
deep inland after encountering little military resistance from the Ming armies. These
pirates were mostly made up of Ronin or dishonored Samurai who had turned to a life of
piracy in order to support themselves. Pirates also used traditional weapons such as bows
and swords. With non-professional enemies such as these, the necessity or motivation to
improve firearms did not exist. Lastly, China during the Ming was a nation that did not
hold military careers in high esteem. Except perhaps the highest-ranking military
officials, soldiers were considered low class and high in status only in comparison to
peasants and merchants. In the Chinese view, a military career was a secondary choice
for men who were unable to pass the civil service examination required to earn a
prestigious position in the government. This meant that military decisions were made by
government officials with no military or combat experience. These officials were only
well versed in government policy, Confucian philosophy, and a thorough understanding
of the Classics. Soldiers with individual skills in combat and martial arts were also
favored more often than those who had actual leadership abilities. This mentality, and
the widespread mismanagement of military matters by neglectful and irresponsible
government officials, had a significant negative impact on the effectiveness of Ming
soldiers, their morale, and the development of technology in the field of war during the
latter half of the Ming Dynasty (Hawley, 2005).
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Author CJ Peers (2006) effectively summarizes why Chinese weapons technology
stagnated while the same technology in Europe improved. "After about 1400 Chinese
military technology began to stagnate – a consequence of the low social status of soldiers,
the lack of sophisticated enemies to stimulate development, and the suspicion with which
the emperors… regarded innovations, especially those which might weaken the power of
the state. Although in Europe gunpowder strengthened royal control by enabling
governments to destroy the castles of the nobility, in China it tended instead to aid the
defence; the enormous thickness of rammed earth fortifications resisted cannon fire in a
way which the vertical stone walls of contemporary Europe could not" (p. 185).
The unique situation and the enemies the Ming Dynasty faced provided little motivation
to further advance the gunpowder weaponry beyond those manufactured in the 15th
century. Ultimately, Europe’s key advances in weapons and its military power played
an important role in establishing itself as a superpower in the world by enforcing its will
from the end of a cannon, from the 16th century conquests of the Americas to the Opium
Wars of the 19th century.
Another major factor that contributed to China’s decline was the fall of the Ming Dynasty
-- a gradual process made up of internal and external pressures both natural and political
such as famine, flooding, earthquakes, government corruption, peasant revolts, and rapid
inflation that finally took its toll in the early 1600’s. By the year 1644, an ethnic group
from the Northeast called the Manchu took over the government of China and established
the Qing Dynasty.
The Manchu were direct descendants of a nomadic group called the Jurchen Jin, rivals of
the Mongols during the time of Genghis Khan. Under their regime, China expanded her
borders to its largest size. However, many changes they made to government policy, and
society as a whole, were detrimental to the progress of Chinese culture and science.
Under the Qing Dynasty, China experienced prolonged scientific stagnation and even
regression while European powers grew larger and stronger as they continued their
policies of colonialism and imperialism across the world.
There are many factors that contributed to China’s continued “equilibrium” under the
rule of the Qing. One notable factor was the increased government intervention and
participation in the private sector. Although China’s population, economy, and industrial
output bloomed under the Qing, the private sector did not exist under a laissez-faire
system, nor did it enjoy the same opportunities as those of the West. The European drive
to obtain wealth increased the demand for technology and the further advancement of
military.
One of the largest contributing factors to Europe’s growth, and creation of the Industrial
Revolution, was the implementation of the laissez-faire system, where government
involvement in the private aspects of the economy was very limited, but exercised
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sufficient control in order to protect the property rights of businesses and individuals.
This system allowed the accumulation of wealth and power for privately owned
companies obtained from colonialism, and thus paved the way for the funding of and
motivation for the Industrial and Scientific Revolution experienced by the West
throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries. The elements needed to create this revolution
were not present in China at the same time. The culture imposed by the Manchurians
was largely traditional and lacked the innovative and progressive spirit that generally
marked the Han Chinese mentality. It also meant that the Manchu had a general neglect
for the improvement and manufacturing of firearms since their culture largely depended
on the bow for hunting and combat. This mentality contributed to their humiliating
defeats in the Opium Wars.
The Industrial Revolution rapidly accelerated the advancement of the European
economy, science, technology, and military, advancing them far beyond their
contemporaries. An example of the developmental gap between the West and the East
was demonstrated in the Opium Wars where British forces easily crushed the military of
the Qing during different confrontations in the 1800’s. The Opium Wars, and Britain’s
colonization of some of China’s key cities, marked the beginning of an era the Chinese
call “The Century of Humiliation”. Even Japan had rapidly industrialized by the late
1800’s when the Japanese Emperor opened its doors to Westerners and trade relations
were re-established (to the disapproval of the Tokugawa Shogunate). China continued
to fight for a place in a rapidly changing world throughout the 19th and 20th centuries as
it struggled, until 1911, to break the bonds of feudalism and government control of the
Qing Dynasty, defended against Japanese invasions, and endured the takeover of the
destructive Communist Party in 1949. In the West, the events leading up from the socalled Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation all the way through the Industrial
Revolution allowed Europe to take the lead in international affairs by the 19th century
and create a world heavily influenced by European culture, religion, and language.
Today, China is the second largest economy in the world and is finding its place amongst
the world’s industrialized nations thanks to drastic reforms that took place within the
Communist Party in the past few decades. Despite the social and economic damage
caused by Communism, China has not forgotten its glorious history and great cultural
heritage. China is looking to the lessons of the past to help rebuild on the principles that
made it great during the dynastic eras of the Han people. Today the world is witnessing
the Chinese Renaissance, the awakening of a nation that has enjoyed greatness and
prosperity throughout most of history. Perhaps it may someday soon witness China’s
emergence as the center of the world’s attention. Napoleon Bonaparte is commonly
believed to have prophetically once said “Let China sleep for when she wakes the world
will shake.”
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Book Reviews
Sing C. Chew. World Ecological Degradation: Accumulation, Urbanization, and
Deforestation 3000 B.C. – A.D. 2000.
New York: AltaMira Press, 2001.
Reviewed by Tereza Coni Aguiar
This book analyses the relationship Culture-Nature during a long period in history, from
the Bronze Age (3000 B.C.) until A.D. 2000, making a retrospective of the environmental
crisis in an extensive geographical area. The book draws important analogies among the
phenomena of ecological degradation observed in ancient and modern civilizations,
making it easier to spot similarities and differences between periods in history and also
to think about the consequences of this issue today and in the future.
Sing Chew, Professor of Sociology at Humboldt State University, makes a broad study
of the relationship of civilization, its productive processes, and nature. For him, the
relationship Culture-Nature throughout history has always been characterized by great
ecological degradation. His main point is that environmental issues are not new in our
planet. Chew innovates in adding an environmental perspective to the debate about the
rise and fall of civilizations, and he even makes predictions about the future of the planet.
For him, the history of civilizations is the history of ecological degradation.
World Ecological Degradation, published in 2001, is the first of three books. The second,
The Recurring Dark Ages, was published in 2006, and the third, Ecological Futures in
2008. The object of this review is the first book of the trilogy, with 217 pages (33 of
bibliography) and nine chapters.
In the first chapter, “Ecological Degradation over World History,” Chew presents the
main concepts, propositions and processes that define the relationship Culture-Nature
through history: accumulation of capital, urbanization and population growth. The author
asserts that deforestation has been a consequence of the economy of civilizations for at
least 5,000 years. The other seven chapters are chronologically organized and discuss
different civilizations, their economic activities, political and social rules, and ecological
degradation. The book ends with the different concepts and approaches to environmental
conservation, from ancient times until the year 2000.
Chew presents his theory in a standardized manner, examining each civilization in terms
of economic structure, social organization, population distribution and hinterland status.
Next he discusses the way each society interacts with nature and the changes of its natural
habitat, detailing the impacts of its social and economic processes. He sees a bridge
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between the level of necessity of natural resources and the demands of economic activities
in each civilization.
Chew reviews the types of environmental impacts that characterized each civilization,
from the Bronze Age until the year 2000, offering the reader a grand historic perspective
and highlighting the environmental singularities of each region as a consequence of how
its natural resources have been exploited. He shows that deforestation, soil runoff,
salinization, air and water pollution, loss of biodiversity, climate change and other
environmental problems are in no way new, but were present in Mesopotamia, Harappa,
Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire.
For the author, ecological degradation is a consequence of the way civilizations interact
with the natural environment and of how different economic activities are organized. The
intensive use of natural resources and excessive consumption typical of many
civilizations can lead to what he calls ecological stress. Throughout history we can
observe limit situations, when several elements of nature were damaged in an interrelated
way, affecting the environment as a whole. An environmental disaster of such magnitude
can interfere with the reproductive capacity of a civilization and can lead to its decline
and fall.
Chew believes that there is a close relation between environmental damage and resource
accumulation, urbanization and population growth. These three are deeply rooted in the
history of civilizations and are associated with great environmental loss through
deforestation and landscape transformation.
By making intensive use of natural resources, urbanization leads to changes in the
surrounding areas and also in distant areas. Urban spaces have been constantly used with
total disregard to their natural characteristics. This reckless use caused serious problems
of landscape transformation such as floods, landslides and even disease outbreaks. In
many civilizations, urbanization has also been also associated with deforestation,
hydrological destabilization, and air and water pollution.
Population growth combined with urbanization required the intensive use of natural
resources to respond to the need for food, goods and tools. To satisfy this demand,
deforestation began, and the search for ore (gold, silver, iron, bronze, among others) was
intensified. Forests were chopped down to give place to agriculture and the exploitation
of natural resources. The ever growing urban centers needed wood to produce energy
and to respond to the internal demand for resources. These cities had also a great need of
wood to construct their buildings, palaces and temples, and also for the construction of
vessels that were the carriers of the intense trading activities between urban centers in
Mesopotamia, Harappa, Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire. Forests were also wiped
out in the fight for territories during military campaigns, wars and conflicts.
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Chew calls attention to the most serious environmental issue that civilizations
experienced in the past and still experience now: deforestation. This has always been
considered a huge problem in civilizations worldwide. For Chew, the intensive use of
wood is immediately related to ecological degradation and is to be considered a proxy in
understanding the relationship Culture-Nature at any specific time and place.
In the journey through the intricate relationship Culture-Nature, it is interesting to see
how contemporary environmental issues and conservationist preoccupations are
historically manifested. For example, in Greece when water and air pollution started to
be felt more clearly, the concern about conserving natural resources started. Climate
change felt in Mesopotamia, Harappa and the Roman Empire, and pollution caused by
heavy metals, lead poisoning, animal extinction (rhinoceros, crocodile, among other
species) were problems faced by the Roman Empire. Government regulation to protect
forests, water basins and woodlands were an initiative of the Roman Empire. Researches
shows that conservationist concerns appear in periods where ecological degradation is
more intensive.
Besides his sociological perspective, Chew also reflects on the phenomena of ecological
degradation from the viewpoint of human geography. He analyzes the size of the
phenomenon in different points in time as well as the connections between different
elements of nature and society, examining its causes and specificities in each moment in
history. In this sense, his broad approach is closer to the idea of Society-Nature than to
the idea of Culture-Nature, as he defines it. In his geographical perspective, Chew sees
the environment as a reflection of the action of society upon nature, in which humanity is
a determining factor due to its overwhelming impact potential when compared to other
animals. (Galvão, 2009). Geographically speaking “one must think of the environment
in a social perspective that actually includes economic and political interactions of society
in the process of historical construction” (Galvão, 2009).
In considering Chew’s theoretical and methodological contribution, it is important to say
that most research on environmental issues focuses on the economy’s impacts on nature,
while very few studies try to understand how the changed environment affects the
economy and how it can prevent societies from growing and even lead to their fall. In
this way, the contribution of Chew is fundamental.
Regrettably, many research studies still approach the elements of nature and society in a
fragmented and dissociated way, forgetting that Man does not live in isolation; he
interacts continuously with all elements of nature (Aguiar, 2012). In this way, ecological
degradation cannot be analyzed only in a Nature-Society dualist perspective. There are a
great number of interactions between all elements involved that must be identified and
analyzed (Aguiar, 2012). But in analyzing the process of ecological degradation in many
civilizations, Chew presents a few examples of the consequences of this degradation to
society.
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The book gives enlightening information on the connection Nature-Society and brings
important methodological contributions; and some concepts and principles can also be
used in the definition of guidelines to protect the environment. It is specially
recommended to university students and environment researchers in different areas of
knowledge.
In the end, Chew surprises the reader by examining civilizations that had a balanced and
harmonious relationship with nature, as opposed to those marked by environmental
damage caused by economic forces. Chew constructs reflections that could make us think
about the future, and changes in how we relate to nature today.
We live in a period of constant change, both local and global, which leads to great
uncertainty. The way contemporary society relates to the environment is already
considered one of the factors that contribute extensively to environmental problems and
disasters. If we compare this present trend with the careers of past civilizations studied
by Chew, it seems that we are once more reaching a limit in the support capacity of the
environment.
Many environmental movements in the second half of the twentieth century and the
beginning of the twenty-first century stand out for their radical protests that aim to raise
awareness of the global environmental issues. Many international conventions aim to
protect natural resources such as forests, humid areas, and biodiversity. In the 1980s,
scientific evidence on human carbon emission started to cause public concern, leading to
the Climate Change Conference of 1990. Environmental issues, though not new, are more
complex today and represent a huge challenge to governments, to society, and to the
economy of all countries.
In the context of uncertainty and globalization in the world in which we live, reflections
brought by Chew, instead of discouraging more effective initiatives to change mentalities,
should invigorate the debate about environmental protection, and inspire us to try to find
new ways to balance the relationship Society-Nature.
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Paul S. Kinderstedt. Cheese and Culture: A History of Cheese and Its Place in
Western Civilization
White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2012
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman
What began as a book that would be a resource for new artisan cheese makers turned into
a book that tracks the history of western civilization, a history in which cheese plays a
larger role that one would have ever guessed. Kinderstedt’s research turned into an
undergraduate course at the University of Vermont (a big cheese state) that would
integrate cheese science and technology. Cheese has been an enormous part of our
civilizations from Neolithic times to today.
I read this book because I am an artisan cheese lover, and have even made a pilgrimage
to Parma, Italy, where Parmigiano Reggiano, called “the king of cheeses,” has been
produced for the past 1,000 years. This book made that journey even more significant for
me.
Although almost all cultures have some sort of simple cheeses, such as the yogurt cheeses
that the Mongols developed out of mares’ milk, it is only in the West that the great
technology of cheeses developed, a process begun in earliest human civilization after the
domestication of ruminant animals.
Milk quickly spoils but cheese, a food transformed by technology, can keep, making it a
value-added product. The history of this process began some 9,000 years ago in
Southwest Asia, a region in which cattle, sheep, and goats had been domesticated. All of
these animals provided a variety of useful products, particularly sheep and goats
providing wool. But all of them in breeding seasons did have surplus milk, which our
ancestors wanted to use around the year.
Beginning about 17,000 years ago, the post-glacial global warming began to establish
what has come to be known as Mediterranean climate, hot dry summers and cool wet
winters. Wild cereals such as wheat, rye, and barley, along with legumes such as beans,
peas, and lentils, began to thrive. The extensive stands of wild cereals extended in an
elongated swath from the Jordan River Valley northward through inland Syria and to what
is now southeastern Turkey. This became, with the advent of hunter-gatherers, “the fertile
crescent,” mother of civilization for much of the Old World.
Between 11,000 and 9,500 BC, the earth had one last cycle of extreme cooling which
wiped out these early settlements. But around 9,500 BC, there was a sudden intense
episode of global warming, increasing the average annual temperature by as much as 13
degrees Fahrenheit over just a couple of generations. This was followed by slow but
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steady warming for the next two millennia, resulting in a global climate that we still have
today.
As humans in the Fertile Crescent developed food crops, they found that such crops
attracted sheep and goats, especially near mountains such as the Taurus Mountains of
southwest Anatolia and the Zagros Mountains of western Iran. The farmers found an
opportunity to begin herding these animals, taking them from the lowlands in the winter
to the mountains in the summer, a pattern that still exists in the migrations of Iranian tribal
peoples.
Mixed farming and rapid population growth brought profound cultural change: the
blossoming of the Neolithic (New Stone Age) period. Architecture bloomed, as did a
new widespread appearance of religious symbols and shrine building. Humans then had
moved beyond the status of a slightly revised and more efficient version of the eating and
breeding machines that had preceded them. To use biblical language, says the author,
humans were made in the image of God.
The archeological record tells us that until 7,000 BC, animals were raised for meat. It
took generations of careful breeding and handling until sheep and goats were developed
to have more milk than just needed for their young, and for these animals to permit
humans to milk them. At the same time, intensive grain cultivation and population
explosion produced widespread environmental degradation and erosion. Pastoralism and
milk production were probably a response to this disaster.
Adult humans in Neolithic times were almost universally lactose intolerant (as many
Asians are today). But they found that cheese, a product made by boiling milk, made this
foodstuff digestible. The invention of pottery enabled milk to be stored, transported, and
cooked. Ceramic pots with drain holes were the first sieves for draining the whey from
curds formed either by heat or by adding a small amount of rennet (from the intestines of
animals). The entire agricultural and herding revolution was characterized by the ability
to store food, a need that cheese met.
According to Kinderstedt, cheese and religion have a long relationship. There are many
references in the Bible to cheese being a gift for the deity (or in polytheist societies, gods).
Several chapters are devoted to all of the inventions that emerged in primeval times that
had something to do with farming--ceramics, metallurgy, animal husbandry, and cheesemaking-- and the uses of these products in trade and religion (temple gifts).
Kinderstedt traces cheese development across the world from the Fertile Crescent across
to India. China, however, never developed a culture of cheese making.
The Mediterranean world was early in developing cheese and the various technologies
that produce varieties, some of which we know today: feta and ricotta, and somewhat
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later, the dry grating cheese such as Pecorino. But it was in northern Europe that the
amazing cheese culture that we know today had its origins. The north was more
hospitable to raising cattle, the most favored herding animal of the Indo-European
peoples. Of these, the Celts were the specialists among cheese makers, and their
descendants, the French and north Italians, still are.
Very interesting chapters involve cheese in the Greek religions, with a good deal on the
diet of the earlier (and hardier) Athenians (cheese, barley cake, ripe olives and leeks).
There is much interesting material on the very elegant cheeses developed by the Romans
which were important trade and luxury goods as well as a culinary boost to their diets.
Italians, beginning with the Etruscans, were always enthusiastic cheese makers. The
Italian genius showed itself in the connection of cheese making and pigs, an important
source of meat that can be smoked and preserved in other ways. The pigs would consume
the whey extruded during cheese making, a symbiotic development still used. Parma is
not only the source of Parmigiano Reggiano cheese, but the equally famous Parma hams
(prosciutto). These foodstuffs have been raised together for millennia.
With the advent of Christianity throughout the late Roman world, systematic cheese
making became the norm. The chapters on the manor, monastery, and age of cheese
diversification are fascinating. Monasteries in France have always been known for their
splendid cheese making. I visited one monastery in the Auvergne region of France that
sold in its gift stores the most marvelous brie-type cheese and all sorts of honey
confections. The ethic of work promoted by the monastic movement produced such
wonders.
Over time, peasant cheese makers in northwestern France fine-tuned their simple
practices and storage conditions in ways that rendered them predictable and desirable.
This was a process that continues to this very day in the production of European and now
American artisan cheeses.
The author covers the extensive cheese making in England and the Netherlands, and
introduces the development of factory-produced cheese which began to replace artisan
farm cheese. The industrialization movement came at the same time as other practices
that replaced female practitioners. Medicine went through such a transformation too,
eliminating the midwife practitioners and replacing them with male doctors and hospitals.
The one good element that emerged with the industrialization of cheese making was that,
for the first time, standardized instructions (recipes) for specific cheese varieties could be
reproduced anywhere. Dairy schools were created during the latter half of the nineteenth
century.
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However, both the transfer of cheese making to male industrialists and midwifery to
medical doctors produced unanticipated consequences: terrible cheese and high maternal
death rates. Both female practices have had a revival today, to the benefit of both cheeses
and maternal outcomes.
The author may have been focused on the evolution of cheese, but its connection with
other aspects of history figures substantially in this book. The section on Holland’s role
as cheese provisioner of all Europe was fascinating. Their cheeses, which were solid,
round, and encased in wax, traveled well and brought in much revenue.
But more interesting than the cheese was the very fact of the identity of a country that
would never have come into being without great human intervention. During the Middle
Ages, much of Holland was uninhabited or sparsely populated, a wasteland consisting of
waterlogged peat bogs and maritime salt pastures. It wasn’t until the fifteenth century,
writes Kinderstedt, that commercial dairying began to emerge in Holland as a significant
element of the economy. Despite the unpromising and sodden terrain, cheese making
figured from the late Neolithic in this area because one could not grow much food in the
salt marshes, but in the ridges formed by oceanic activity on the coast, the people could
raise cattle and survive on dairying.
The miracle of Holland began from the tenth century onward, when the Dutch undertook
massive land reclamation. They laboriously drained the fields with drainage ditches, built
low dikes, all despite having a chronic labor shortage (this was the period of recurring
cycles of Black Death). The aristocrats and churchmen recruited the necessary labor force
by offering serfs their freedom and almost absolute, exclusive property rights to the land
that they reclaimed in return for their labor. (The labor shortages in other parts of Europe
were treated in much the same way, changing the social pecking order for the better.)
But in Holland, there were unexpected consequences. The reclaimed lands were not good
for grain raising. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the production of bread cereals
collapsed, brought on by an ecological crisis of largely human making.
Draining the peat bogs produced the sinking of landmass, opening the country to
devastating oceanic flooding, made worse by a gradually rising sea level. They were
losing their country. However, in an amazing example of human determination and
ingenuity, says Kinderstedt, many Dutch peasants chose to adapt their agriculture and
fight the North Sea. They developed the polder system, enclosing their fields with dikes
and pumping out surface water to create permanent dry lands. In 1408, the windmill,
once used for grinding grain, was adapted to pump water from a polder.
The soil still was not good enough for wheat, but it was fine for barley and hops, and gave
rise to artisan beer brewing. Other farmers dropped grain cultivation for dairy cattle. The
Dutch created a lucrative trade (in exchange for wheat that they imported) in their hearty
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artisan cheeses and beers. In addition, the rise of Calvinism in Holland further encouraged
the entrepreneurial spirit that was already part of their culture.
Between 1500 and 1700, Holland’s economy expanded, probably more rapidly than any
other in Europe. Kinderstedt shows the interrelationships of trade, religion, ethnic
temperament, and the growth of the nation state. Holland has been an amazing case study
of what determined human beings can do.
The rest of the book tracks the modern evolution of cheese making, beginning with
factories and systematic production, but then going on to today’s wonderful artisanal
cheeses and the governmental rules for keeping them pure and safe. Who would have
thought that cheese could be such an important part of human history?
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Daniel Richter. Before the Revolution: America’s Ancient Pasts
Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011
Reviewed by John Grayzel

Daniel Richter’s Before the Revolution provides a broad historical sweep of the dynamics
between groups, settlements, and settlers, as well as between the populations inhabiting
North America and the engaged European powers circa 1492 to 1774. For those of us
accustomed to using the revolution and 1776 as our reference point for the start of the
American nation and its character, it is a long needed wake up call. Though we are aware
that Europeans have been systematically interacting with the continent since Columbus’s
voyage in 1492, as Americans our understanding of American character, behavior and
society is almost entirely post-revolutionary. Our official heroes and references are the
founding fathers, upon whom we look with nostalgia for a supposed time when virtue and
talent seemed to reign. At the same time, our intellectual reference for enduring American
character and behavior is the 1830s Jacksonian revolution, which gave formal power to
the white middle class and championed the values of the common man. These values, in
the observations of Alexis de Tocqueville, were work, making money, individualism, and
the promotion of equality -- to the detriment of merit and intellect. (Tocqueville felt that
this situation was saved only by the American capacity for creating quick associations for
mutual benefit, a penchant that he felt resulted in a vibrant civil society but a weak
government.)
Richter paints for us a dramatically different picture. His picture is of an America that,
for most of the 275 years prior to its becoming an independent country, was a cauldron
for the collection of the flotsam and jetsam of not only a distressed Europe but also the
remnants of those local North American Indian populations who had lost up to 90 percent
of their population to European-brought diseases. In that cauldron, things did not meld.
Rather they alternated between being settled on the bottom of the vessel and swirling
around whenever some outside force (usually conflict) stirred the pot.
To give structure to that phenomenon of periodic repositioning, Richter provides a simple
framework for understanding what seem to have been 40-50 year cycles of alternative
organizing principles for the colonial political economy. Richter characterizes six such,
in their order of appearance, as: Progenitors (the agriculture based societies of the preEuropean indigenous population), Conquistadores (those who came to conquer that
population and extract its wealth), Traders (those who established opportunistic relations
primarily for the exchange of European goods for furs), Planters (a relatively elite group
that established both small and large agricultural plantations to produce goods for local,
Caribbean and European markets), Imperialists (who sought to establish an imperial style
domination of the American political-economy by the British Crown after the restoration
of the Monarchy in 1660), and the Atlanteans (those commercial interests that regularly
plied their trade across the Atlantic and up and down the Atlantic coast of North America).
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The resulting characteristics of that pre-revolutionary stew were far different than the
shared American character identified by Tocqueville. As related by Richter, to see
America before the Revolution was to see: 1) an incredibly heterogeneous population
(British, Scots, French, Dutch, Africans, Germans, Irish, Basques, Jews, Swedes and
settled Indians); 2) the continuous economic, political and military alliances and
encounters between European settlements and the surrounding Indian tribes; 3) the key
role that mutually antagonistic Christian Churches played in the ordering of public life;
4) a dramatic lack of social, economic and political equality -- with much of the
population being pauperized bonded laborers; the majority of the others surviving as
indigent farmers or craftsmen, and a small but dominating political, propertied and
religious elite; and 5 ) the constant presence and influence, through their representatives,
of various Europe overlords. All of these strands were clearly different from the moneymotivated individualist mediocrity of equality that characterized America per
Tocqueville.
Richter does a good job of chronicling the key events, circumstances and relationships.
His book is a valuable reference text for envisioning those times. However, he draws no
deep lessons from that period in terms of understanding post-revolutionary times, nor
does he extract any larger message as an insight on society and civilization per se. In fact
Richter sort of consciously punts on the question of greater meaning to be garnered from
those times when he ends the book with the quote: “After all,” wrote black Atlantean
Olaudah Equiano quoting the prophet Micah, “what makes any event important, unless
by its observation we become better and wiser, and learn ‘to do justly, to love mercy, and
to walk humbly before God’?”
Such an ending I find spiritually warming but intellectually lacking. Richter’s book raises
a host of questions: How did this diverse “before the revolution” world so quickly morph
into a perceived single shared national character? What elements of that pre-revolutionary
past, if any, can enrich our understanding of present day America? Are there lessons to
be learned that have a large relevance to our understanding of the development of human
societies and civilizations?
Personally, I think one can draw larger lessons from this study in terms of understanding
the difference between a society and a civilization. What we see in Richter’s book is
clearly not America as a civilization or even a sub-set of Western Civilization. America
appears as an amalgamation of transacting and transecting fragmented cultures. Certainly
it evolved its functional ways and organizations as needed, but it did not begin its journey
to an “American Civilization” until it had created its national identity and corresponding
independent institutions. It is as if American before the revolution was a supersaturated
solution of diverse whirling elements, none truly dissolved. Somehow, from this solution,
between 1776 and 1830, under the dynamic circumstances of revolution, independence
and territorial expansion, precipitated out a perceived American character. By the time
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Tocqueville came to America in 1832 that character had been sufficiently formed for him
to characterize it in a way still pertinent today:
… it is easy to perceive that almost all the inhabitants of the United States conduct
their understanding in the same manner, and govern it by the same rules, that is to
say, that without ever taking the trouble to define the rules of a philosophical
method, they are in possession of one, common to the whole people…(that is) to
evade the bonds of system and habit, of family maxims, class-opinions, and in
some degree, of national prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of
information, and existing facts only as a lesson used in doing otherwise and doing
better; to seek the reason of things for oneself, and in oneself alone; to tend to
results without being bound to means, and to aim at the substance through the
form--and if I seek among those characteristics the principle one which includes
almost all the rest, I discover that, in most operations of the mind, each American
appeals only to the individual effort of his own understanding. (Alexis de
Tocqueville. Democracy in America. Book I, Chapter I. “Influence of Democracy
on the Action of Intellect in the United States”)
Oh well, maybe Richter, as an American, is leaving the resolution of any questions of
greater meanings to the individual efforts of our own understandings? If you are interested
in such questions, read the book. It is worth the effort.
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Liel Leibovitz and Matthew Miller. Fortunate Sons: The 120 Chinese Boys Who
Came to America, Went to School, and Revolutionized an Ancient Civilization
New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009
Reviewed by Connie Lamb
In 1850, at Yale University, the annual football match of freshmen vs. sophomores was
underway. A freshman spectator on the sidelines dressed in a long robe with his long hair
in a queue was trying to understand this mass of bodies pushing against each other when
he saw the ball pop loose from the group. He picked it up and ran as fast as he could
toward the goal line. The players stood in amazement for a moment, then a sophomore
ran after the freshman and pulled on his queue. The pain made Yung Wing drop the ball,
which he kicked across the goal line winning the game for the freshman team – a true
upset. The boys hefted Yung to their shoulders in celebration. Thus begins the book
Fortunate Sons about Chinese students in America, in particular the Chinese Educational
Mission of 1872-1881, which Yung Wing championed and directed.
This introductory story demonstrates that the book reads like a novel – like historical
fiction – except that it is true and well documented. The book is divided into three
sections. Part I tells of Yung Wing who was brought to America by a Christian
missionary. Yung graduated from Yale and returned to China with the goal of
encouraging the Imperial Court to send Chinese students to the United States for
education in western knowledge. The book describes his work and eventual success in
the creation of the Chinese Educational Mission (CEM) and his return to America to direct
the program. Part II explains the journey of the 120 Chinese students, thirty per year for
four years, and their experiences living with New England families and attending school.
Part III details their return to China when the mission abruptly ended and then follows a
few of them through their lives and activities. It provides an overview of Chinese history
from the 1880s into the 1900s, including the French attack on Foochow, the war with
Japan, the demise of the monarchy, and the struggle to modernize China.
In 1847, at the age of 19, Yung Wing was taken to America by a missionary-teacher,
Reverend Samuel Brown, who schooled Yung while serving in China. Rev. Brown lived
in Connecticut, so Yung lived there too and was the first Chinese student admitted to Yale
University, graduating in 1854. He returned to China and the rest of part I explains his
adjustment back in his homeland, the challenges China was facing, the corrupt Qing
dynasty, the increasing European presence, and Yung’s work to earn money for his own
stability. He helped found an arsenal with purchased Western technology, which
produced guns and cannons. He also aided in establishing an engineering school near the
arsenal where local Chinese students could train in designing, building, and operating the
Western machines. He finally became a mandarin, in recognition of his knowledge and
abilities. He promoted the idea that China should send students to America and pay for
their education at the finest colleges there, with the idea that they would become the future
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leaders of China unburdened by antiquated thinking and superstitions (p. 85). They would
learn Western skills that would help their country to modernize.
In the late 1800s China was ravaged by poverty, population growth, and aggressive
European armies. Driven by a desire for progress and reform, called the Self
Strengthening Movement, the Chinese Imperial Court agreed to send students under the
direction of Yung Wing to America to study at New England’s finest schools. The
students chosen to go (with their parent’s permission) were 11-14 years old and were
expected to stay in America for 15 years, going to high schools and universities to learn
skills that would help them advance China toward modernity. The students sailed across
the Pacific Ocean, landing in San Francisco in September 1872. To these boys, mostly
from poor families in Southern China, the bustle of the city, the strange language, the
hotel amenities, and the new technology were amazing and difficult to comprehend.
“They could never, it seemed, ring an electric bell often enough and giggle as it emitted
its metallic trill, or turn on a faucet and stare, hypnotized, at the never-ending stream of
fresh water. They rode the elevator, up and down and up again” (p. 94). The book
provides short snippets of U. S. history to provide context, including the Chinese who
came to America to work on the railroad or other menial jobs and who settled in
Chinatown, San Francisco, the opening up of the Western U. S., the completion of the
transcontinental railroad, and the educational system. The students traveled by train
across the United States where they saw vast open plains, high mountains, native
Americans, buffalo, fields of grain, and as they drew nearer to their destination, the
change in scenery to green forests, church steeples, and developed cities. They settled in
with welcoming families in Hartford, Connecticut and began their American schooling.
They learned English quickly, made new friends, and participated in American sports and
culture. They were also provided instruction in Chinese traditions and language so they
would not forget. In 1891, due to the growing anti-Asian sentiment on the American
West coast, and fear among the Imperial Court that the students would become too
Westernized, the mission was closed after nine years and most of the students returned to
China.
When the students returned home, they had to overcome the suspicions of their
countrymen in an environment deeply resistant to technological and cultural change. In
fact they were first imprisoned and interrogated for a few days before they could go home
and finally reunite with their families. The book follows the lives of Yung and a few
others that provide an overview of about 20 years of Chinese history and the work of
these particular students. The students most mentioned (with their American nicknames)
are: Yung Leang (Byjinks Jonnie), Tong Shao-yi (Ajax), Liang Ju-hao (Cold Fish
Charlie), Tsai Ting Kan (Fighting Chinee), Jeme Tien-yau (Jimmy), Liang Dunyan, who
was an excellent baseball player, and Cai Shaoji. Yung Leang, who was a nephew of
Yung Wing, was assigned to a naval academy along with a handful of other CEM
graduates. He was seriously wounded when French naval ships stationed there attacked
the Chinese fleet in August 1884 over a minor scuffle. Tong and Liang, who were
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cousins, were dispatched to Korea, which figured prominently in the dispute between
China and Japan. As bureaucrats, they encountered widespread corruption and the
determination of Dowager Cixi of the Qing dynasty to stay in power. Some of the
students fought in the first Sino-Japanese War, which China lost. They watched in dismay
the Boxer Rebellion against imperialist powers in 1898-1900 because, to them, the Boxers
represented all that had been stifling China’s growth.
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, mission graduates were sprinkled throughout
the empire, and it seemed that the American-educated boys would be able to guide their
nation toward progress. Liang Dunyan, Tong Woo and Cai Shaoji were secure in midlevel
positions in the Qing’s hierarchy; Liang Ju-hao was entrusted with running the allimportant Beijing–Shanhaikuan railway line. Jeme helped build other railways and
became a national hero. Liang Dunyan helped establish a preparatory school to teach
English and other subjects; the school later became a university. He and others convinced
the United States to use the Boxer Indemnity Fund to pay for more students to study in
America. When the Republic of China was established in 1912 with Yuan Shikai as the
newly elected president, Tong Shao-yi was named prime minister; Liang Dunyan was
appointed minister of foreign affairs with Cai Shaoji and Liang Ju-hao as his deputies;
and Tsai Ting Kan was now senior advisor to the president. Unfortunately, although
Yung Wing’s American-trained students had helped achieve the goal of the mission to
modernize China, he did not see this good work happen. Yung had married an American
but she died young. He had two sons and moved back and forth between his native land
and adopted country, dying in 1912 in the United States, penniless and quite alone.
However, his vision of Chinese youth being educated in America was not lost, but revived
later, and since the first mission, thousands of Chinese students have studied in the United
States and other Western countries.
The first author, Liel Leibovitz, has a Ph.D. from Columbia University and his main focus
is on video games and interactive media research and theory. He has written several
books with Jewish themes, one on video games, and he and Matthew Miller also wrote
the book, Lili Marlene: the Soldier’s Song of World War II. Both authors live in New
York City.
There are several other published works that discuss the Chinese Educational Mission to
varying degrees. Much of Leibovitz and Miller’s book is based upon the autobiography
of Yung Wing, My Life in China and America, published in 1909. In 1954, the China
Institute of America published a small book in commemoration of the 100th anniversary
of Yung Wing’s graduation from Yale titled, A Survey of Chinese Students in American
Universities and Colleges in the Past One Hundred Years. It provides descriptions about
Yung and his first group of students and other later Chinese student groups. For a detailed
assessment of the CEM, readers should consult Edward Rhoads’ book called Stepping
Forth into the World: the Chinese Educational Mission to the United States. The author
gives specifics about each of the 120 students of the CEM program and what they
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accomplished in America. He provides statistics and scholarly analysis, and discusses
their work upon returning to China. There are also other books that discuss the CEM,
China’s search for modernity, the perceptions of those involved, and the results of
Chinese-American transnational activities.
Fortunate Sons is a fascinating read because it includes dialogue and story lines like a
novel. But it also includes considerable history, biography and culture. There are a few
pictures, mostly of people, and the content is documented with 14 pages of notes.
However, it would be helpful to the reader to have maps, especially of China, and a
glossary of the student’s names (and nicknames) that are mentioned in the book and a
short blurb about them because it was hard to keep them straight.
Leibovitz and Miller’s book is a captivating story rather than a scholarly rendition, which
makes it a good introduction to the topic and very enjoyable to read while providing
insights into the mission, its participants, and its impact upon the students and countries.
It also reminds us of how long exchanges between these two countries have existed and
the risks and rewards that these connections have produced.
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William E. Dunstan, Ancient Rome
London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011
Reviewed by Adán Stevens-Díaz
This is a large and expansive tome that traces the history of the Roman Empire from the
earliest archeological remains in Italy to the Merovingian line of Frankish kings in the
ninth century who claimed to replace the Western Roman Empire with a Christian
version. The book consists of 41 chapters and the epilogue, which adds a cursory
treatment of the Byzantine Empire until the fall of Constantinople to Ottoman Turks in
1453. Historical narrative is interrupted by lengthy analysis of Roman art, culture,
literature, architecture and construction (Chapters 9, 14, 17, 22, 23, 28) for each of several
periods during the Empire. Explorations of archeological pieces are accompanied by
pictures of statuary, buildings and detailed reproductions of floor plans that help visualize
the innovations that Dunstan’s expert eye has discerned. His fascination with the remains
of buildings can be explained by his academic expertise in the archeology of classic
antiquity. In fact, this volume is the third produced by Dunstan, following similar books
on Egypt and Greece.
As befits an encyclopedic treatise, the narrative is plain and straightforward, without
affect or flourish. Even with his unfolding of myriad details, it does not take the reader
long to realize that Dunstan has little admiration for Roman culture. He scarcely disguises
his conviction that Roman religion, philosophy and literature are inferior to earlier Greek
achievements and suggests Roman efforts are imitations of the genius of Ancient Greece.
This discipleship to Greece, he notes, actually culminated in the Byzantine Empire which
replaced Latin with Greek.
The narrative of nearly a thousand years of history, in 596 pages, has necessarily selected
some subjects for curtailed treatment while dwelling on others. For instance, he adopts a
quasi-clinical perspective about homosexual behaviors among men, telling readers that
Romans admired the ability to assume the male position in all sexual encounters,
heterosexual as well as homosexual. Despite this excursus, there is little description of
the seamy side of history from the Julian dynasty that is dramatized in the TV series
“Rome.” While the televised series humanized ruthless political intrigues and indulgent
sexual behaviors in dramatic character development, Dunstan is content merely to
mention them.
This is not to suggest that Dunstan is without moral perspective. He pictures typical
Roman behavior at virtually all levels of society to have been endemically bloodthirsty
and murderous, circumstances he finds repellent. I was reminded of an episode in the
award-winning TV show, “The Sopranos.” In one scene, Tony Soprano and his New
Jersey “muscle” are torturing an Orthodox Jewish man who operates an old-age home but
who refuses to pay a required kick-back. Despite his pain, the Jew taunts the Mafiosi by
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reminding them that his people have suffered through the ages and endured all types of
persecution, dating back to Roman times. “Where are the Romans now?” he asks
defiantly. Tony Soprano pauses and then answers: “You’re looking at them.”
Dunstan is largely reliant on Latin historians of each period, such as Tacitus and
Suetonius. This reliance has the virtue of capturing the attitudes towards events and
persons in the full flush of historians from those days. But the liability of his approach is
also acknowledged, inasmuch as these writers often had the transparent political agenda
of flattering their patrons and besmirching their enemies. Dunstan interprets the bias of
each source, selecting for the reader some to be believed and others to be doubted.
Unfortunately his opinions are rarely supported with footnotes or references to academic
sources. The lack of critical review muddles his opinions. For instance, the narrative of
the Emperor Julian (pp. 361-363), known as “the Apostate,” reports he confiscated
property given to Christians by his predecessor, Constantine. Dunstan says that Julian
intended this action against Christians to unite polytheists and reconvert Christians to
Roman religion. Lower on the same page (p. 446), however, he writes: “To fan the
discord always raging in the church, he [Julian] recalled those bishops Constantine had
banished…thereby encouraging them to continue their divisive quarrels over point of
doctrine.” If Julian’s vengeful policy was to foment Christian divisiveness, how can
Dunstan cast it as an effort for greater unity?
In another place, the reader is told that Caligula was justifiably assassinated because
Dunstan judges the historical sources to be accurate (pp. 286-87). Dunstan bemoans the
assassination of Nero (pp. 296-97), however, because that Emperor had “praise for all
things Greek,” adding that Nero’s admiration for Greece earned him “significant numbers
of admirers.” With these kinds of contradictions, it is hard to separate Dunstan’s
predilections from the facts.
Happily, Dunstan frequently provides reliable insights that ring true. For instance, he
repeats – although without attribution – Alföldy’s observation that the rise of the empire
was linked to the rise of Rome’s equestrian class (pp. 100-03, et passim). Because the
senatorial class under the republic could not engage in commerce, its wealth was
dependent on land-holding or latifundia, he says. The equestrian order, however, used its
military vocation to head the armies to enrich itself by creating monopolistic commerce
with the conquered countries. Thus Caesar was the most famous, but not the only member
of the equestrian class to learn that the spoils of war could buy votes with the Roman
populace and easily achieve actual political power greater than that reserved to the Senate.
The other threat to the power of the Senators that Dunstan describes in detail was the
redistribution of their lands to compensate Roman soldiers at the end of service. While
consuls such as the Gracchi (pp. 136-143) subordinated the interests of the Senators to
those of military commanders, the landholders were often powerful enough under the
Republic to thwart such reforms. Gaius Gracchus lost power in 122 BCE and died when
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faced with mob violence (p. 143). The issue was resolved only later under Octavian who
distributed to the soldiers lands that were located outside Italy. This created Roman
colonies within conquered territories while preserving the interests of the Senators in
Italy.
Dunstan’s narrative is content with describing the power base of successive emperors,
generally avoiding class analysis. Some emperors are “good” (Chapter 20, pp. 310-329)
because they established stable and efficient government. In that environment, literature
and art flourished. However, readers will not find in this volume an explanatory dynamic
for either the rise or the fall of the Roman Empire. In fact, the only brief treatment of
Roman civilizational dynamic is contained in a short endorsement of Gibbon’s eighteenth
century analysis (pp. 522-24). This endorsement is paired with a dismissal of competing
theories. If not for the ability of readers to turn his avalanche of details into patterns of
social dynamics, this book might be described as a series of “missed opportunities.”
Dunstan’s grumpy complaint against analytical theories is another major flaw in this
ponderous volume. For instance, the treatment of Emperor Justinian (pp. 526-531) fails
to mention the plague that decimated the population, and which might easily be the major
reason for Justinian’s failure to reunify the eastern and western parts of the Empire in the
sixth century. Dunstan relies extensively on dated sources from antiquity and the
eighteenth century, without updating his analysis with cogent contemporary insights on,
for instance, environmental factors.
Dunstan’s volume also wrestles with how to portray Christianity. While his narrative
cannot escape description of the impact of the new religion on the Empire, he decides to
devote two chapters (29-30) to Jesus, the Apostles and the early church. These chapters
fail to display the level of expertise utilized in his treatment of Roman history. In fact,
they betray his negativity towards Christianity. He fiercely defends the analysis of
Gibbon that sees the rise of Christianity “as a tragedy producing the greatest internal
weakness of the Empire” and insists that “the conversion of Rome to Christianity fostered
a dangerous pacifism that drained the Empire of military vitality” (p. 522).
I also found his uneven presentation of religious persecutions to reflect bias. There is
only one sentence about the brutality against Christians under Nero (p. 293), and no
description of martyrdom as carnage for sport under Domitian, Marcus Aurelius and
Diocletian. In contrast, descriptions of Christian persecution targeting polytheists carry
considerable detail and none too flattering characterizations of Christians (p. 502).
Shortchanging the violence done to Christians in the persecutions by polytheists, I think,
deprives of context the violence later perpetrated by Christians against their former
persecutors. I would also criticize the general lack of original analysis because it renders
the book very much like a collection of facts that can be found easily by computer-wise
students on the Internet. I found repetitions of the same information, at times with the
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same words. This suggests to me that the book was cobbled together from previously
composed materials on the specific topics.
These critical observations should be balanced by an appreciation for the achievement of
collecting so much material and placing it in ordered fashion in one book. The volume
has a valuable chronological chart that enables quick review of events. The index is
complete and the bibliography inviting. I view it as a source of data and facts about
people, places and artistic production that will be useful to those seeking to go beyond
this book’s content and enter into civilizational analysis.
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Richard Miles, Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient
Civilization
Penguin, 2012
Reviewed by Mariana Tepfenhart
Richard Miles is a professor of history at the University of Sydney and a Fellow
Commoner of Trinity Hall, at the University of Cambridge. He has extensive knowledge
of the ancient world. He wrote about the Punic wars, the Romans, the Vandals of North
Africa and hosted on BBC a television series – Ancient Worlds. He also directed
archeological excavations in Carthage and Rome.
The title was inspired by the famous statement of the Roman senator, Cato the Elder,
“Delenda est Carthago” – “Carthage must be destroyed” - which sealed the fate of that
Mediterranean city. The book provides a sweeping yet vivid narrative of about ten
centuries of developments that led to the destruction of Carthage, after three Punic Wars.
The book is a comprehensive history of Carthage, from its origins to its demise. The
purpose of the book is to recreate the lost world of the great North African metropolis and
to “reassess some of the comfortable historical certainties that underpin many of the
modern West’s assumptions about its own cultural and intellectual heritage.”(22). Miles
wants to prove that Western civilization is not founded exclusively on Roman and Greek
cultures but is indebted to other cultures and people as well. The author uses primary
sources, secondary sources and the latest archeological discoveries. However, he points
out that the Greek and Roman sources are negative and clichéd. They promote the image
of cruel, unmerciful people, untrustworthy, cheaters who practiced child sacrifice to
appease their gods. It was this version of the history of Carthage that was adopted in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Western Europe.
Miles commences his story with the roots of the Carthaginians in Phoenicia – the land of
the color purple. The Phoenicians’ prosperity was the result of their outstanding mastery
of the sea. They created a network for trade with merchants stationed in foreign ports as
royal agents who were treated more like ambassadors. By the eighth century they
established colonies in Sardinia and southern Spain where they found a large supply of
silver and iron. Carthage was a Phoenician colony and became a major manufacturer of
terracotta, ivory items, and jewelry. Although it was the Phoenicians that discovered the
silver mines in Spain, Carthaginians exploited the mines, which became the source of the
city’s wealth. They gained control of part of what is today Tunisia and became a maritime
and trading power.
Richard Miles makes a great effort to introduce the reader to the Mediterranean world of
that period and to describe the relations between very diverse people, both competitive
and cooperative. A reasonable consequence of this interaction is the exchange of the
ideas in every field. One aspect is the religion. Highly important for the Romans and the
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Carthaginians is Heracles, the son of Zeus and a human mother, who is used for
propaganda reasons by both people, to show that the gods were on their side.
Miles also comments on the ritual of child sacrifice to honor their god, Baal. By analyzing
the latest archeological discoveries in Tunisia, the author states that this was not as
widespread as was described in the written sources. It was a practice known in Middle
East as “molk,” which the Carthaginians, like the Phoenicians before them, did resort to
as a ritual in times of crisis for the benefit of the whole community. Evidence suggests
that the children offered for sacrifice were from the elite families. Sometimes animals
and birds were substituted for humans.
The study continues with the reasons for the conflict. Miles stated that Carthage and
Rome were competing for resources but also started to fear each other. He presents in
great detail the battle for Sicily, a territory that both the Romans and the Carthaginians
claimed. This set the stage for the first Punic War (264-241 BC) that the Romans won.
The impact of the war was devastating. The Carthaginians were expected to pay huge
war reparations to Rome and also had to pay the mercenaries who made up their army.
They realized they needed resources, materials and manpower. The focus of the book
moves to Spain where the Barcid clan, prominent in Carthage, established a protectorate
and took hold of the silver mines.
Next, Miles introduces Hannibal, using the work of the Roman historian Livy. He
emphasizes Hannibal’s tactical ability, bravery and endurance but also “his all-consuming
ambition” (Livy, 231). Hannibal used propaganda extensively to portray himself as a
favorite of the gods and a savior of Hellas from a tyrannical Rome. This propaganda was
central to the success of the Carthaginians.
The author depicts the journey of Hannibal’s army across the Alps, the hardship, exertion
and loss of people not to enemies but to cold, hunger and steep precipices. Despite all
these obstacles, the Carthaginians inflicted a terrible defeat on the Roman army.
Hannibal was a skillful general who turned his army into a formidable machine that
defeated the Romans. However, he had a poor understanding of the Roman mentality.
Instead of striking at the time when the Romans were weak, he allowed them to re-group
and attack later. There are different interpretations to explain the hesitation of Hannibal
in front of the gates of Rome, but Miles attributes it to an account of Heracles’ sojourn in
Rome, found in a history written by Silenus. Hannibal, according to this account, wanted
to present himself as a new Heracles, who came to free the people of the region.
The tables turned for the Romans when a new general was appointed commander of the
Roman Army. He was Publius Cornelius Scipio. The ancient sources reveal that he
borrowed and improved on “many of the strategies that Hannibal himself had deployed
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to such great effect” (299). Miles also explains how Scipio used the propaganda machine
to show his people that he was the favorite of the gods. He defeated the Carthaginians in
the Iberian Peninsula, and thus destroyed their power base. The book continues with the
campaign launched by Scipio against Carthage, which ended with a decisive victory for
the Romans, at the Zama.
Despite the military defeat, the Carthaginians managed to prosper economically. Marcus
Porcius Cato, a Roman senator, famed for his ascetic life, led an embassy to Carthage and
was alarmed by what he found. He started to lobby for the total destruction of the city.
He argued that once the Carthaginians paid the indemnity, it would become again a
challenge to Rome. He emphasized the suffering of Rome and used all available
stereotypes to persuade his fellow senators of the necessity to eliminate totally this threat.
The Roman historian Livy presents the Carthaginians’ defeat as “divine retribution” (361)
for their vices, which are contrasted with the Roman virtues. It was a needless, unjust
and savage conflict that ended in 146 BC. The world of the Western Mediterranean was
Roman.
In concluding, Richard Miles argues that the debt that Rome owed to Carthage is difficult
to assess not because of lack of achievements but because the Greeks were better at
claiming ownership of all the advances. The Romans benefitted from the economic and
political infrastructure put in place by the Carthaginians in the territories they inhabited.
Rome destroyed a strong rival. The sacking of the city was a profitable business. They
took the wealth of the city, the works of art and the people and shipped them to Rome.
This huge wealth would eventually lead to the decline of Rome, fuelled by the greed and
ambition of the elite.
Miles challenges the stereotypes and myths that characterize traditional understanding of
the Punic Wars. Featuring an extensive array of selections from major Roman and Greek
sources, combined with the latest archeological discoveries, the book offers an insight
into the political, social, religious, cultural and economic aspects of the Roman and
Carthaginian civilizations. It is vividly written and accessible and provides fascinating
observations about a vanished world.
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Call for Papers
45th Annual Conference of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations
June 10-13, 2015
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Civilizational Values at the Crossroads
Civilizations cannot be properly studied or compared without examining their basic value
systems. But what exactly are values? How are they exemplified across civilizations?
Do values even exist? Are they relative or absolute? Are “decline” and “progress”
relative terms? Are there universal values?
Possible topics include:
Values in Crisis
 Do we now live in a Nihilistic Age? What does this mean?
 Values in transition.
 “Civilization and Its Discontents”
 Moral Crises and Catharses: How have watershed events in the History of
Civilizations helped destroy old values and usher in new ones?
Values and Power
 Is “the good” defined by the powerful? What do ancient thinkers say (Cf.
Thrasymachus, Thucydides)? What about modern thinkers (Nietzsche, Foucault,
Gabriel Garcia Marquez)?
 Hard Power vs. Soft Power: Which Shall Prevail?
 Ideology, Politics and Soft Power
 Wisdom and Soft Power
 Realism and Soft Power
Religion, Science and Values
 Do we live in a secular age (Taylor)? A post-secular age? Is this era the time of
the Second Religiousness (Spengler)? What specific values are represented by
Fundamentalist religious movements worldwide? How is their rise to be
interpreted?
 Science and Religion represent different explanatory frameworks. Is science
really “value-free”? Should it be? Is this even possible? Are these different
explanatory frameworks compatible or incompatible?
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Values and Economics
 Was the 2008 Financial Crisis first and foremost a moral crisis?
 Has postmodern capitalism become morally bankrupt?
 Sustainability vs. Profit: Which Path Shall We Take?
Values in Conflict
 Conflict vs. Cooperation: Can war ever be eradicated? Should it be?
 Clashes of Civilizations: How do we maximize good and minimize evil? Who
defines these terms? According to which criteria?
Values and Culture
North vs. South, East vs. West. As this is the first ISCSC conference to be held
in South America, we are extremely interested in any papers specifically on South
American and Meso-American civilizations, history, value systems, etc.,
especially Brazil and its complexities, challenges and paradoxes.
Send abstracts of about 300 words to the Program Chair Michael Andregg at:
mmandregg@stthomas.edu
Abstracts must include your name, email address, and institutional affiliation, if any.
The above themes and subthemes are just guidelines. Any professional treatment of
civilizational issues, especially comparative, is appropriate.
Deadline for abstracts is April 1, 2015, but earlier submissions are encouraged.
Conference language is English, but papers may be read in Spanish or Portuguese if
accompanied by a supplement in English outlining the paper’s basic argument.
For more information: www.wmich.edu/iscsc
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